INDIAN DRAMA

Traditional Societies in Transition

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PREFACE

This book is based on a somewhat cursory but serious study of years and the reflections, "recollected in tranquillity", of a mind reacting to events for almost half a century. The problems of modern and contemporary India cannot be understood without an understanding of her past, a part of which is living, and the past is not a picture book but a society of long ago in flux. India has been changing but unageing, and it is this continuity and change, as it has been called in one of the classic cliches of the age, that I have tried to trace. It is the portrait of peoples becoming a people over the centuries, of traditional peoples struggling to modernize. I have written not so much as a chronicler but as a commentator, dealing only with the broad trends of what I have called a drama, of which there can be no denouement and no end in this finite but boundless universe. It consists of many acts and many scenes, an almost eternal drama with many dramatis personae, some more celebrated and remembered than others.

Fifteen years ago, I wrote a book, *Fragments Of A Revolution*, for an Oxford publisher. It was on what I called the Indian Revolution which had originated from several sources and had gained force and direction under Gandhi and Nehru. I dealt with several of its aspects critically, in a personal vein and in a fragmentary fashion. The revolutionary forces are being thwarted and there is much less of a revolution now; there is more of uncertainty, hiatus and discontinuity. But I have avoided dealing with tendencies and distortions which might be temporary and have dealt only with the more abiding aspects of India's progress objectively and with responsibility to history. It is more of a planned book and as impersonal as possible, though it contains one man's view of many problems. I thought that India, more a subcontinent than country even now, could be summarized in a book which is larger than an album with a commentary but broader, more vivid and less

detailed than a treatise. The research of years has been absorbed, though much of it eschewed for the convenience of the general reader who likes to be served research with a light touch. My study of Indian history has been supplemented by studies in the history of other countries, in politics, sociology, literature and law. I have not allowed myself to be bound by any particular discipline and have discarded the distraction of footnotes. The themes are bound by a uniformity of outlook. I must acknowledge my debt to all scholars who have made my task far less onerous than it could have been.

India cannot live in isolation and her relations with the rest of the world are important. In company with the rest, she is voyaging through space and time and there is hope, however slight, that she will, amidst the present collapse of morals and standards, try to remain true to the lasting values of life to which all countries have contributed and which have stood the test of time.

The title of the book was not suggested by Gunnar Myrdal's *Asian Drama*. It had struck me as appropriate till I discovered it was based on the Myrdal model. But the more I thought of changing it, the more I found that no other title could be more appropriate. So, while deciding to be immitative, I thought a sub-title would make my meaning clear and make it different from what Myrdal meant by drama.

M. CHALAPATHI RAU

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WHAT IS INDIA?

Rabindranath Tagore once summed up the spirit of India thus: "I love India not because I cultivate the idolatry of geography, not because I have had the chance to be born in her soil, but because she has saved through tumultuous ages the living words that have issued from the illuminated consciousness of her great sons—*Satyam Jnanam Anantam Brahma*. Brahma is Truth, Brahma is Wisdom, Brahma is Infinite; *Santam Sivam Advaitam:* Peace is in Brahma, goodness is in Brahma, and the unity of all beings . . . ."

As others, seers, poets and philosophers have interpreted it, spiritual life is the true genius of India. Those who make the greatest appeal to the Indian mind are not conquerors or kings and rich men, but the sages who are revered because they embody spirituality at its finest and purest. Pride and power, wealth and glory are nothing before the power of spirit.

That has been the essence of India, Hindu India, and the people at large cling to that ideal, though the attraction of material prizes has been increasing. Jawaharlal Nehru has described India in her many moods, in poetic or matter-of-fact language; that India is both ancient and modern, with Islam, Christianity and other religions added, with her many diversities and underlying unity, a changing India but clinging to her old values like her search for the spirit behind material forms, for beauty and serenity.

India is not her rivers and mountains or the culture of centuries through which she has lived. No country means only its geography or history. India, like other countries, is essentially the people. It is they who have made her what she is. The people have made their gods, their temples, mosques and

churches to reflect the awe of the divine, the wonder of the world around, people of different colours, of many racial stocks, absorbed in thought and prayer and adoration, producing many languages and literatures, living old and new ways of life, so different from each other, yet all Indian. India is no longer wrapt in herself; she is wide awake, aware of the world, a small part of the many shining worlds around.

India has come to mean a land of the eternal quest, lost in its antiquity and myths, in which gods and men have often become mixed, clinging to continuity amidst change. Yet, in spite of her identity with other-worldliness, India is of this world, a subcontinent of multitudes exemplifying the many in the one.

In the beginning, there was no beginning. The Song of Creation, a hymn of the Rigveda, says:

There was neither non-existent nor existent: there
was no realm of air, no sky beyond it.
What covered it, and where? And what gave shelter?
Was water there, unfathomed depth of water?
Death was not there, nor was there aught immortal,
no sign was there of the days and nights divided.
That one thing, breathless, breathed by its own
nature; apart from it was nothing whatsoever.

India was there for centuries before anyone gave her a name, as a concept, as a civilization, as a legend which lived in the vision of her sages and on which the constellations shed their light, a dream of splendour which beckoned the wandering conqueror.

The mounds of Mohenjodaro on the banks of the Indus (now in Pakistan) and numerous other places in the great northern plains reveal a five-thousand-year-old civilization, with well-laid-out cities, signifying many millenia of human endeavour behind it, a civilization which had contacts with contemporary Mesopotamia and Egypt and was no less developed than theirs. There are many colourful accounts of India as she has appeared through the ages to foreign observers, from Megasthenes to Marco Polo to confused superficial modern chroniclers like Pagett M.P. or Connecticut Yankees. The British

depicted her as a pastoral dependency of pagoda trees, a hang-over of the past with touches of modernity, but she has been changing, though unageing, and has become as modern as some other countries.

From Mohenjodaro to the modern nation state of India, it has been a recurring centuries-long crisis. The change and continuity and the oneness of the many processes which have made India what she is can be easily explained by a mere summing-up of the historical process. The inundations of Central Asian peoples through the north-western passes, of Aryans, Iranians, Greeks, Parthians, Bactrians, Scythians, Huns, Turks, Jews, Zoroastrians, Muslims, forces ranging from primitive communism to myth and ritual, many races, many philosophies, many religions contributed to the making of India. There is a congestion of cultural forms, in spite of some blank pages in Indian history, and while there are no dark ages in many aspects of life, though they may be yet undiscovered, all history seems to be contemporaneous in the case of India more than in that of any other country.

India, as seen by foreigners throughout the ages, was a land of contrasts, a land of spiritual splendour and material squalor. Herodotus wrote from hearsay: "India is a part of the Persian Empire and something vague beyond myth and fable and fact." The Greeks who came with Alexander were attracted but Nearchus and others were more interested in spreading the legend of their lord. Subsequently Megasthenes who saw the Mauryan court with his own eyes was fragmented before he was preserved in several versions. From Megasthenes to Marco Polo it was the splendour of courts and the squalidness of the peoples that attracted attention. Macaulay's caricature of Indian culture as consisting of "astronomy which would move laughter in girls at an English boarding school", "history abounding with kings thirty feet high, and reigns thirty thousand years long", and "geography made of seas of treacle and seas of butter" was a wicked literary exercise, for he could not separate Indian myth from India without mystery. The Persian and Arab chroniclers who travelled with Muslim invaders left distorted accounts. The exceptions were Fa-Hien and Hiuen-Tsang, who came as pilgrims, in the golden periods of Buddhist India, and left reverent accounts. Christian accounts were a

mixture of objectivity and subjectivity. Alberuni and Ibn Batuta despite their historical sense were courtiers of their masters. Foreigners like Razak and Paes who saw the Vijayanagar Empire at its best were witnesses to its grandeur, more than its misery. Tavernier and Bernier were not falsifiers. Bernier's reference to the Indian addiction to astrology is true even today: "The large majority of Asiatics are so infatuated in favour of judicial astrology, that, according to their phraseology, no circumstances can happen below which is not written above. In every enterprise they consult their astrologers . . . the astrologer is necessarily made acquainted with every transaction, public and private, with every project, common and extraordinary."

These are travellers with no responsibility to history and record fleeting glimpses. The image of India in foreigners' eyes was changing but it was rarely the real India.

India has been like a tireless pilgrim at the gates of time. The Vedas, the Upanishads, the great epics, Jainism and Buddhism, the Gita and other compositions of the human spirit, ignorance, enlightenment, schisms, creeds, the coming of St. Thomas, the impact of Islam, Nanak, the Industrial Revolution which arrived late, the lamp-lighters of the renaissance, Gandhi, Tagore, the mathematicians who discovered the zero to modern astrophysicists and atomic scientists, all these and more, together or separately, are India. Every century is represented in this country.

Indian life is like a tranquil ocean, vast and diverse, though unified. It is difficult to think of it in terms of movement, for the movements are slow and break up on the shores of eternity. There were no nation states or even states with defined boundaries. The sages and priests were more important than the kings. The incursions of peoples of various races merging and re-merging, of conquerors few of whom stayed, made India a perpetual melting pot, a changing ethnological museum. There were famines and discontent, protests and protest movements, but the Indian, accustomed to bear long suffering with unshaken faith in his fate or gods, accepted hardship with resignation, which is the essence of Hinduism as a religion, if not of Hindu philosophy. There were changes of dynasties, palace killings and revolts in various parts of the Hindu and Muslim kingdoms,

but there was nothing like a revolution in the western sense. Anything approaching a revolution was absorbed in religion, and some of the greatest revolutions took the form of religious movements. India absorbed everything, she was rarely shaken as a whole; two world wars passed her by, the second only touching her. The biggest shake-up with social significance was the Great Rebellion of 1857. The next biggest shake-up was Gandhi, probably the biggest Indian since Buddha.

India's lethargies have arisen from the lack of challenges, and when challenges came from Alexander or Timur, the lack of an adequate response was due to various reasons. There was no challenge in the physical environment. In the Indo-Gangetic valley, people prospered and had time to look at the stars and think of the universe and compose their hymns or sutras about almost everything. For long periods, there was an other-worldliness, in spite of the roots in this world.

India includes South India and, only to a lesser extent, east India. In spite of modern mass communication, North and South have not mixed. There is an invisible Great Wall of India. If Mohammed bin Tughlak had stuck to Daulatabad as the capital of India, North and South might have met, not only in the corridors of power but in other spheres. The proto-Dravidian linguistic remnants may give a clue to Dravidian language and culture, which, with some gaps, have remained as old as the Mohenjodaro culture, and more pristine because of freedom from invasion; the South Indian parts of India maintain their historical memories of the Pandyan, Pallava, Chera and Chola kingdoms, and of the Chalukyas and their branches, and later of the Vijayanagar and Bahmani kingdoms and their branches. The Satavahanas provided an important chapter. If, in the North, invasions followed the geographical pattern, as illustrated in the three battles of Panipat, and civilization grew in river valleys, so it was in the South also. South Indian history has had its eras and its own ethos within the all-India framework, sub-nationalities within a nation or nations within a multi-national state. The nature of the Indian state, whether it is a nation of sub-nationalities or a multi-national state, cannot be decided now. In east India too, which has come back to life under alien impact, sub-nations are struggling back to life. Indi overflows to Southeast Asia.

Several unanswered questions remain, like the undeciphered Harappan script. Was the Aryan incursion pre-Harappan or post-Harappan? When was north-western India a part of Central Asia? When exactly did the Aryans reach the stage of transition from food-gathering to food-producing? What was the origin of the Rajputs? Or of the Jats, the most stubborn of peasant castes or communities? History, like science, may be a rediscovery of old discoveries or a perpetual correction of its own mistakes. It repeats itself no less than historians.

India is no longer lonely in the world. The ferment of the ages has thrown up metaphysical groups, Marxists and non-Marxists. There is no Donne among them; the new scholasticism has also not found its Dante; though there have been good poets, good scholars, and good scientists, there are no representative Renaissance men. The rapid advances in science and technology have lodged terrors in the mind of man, though there is great promise in this age. Social and economic change is faster than before but social distribution of power has been slow. Science can be humanizing, but it is also exciting and embarrassing. Eras are telescoped, man has reached the frontiers of outer space in Einstein's limited but expanding universe. The primacy of matter and the inevitability of change are perplexing to man and driving him to the spiritual solace of Sai Babas.

The Indian Revolution, as it can be called now, had its own renaissances and reformations. Gandhi and Nehru were part of the historical process and should not be allowed to be lost in the grey eminence of a greatness reduced to legends. The revolution is not yet total in its character, though revolutions are generally total. The nation-building process goes on at many levels. In an age of rapid transformation, there has to be a new base of civilization, new ideologies, new philosophies and new forms of collective life. India is a traditional society in transition, absorbing as much of new technology as possible. There is a new sense of responsibility to social progress; still there is a strong desire for personal salvation and there is no end to pilgrimages to shrines at Tirupati and other places, as much for material as for spiritual gains. The people are taking to production on a large scale, in production by machines and not by hands, and machines which make machines are at work.

Technology which has not obliterated several divisions in the West, may not obliterate caste and sub-caste in India for a long time, but there is not much resistance to change. The struggle is not between religious beliefs and new values or between individualism and increasing forms of collectivism but rather between ancient lethargies and the dynamics of modern production, between social habits and social needs. The old values like tolerance, non-violence and other-worldliness, which is not outdated in these days of outer-space exploration, will not be complete casualties, but it will require courage and faith for a traditional society, proud of old values, to face the future, untempted by any Mephistopheles of the age.

2

BACKGROUND

The broad background of India religiously, culturally and socially is Hindu. It is a word akin to Indus derived from its name of Sindhu, the land of the Indus, a name given by the first foreigners who visited it, Greeks and Muslims. The most ancient thought, philosophy and religion is Hindu. There is a similarity between the thought of ancient Hindu astrophysicists and modern Nobel Prize winners. There is similarity between the content of the Upanishads and the songs of Rabindranath Tagore. In religion, Hinduism varies from the subtlest pantheism to the crudest ritual. In philosophy, it ranges from monism to polytheism degenerating to totemism. In spite of change, there has been continuity, and in the first arbitrary division of Indian history, Hinduism is identified with the earliest and longest period, surviving all contacts, collisions and invasions. A Hindu can be an atheist or an idol worshipper, and, within its fold, Hinduism seems to be more a federation of faiths than an organized, monolithic religion. It is difficult to think of the stubborn Hindu social structure without caste.

Hinduism is associated with the early Aryans, which means the period after Mohenjodaro. When Sir John Marshall and his associates found the remains of Mohenjodaro, Harappa and other places, and proved the highly developed state of what came to be called the Indus Valley civilization, it was established for a startled world that Indian history did not begin with the Aryans. The Aryans came, whether from Central Asia or the shores of the Arctic, as lusty immigrants, as warriors rather than as conquerors, a sturdy race, soon to establish themselves as founders of the first religions, philosophies and rituals, the first kingdoms, the first republics, the first democracies in this

part of the world. The tradition was strong and virile from Kapila to Sankaracharya, from the physics of the Vedas to the Raman Effect.

The chronology of ancient India differs from one school of scholars to another. Some place the beginning of the Indus Valley civilization at 2500 B.C. and of the Aryan incursions at 1500 B.C., others place the Aryan civilization at 5000 B.C., which seems a patriotic but not verifiable gesture. The date of the Mahabharata war depends on this chronology. The first firm date is, of course, Alexander's invasion, and upon that foreign chronicles fix other events like Asoka's reign or Buddha's birth, renunciation, enlightenment and death. The picture of an unchanging East or India has not been accepted by western scholars like Basham, who believe that India has always been steadily changing. The Gupta era was different from the Mauryan Age, as internal and external evidence shows. Even the religions of India have changed, according to these scholars, in spite of the clinging past. The older strata of India's cultural life are older than anything in the West. The whole of the Rigveda had been composed before the Iliad, though the Vedas, composed over 3,000 years ago, are still chanted. For continuity of tradition, India is said to come first, China with Lao Tse's book of Tao next, and Greece third with Homer and Hesiod, the great dramatists like Aeschylus, the great philosophers like Aristotle, inherited by modern Europe, not modern Greece alone.

The Mauryan Empire reflected not only a great civilization but a highly developed polity and statecraft, associated with Kautilya and his *Arthasastra*, as modern as and subtler than Machiavelli. The years between the Mauryas and the Guptas, which produced the composition of the Bhagavad Gita, regarded as the most influential text of Hinduism, saw many changes, while scholars call the period between the rise of the Guptas and the death of Harsha as the classical period of Indian civilization, with its Kalidasa and great pieces of sculpture, moulded by Greek influence. The period can be said to be the age of the rise of Brahminism which became identified with Hinduism and led to the stratification of Hindu law, Hindu theology and Hindu religion which became almost equivalent to Hindu ritual. This

led to petrification and a rigidity which, apart from other factors, did not permit of any kind of revolution, though there were reform movements.

The Dravidian strain developed in the Deccan independently or was the result of an old indigenous stock driven from the north and developed an original tradition illustrated in Tamil language and culture. There has also been the pure proto-Australoid type, which is to be found among the tribal peoples of the wilder parts of the peninsula; the type is short, dark-skinned, broad-nosed and large-mouthed. The Palaeo-Mediterranean type, often loosely called Dravidian, is supposed to have come to South Asia from the West, not long before the dawn of civilization in the Indus Valley. Then came the Aryans and the Aryan culture was so much nurtured in the soil of India that in the end the Aryan elements might be more numerous than the non-Aryan. The Indo-European or Aryan type is to be found chiefly in Pakistan, Kashmir and Punjab. In these three main strains, immigrants from about every race of Central Asia became merged.

Hinduism reflects this multiracial mixture. It has never been monolithic. It is worldly and unworldly. It is a perpetual search for the divine. But all its gods and temples have been compelled by the impact of industrialization and democratic concepts to recognize the divinity in man. The religion of man is asserting itself over the religion of god, though the soil is mostly superstition and reason is yet to take firm roots.

Under the impact of Islam or of the West. Hindu society underwent some changes. The Brahmo Samaj, under the influence of Christianity, repudiated caste and endowed Hinduism with a new eclecticism. The Arya Samaj was an attempt at a return to Vedic purity. Ramakrishna introduced syncretism and spread awareness of the universality of all religions. Vivekananda with his gospel of a new manliness and a new doctrine of service to the lowly established a monastic order of service which is serving Hinduism well by annotating it into a religion of service, instead of its earlier rigid manifestation as ritual. India is a land of many religions where the state is not identified with any religion, but in social structure it is predominantly Hindu, unlike Nepal which is more of a Hindu state.

Hinduism has a rationalization of its own. If the universe is moral, man must be moral. If the universe is run on moral lines, man must be born and must live on moral lines. His present flows from his past, his future flows from his present. This is cause and effect, or karma, which can be further rationalized only by reincarnation. Caste and its rigidity are justified by what one deserves because of his past and present. The moral order justifies the social order, howsoever irrational it may seem. The individual is thus important and must shift for himself in society. Caste, originating in a comparatively simple society, and sub-divided rigidly with its own codes and customs, has little relation to the rest of society; so it can be said that Hinduism did not permit of easy social mobility. The original socio-economic divisions of caste become petrified because birth is the important thing in caste. There has been over the years no relation between caste and occupation and there is agrowing separation between duties and rights. The Brahmin now fights, the Kshatriya trades, the Vaisya rules, and the Sudra is a teacher.

The greatest adhesive factor in Hinduism has been custom and this is what has sustained caste, which has had little to do with religion. Till recently cu 'om outweighed the written text in Hindu law. The Brahmanical Dharma Sutras, which codified the Brahmanical canon and custom, decided everything. Priesthood was the power behind Brahmin ascendancy, and because of the Brahmin example or the impetus of social diversification each caste had as much scope as in Hindu society, untramelled by an organized church. Hinduism was thus derived from revealed texts as well as moulded by sociological factors. According to the best Hindu philosophers, Hindu philosophy imbibed infinity, divinity, causation or karma, reality behind this world of illusion, faith in tradition, and was absorbed in a perpetual search for salvation, truth and harmony. Conflict is not encouraged in Hinduism except conflict between good and evil. Hinduism has believed in synthesis, though there could be no synthesis with Islam. In such a society, with religion ruling philosophy, even political philosophy, there could be little conflict and little progress. There could be only small whirlpools in stagnant waters.

Buddhism is now not a major religion of India but it was born in India and spread over large parts of the world. It has served to emphasize not only the ethical aspect of religion in general but the ethical aspects of Hinduism. On the basis of Ceylonese chronicles which are considered not far too wrong, Buddha lived between 563 and 483 B.C. The main incidents of Buddha's life are fairly well established. Born a prince of the Sakya republic, he went forth "from home to homeless life" at the age of twenty-nine, attained Enlightenment at Bodh Gaya at the age of thirty-four, and passed away at Kusinagara at the age of eighty. For forty years he preached his beliefs, mainly in Magadha and Kosala, and in nearby principalities. His disciples came from all classes of society and he had both an extensive circle of lay adherents and a smaller, more select band of monks and nuns as followers. From the mists of legends, Buddha's personality emerges clearly—a combination of wisdom and kindliness, dignity and freedom from dogma and ritual. The main tenets of Buddhism are refuge in Buddha, who was wrongly deified, the Dharma, which with its many evolutions of meaning is now well understood, and the Sangha, which is a democratic order of the whole Buddhist community which Buddha created. The oral tradition and the canonical literature, though they became voluminous with time, did not obscure the essence of his teaching. If it slowly disappeared as a religion and a social force from the land of its origin, it was because Hinduism absorbed much of it and it absorbed a part of Hinduism: Buddhism appropriating the forms of Hinduism and Hinduism assimilating some of the spirit of Buddhism. The Sangha was destroyed when the great Buddhist centres of learning, Taxila, Nalanda, Vikramasila and others were destroyed by the fury of Muslim invaders. But since the 2,500th anniversary of Buddha's Parinirvana in 1956-57, when the relics of Sariputta and Mogallana, his disciples, were received from London by Nehru, till the conversion of many Hindus, following Dr. Ambedkar, to neo-Buddhists, there has been a Buddhist revival which has made a small difference to the Indian social structure.

Jainism took shape with the renunciation of Mahavira, a senior contemporary of Buddha, whose life is a parallel to Buddha's. The Jains are a small community but they have sur-

vived and contributed much to Indian life. Jainism has added to the meaning of ahimsa. Its metaphysics are of no wide interest but by reinforcing the tradition of asceticism and keeping it alive, it has influenced men like Gandhi and thus given point to India's attachment to non-violence as an abiding principle and to peace as an abiding policy.

Sikhism began as a reform movement in Hinduism under Nanak and on the basis of his teachings became an organized and militant religion under the pressure of social needs. Whether it is the Gurumat, or the Guru's doctrine as some hold, or Sikhism, a reform movement which imbibed the tenets of Islam, it became a casteless creed and a regional force. Nanak's teachings are mainly about the nature of God and the nature of man. The ten Gurus added to the compositions which are communally sung. While the Gurus belonged to the urban Khatri caste, most of their followers were rural Jats who gave a character to the community. It was during the time of the tenth Guru, Govind Singh, that the conflict with the Mogul authorities became serious and he gave Sikhism a military semblance with the Khalsa and the discipline of the five K's. The line of the gurus came to an end with him as he wished. The only Guru thereafter was the Granth, the codified edition of the Sikh hymns. The Sikh temple or gurudwara became the centre of the Sikh community, which, like the Buddhists, took refuge in the word of the Guru and in the community's cardinal doctrines. Under Ranjit Singh the Sikhs became a significant temporal power. After the sequestration of the Sikh power by the British and the development of the gurudwaras as community property, with the growth of the Akali movement, both the Akalis and the gurudwara funds have been playing a growing part in the political life of the country. Sikhism is one but it too has developed its sects.

Christianity is an important religion which came with St. Thomas, one of the Apostles. The Christians have been an enlightened community, though organized into sects and schisms, but with a world outlook. Zoroastrianism too is an ancient creed, and the Parsis, fleeing from persecution from Islamized Iran, have settled down in the country with the least alien of strains.

3

IMPACT OF ISLAM

Islam has not only been a religion but also a social philosophy and a social structure which has remained an intractable element in India. India has shown great adaptive and assimilative power with regard to foreign races, religions and cultures which entered it at different times. Islam has assimilated the cultures of most other countries it touched into the mainstream of Islamic culture. But India has not been absorbed into the Islamic world and Islam has not been absorbed by India. This aspect of India is as important as the catholicity and vitality of the Hindu background.

Islam has made an indelible impact on India. The Muslims came to India not as a solid block but in successive phases spread over centuries, and this has made the Indian Muslim distinct from the Muslims of other countries. Even after Partition, the problem of Islam in India has not changed. India was too vast and too civilized to be conquered by anybody and Islam has been too stubborn a religion and social force to be swallowed in the vastness of India. Islam's main contribution to the make-up of Indian Muslims is insistence on democracy, rationalism and monotheism which had its fits of iconoclasm and intolerance. Islam's democratic urge has been considered its greatest contribution to world culture. Islam has observed fewer barriers of colour and birth and within itself has fostered brotherhood more than any other religion. In spite of its missionary character and conquering zeal, Islam has maintained its liberalism along with its freedom from geographic limitations. From Morocco to Indonesia, it has maintained a coherence transcending national boundaries. Hinduism, in contrast, was confined to one country, apart from Nepal, though

that one country is equal to almost most Islamic countries put together in size or in strength. In the days of the sovereign equality of nations, Islam's single voice has found many expressions. The unity of truth on which Islam seems to insist has found many manifestations, without being hampered by a single Caliphate.

It would be good for Indian non-Muslims as much as for Indian Muslims to know what Islam is. Islam originated in Arabia, the largest of all peninsulas, and Arab means arid. Kaaba means a cubical structure, built or rebuilt ten times. Within the Kaaba, there were many idols representing pre-Islamic gods, and among them was Allah, probably a god of one of the tribes, the Quraish. Mohammad was born in this tribe. He felt the need for a new religion that would unify all the factions, but it was not till he was nearly forty that he became more and more absorbed in religion. Then he had a revelation and he announced his mission. He had other visions. He announced himself as the prophet of Allah and there were more and more converts. From Mecca the prophet had to take flight to Medina beginning the Hegira (flight), the Muslim era. In the subsequent campaigns, the prophet proved himself an able general. Ultimately, he was victorious. In his sixty-third year he died, establishing a new religion, a new moral code, a new order of government, converting a peninsula of idolatrous tribes into a nation. He was a great figure in history, judged by his influence which spread over many countries in a few years and by Islam becoming a clear, strong, permanent force in half the world.

Koran means a reading or discourse and is applied by Muslims to the whole or any section of their scriptures. It is the work of one person, unlike the Upanishads or the Bible. It is not an orderly composition because its chapters are arranged not in the order of their composition, which is unknown, but in the order of their decreasing length. The core of the Koran or of Islam is that religion is a mode of moral government. Allah, the one God, is omniscient, a god of power, though a god of compassion and mercy. The Islamic faith is based on fear of punishment and hope of reward. Death is certain, resurrection can come but not at once. Law and morals are one; right belief is more important than good conduct. If in any

religion there is a wide gap between theory and practice, the gap in Islam is the narrowest. The Arabs were sensual and the Koran accepted polygamy, but the prophet prescribed restraint. Islam is free from idolatry, sacerdotalism, ritual and mysticism. It made men strong by making no pretence of returning good for evil. Islam soon conquered the world in the west up to Spain and in the east up to India and then went into India, starting with Mahmud of Ghazni.

There have been two broad versions of the spread of Islam in India: as a conquering, idol-breaking, cruel antagonism of Hinduism and Buddhism, and as a civilizing, conciliatory force meeting an older, and decadent, civilization. The two strains will continue and it is difficult to say if history can bring about a reconciliation, for history consists of facts and depends on what facts are selected and how they are presented. The peak of Hindu-Muslim synthesis was reached in Akbar's time. He was a visionary and he had a vision of India with a new religion above existing religions. The Turko-Afghan Sultans had been foreigners ruling some parts of northern India; the Moguls settled down in India and considered themselves Indians. Akbar was not literate but he had a superior mind and character; he had a passion for metaphysics and a tendency to mysticism. He was kind and humane, though not always prudent. He was a great warrior and builder, he believed in secularism. He loved speculation. He was deeply interested in religion and studied Indian faiths. He had Brahmin, Buddhist and Muslim wives. He loved free discussion of different religious faiths. His most notable act was to found a new religion. He proclaimed himself the infallible head of the church, an idea taken from Christianity. It was a new kind of pantheistic monotheism in the Hindu tradition. The slaughter of cows was made a capital offence; vegetarianism was made compulsory for a hundred days in the year. The building of mosques, the fast of Ramazan, and pilgrimage to Mecca were forbidden. The new religion never succeeded. Tradition was too strong for his infallibility. A few rallied to the new cult: Hindus benefited; most Muslims repudiated it. Akbar was a disillusioned, defeated man and died without the benefit of the prayers of any sect or faith. The Mogul Empire declined. The medieval period had many dark periods. Akbar remains a figure of splendour

and his rule provides a resplendent chapter in Indian history. But his dream died. Din-e-Ilahi vanished.

The Indian Muslims, with their belief in social homogeneity, found themselves stronger before the Indian tradition of caste. Caste had had some validity when it was functional and not hereditary, but when it became a rigid factor of sharply differentiated social strata and of an ossified society, it became outdated. Islam could not escape its impact and developed its own variations of caste, in subsequent manifestations. In course of time, Hindu teachers like Nanak reduced the distance between Hinduism and Islam, while Muslim teachers like Kabir and Chisti tried to bring about an understanding between the two faiths. Akbar made a supreme effort. Whatever synthesis was possible in later times was interrupted by the interfering force of the British.

There was a difference between the first Arab invaders and the Turko-Afghan rulers who had acquired Islamic civilization and culture recently and did not have the zeal of the Arabs to impose their own culture. There was also a difference between the Turko-Afghan rulers and the Moguls, who settled down in the land over which they ruled and accepted most indigenous forms because it was necessary and much could not be imposed. Hindu society gave in easily because it had become decadent and debilitated. There was a coming together but both Muslims and Hindus were becoming subjects of a western power representing another religion which was as crusading and proselytizing as Islam in its best days.

In terms of history, Muslim rule in India coincides with medieval India as defined by a consensus among Indian historians as covering the period from 1206 to 1761, starting with the occupation of Delhi by Muhammad Ghori. Five dynasties ruled at Delhi from 1206 to 1526: the Ilbari Turks, the Khaljis, the Tughluqs, the Syeds, and the Lodis. There were other kingdoms too during this period, both Hindu and Muslim, in North and South India, contributing to the development of a composite culture, the outlines of which are still unshaken. The Moguls were the central theme of the period, who gave a kind of unity to the country it had not known since Asoka and the Mauryas. The Mogul regime substantially ended with Aurangzeb's death in 1707 and faded away

with the feeble rule of his successors, though the semblance of Mogul rule lasted till 1857. There were the Marathas, the Sikhs and the Jats also fighting for power. Finally came the Europeans--the Portuguese, the Dutch, the English and the French. The Muslim phase ended with the third battle of Panipat in 1761.

The features of Muslim rule in its essentials have to be noted as a part of the impact of Islam. The Sultans of Delhi acknowledged the sovereignty of the Caliph, and considered their kingdom as a part of *Dar-ul-Islam* or abode of Islam, of which the Caliph was the juridical head. India under the Moguls too was governed by the Muslim law. Akbar based his government on secularism and so did his two successors. The Mogul Empire under other emperors was an Islamic state. Both under the Sultans and the Moguls, the state could not conform absolutely to Islamic ordinances as it had to adapt itself to realities and expediency. There has been a controversy whether the medieval Indian state was a theocracy. It apparently was, because it acknowledged the sovereignty of God and government by the direction of God through priests in accordance with divine laws. The state under Akbar and Jahangir could be said to be an exception. The question whether the state under the Sultans and Moguls was a culture state or a police state can only be partly answered, for it could be claimed that it was to a limited extent a culture state under the Sultans; it could also be claimed that to a limited extent it was a modern state and not a mere police state under some of the Moguls. The ulema exercised check on royal power, and there were the judicial and external checks, including the authority of the Caliph whose legal sovereignty was acknowledged. Both the Sultanate and Mogul governments were organized bureaucracies and were not feudalistic. It was thus a composite structure, Perso-Arabic, Turko-Mogul, and Indian.

The administrative organization under the Sultans was composite, drawn from Indian and foreign sources. Under the Moguls, the authority of the Caliph was nominal; each Mogul emperor was a Caliph in himself. Under Akbar, all men without distinction of faith and complexion found welcome in the service of the state. The basis of social order and economic organization remained unchanged under both sets of

Muslim rulers. There were ruling classes but gradually state services ceased to be the monopoly of Muslims. The people at large had to be served and the Governments' policy remained liberal and secular with occasional aberrations. There were divisions among the foreign elements among Muslims, though community of faith made Muslims more homogeneous. Intermarriage between Shiahs and Sunnis was not uncommon, and among Hindus, the social structure remained unaffected. There were Hindu and Muslim religious movements and outbursts of linguistic and literary revivals, and the period was marked by some marvels of art and architecture, in which Hindus and Muslims partook.

No less vigorous were the Islamic reform movements under Wali-Allah and Wahhab, when Islam found itself leaderless in the vacuum that followed Aurangzeb. Barelwi started in the early years of the nineteenth century a mass contact programme among Muslims in both rural and urban areas, a strictly fundamentalist and monotheistic movement. Titu Mir led Muslim peasant revolts against Hindu landlords in Bengal. There was a fundamentalist reformist movement known as the *Faraidi* in that province. Though the movements were not interrelated, they came in conflict with Hindu landlords and British indigo planters and ultimately with the British administration in Bengal.

The Great Rebellion of 1857 represented a break in whatever was going on, though the influence of the ulema on the rebellion was known to be small. But it was a shattering blow to the Muslim upper classes, and as an aftermath, Syed Ahmed Khan saw the need for a change in the Muslim community's outlook. He wanted reform and adjustment in all spheres of life and not confrontation with the East Indian Company or with western domination. He dabbled in the sciences to introduce them to his community and founded the Muhammedan Anglo-Oriental College in 1875 in Aligarh to develop a major educational institution for Indian Muslims. It later became the Aligarh Muslim University. He also attempted religious reform. He believed in accepting British rule as a reality and promoted better relations between his community and the British regime. The Urdu-Hindi controversy made him believe in the separateness of the two major communities. The Ahmadi

movement started by Qadiyan was another politico-religious movement based on defence of Islam against the Arya Samaj and Christian missionaries. The seminary at Deoband represented a traditionalist revival, though some of its scholars came close to the Indian National Congress. The Farangi Mahal of Lucknow specialized in Sufism. The Khilafat movement absorbed the fervour of most of these schools and later separatism obscured everything followed by vote-catching in electoral politics. The national movement was itself the biggest result of the western, particularly British, impact, and its literature is vast and still growing.

The more intractable classes of Muslims, encouraged by foreign rule, artificial divisions, and exaggerated misunderstanding encouraged by the segregation of separate electorates, seceded in the form of Partition, which involved much pain and bloodshed. But the problems of divided India are the same as those of undivided India and Islam remains an important element of life and Muslims the most important minority community. India is in many ways the third largest Muslim country in the world, and while it makes her look both east and west, she remains a state with a composite culture and still in the process of integration.

4

PARTITION

There has been considerable literature on Partition but not much of it is coherent and objective and nothing is complete. Apart from symposia and anthologies, in which several Indian and foreign historians, probably more foreign than Indian, have collaborated, no single historian has taken an overall view of Partition, taking all sides into consideration. Three broad views of Partition in conflict with one another have emerged and have often been put together. One view is that the Hindu community or the Congress, if not organizations like the Hindu Mahasabha, was responsible for it either in its origins or in its acceptance by not opposing it. The Muslim community, represented by the monolithic Muslim League, led by Jinnah, has been blamed, according to another view, for its intransigence. The third view lays the blame on the British as the third party which interrupted Hindu-Muslim synthesis, introduced for the mere asking the trend of separatism by agreeing to and fostering separate electorates from Minto's time and magnified the importance of Jinnah and the League during the seven years of Amery and Linlithgow and embedded Partition in all proposals from the time of the Cripps mission. If all these views had been brought into a synthesis by a historian of vision, a complete view would have been possible, and that might accord with the hypothesis that almost everyone was responsible for Partition.

The prevailing view accords with Indian opinion, Pakistani opinion or Bangladesh opinion, broadly. The predominant Hindu view in India would seem to be that Partition was avoidable, that the British and major Muslim politicians insisted on it as a precondition to Independence, and among

certain Hindus at least there are no regrets, though they tend to ignore that even after Partition there has been a Muslim problem in India. Indian Muslims have no adequate explanation why Muslims overwhelmingly voted for the Muslim League knowing its demand for Pakistan and many of them blame Hindu communalism not only outside the Congress but also inside for provoking Muslim communalism. The more nationalist of them seem to feel with Azad and others, who fought till the end against Partition, that Pakistan could have been accommodated within India, and not forced out, through some scheme of confederation devised by British scholars like Coupland or some Indian Abbe Sieyes.

The idea has not been discussed by anybody why Partition was so bad except that it meant a blood bath. The worst thing about Partition was not only that it involved a permanent artificial division of a country and its people, leading to such problems which could have been avoided. It involved fratricidal killings, unplanned unlike those of the American Civil War, involving unprecedented death and misery including the greatest mass migrations and counter-migrations known to history, some of them provoked by force and others provoked by panic. It is well known that Islam has been an intractable element in India. India is the one country that, with the absorptive genius of Hinduism, has not been able to digest it, in spite of stray attempts at writing an Allopanishad and other clever and conciliatory texts. Again, Islam, which absorbed almost every other country in its fold, could not absorb India. There was a permanent duality about her. Many attempts were made at Hindu-Muslim synthesis in the time of Akbar and subsequently. and it might have been achieved, if the British had not interrupted the process, which meant the western impact and new elements of culture. Muslim separatist movements were growing even long before there was a possibility of Indian self-government. If the configuration of India into predominantly Hindu and Muslim areas was a fact, Partition could still be avoided with extreme luck as in Canada or elsewhere, but it could also become inevitable. The main force against Partition was acceptance of a modernization which surmounted race and religion, the synthesis that had been taking place for some centuries, the evolution of a common culture, if not a common religion, and the political

and constitutional unity which the British had brought about and which they had been working under the British Crown, if not under the East India Company, since the "Mutiny".

India was not always united. Even when it was united culturally, it was not united politically, except rarely. Even when she had ceased to be a civilization and a dream and was becoming a political entity, she was more a subcontinent than a country. As a country, her boundaries were varying from time to time between Bactria and Burma. India came together as a big country under Asoka, Kanishka, the Guptas, Harsha, Akbar, and to the largest extent under Aurangzeb. Wellesley's India was small compared to Dalhousie's India, and the Indian states with princes with enormous power, privileges and privy purses came together under the British, helped by some of Dalhousie's annexations. The Butler Committee, appointed at the time of the Simon Commission, summed up the process by peremptorily saying that Paramountcy must be paramount. Jinnah would not have probably thought of Pakistan without states like Kashmir and Hyderabad, even Junagadh and Jodhpur, with possibly an independent Travancore, apart from the Muslim majority provinces, though some of these seceding majorities had to allow their large-sized minorities to secede.

Jinnah had to support his demand for Pakistan with a theory, for religion alone had nowhere been the basis of statehood, in spite of its incendiary character. The Two-Nation Theory was needed and invented. The feeling of nationhood or statehood cannot be simulated. But when a people feel they are a nation or a state, they can try to be one. On the basis of the separatism of separate electorates, Jinnah made most Indian Muslims feel they were a nation on the basis of the existing suffrage, while the British were losing time by successive infructuous offers. There had been grievances and there had been incidents, riots which were magnified into atrocities. The Pirpur Report which compiled grievances against the 1937-39 Congress regime in U.P. gave a distorted and exaggerated version of events which even a British Governor could not endorse. Jinnah's campaign succeeded more in Muslim minority provinces like U.P. than in Muslim majority provinces like Punjab and Bengal, and the death of leaders like Sikandar Hayat Khan, who stood against division, helped him. The 1945 elections gave him Muslim

majorities in Muslim provinces and the Two-Nation Theory waxed among most Muslims, for nationalist Muslim feeling was not strong enough—even in non-Muslim constituencies. The Constituent Assembly had Muslims mainly from Muslim electorates. Jinnah claimed all Muslim majority areas for his Pakistan, and these included not only a Muslim majority area ruled by a Hindu Maharaja in Kashmir but a Hindu majority area ruled by a Muslim in Hyderabad. Besides, he wanted contiguous Hindu areas like Junagadh with a Muslim ruler or Jodhpur with a Hindu ruler. But the Pakistan which ultimately resulted was not the Pakistan of Jinnah's dream.

Jinnah probably would have given up his demand for Pakistan if he had known that he would get only a moth-eaten Pakistan. If Muslim majority areas could claim to be separate, Hindu minority areas in them could also secede. The Cabinet Mission scheme, which spelt out the Cripps proposals, contained not only the seed of division but the seed of division within division. Jinnah's original dream of a treaty between Hindu India and Muslim India and a corridor between West Pakistan and East Pakistan had to be given up before Partition could be forced. An untenable logic, the logic of division of interlocked communities in a country which could be consolidated into one constitutional fabric for a large nation state, with enough safeguards and guarantees for everyone, led to many illogicalities. The Congress shrank from Partition till the end, but it could not deny the logic of democracy. It accepted Partition not as division under the 3 June 1946 scheme but as the secession of unwilling elements, with the Indian Union becoming the successor state.

Two issues have become obscured in all discussions on Partition. One is why nobody said—or even now says—and insisted that such a paramount question as Partition should be decided by adult suffrage and not by the limited suffrage of the prevailing electorates. Under adult suffrage too Jinnah may have carried the day among Muslims for his Two-Nation Theory. There was a chance that he might not succeed. Adult suffrage with mass illiteracy would not have meant the triumph or reign of reason. But it would have given some satisfaction that all the adult citizens of a country decided such a major question, and adult suffrage could have been exercised only in

a free India. It would have meant waiting for freedom before some major constitutional questions including Partition could be decided. The British had been denying freedom till an agreement between the major communities came about first. The British, the conscious instruments of unity, became the conscious instruments of division. In the end everything came together—freedom, Partition and a Constituent Assembly which did not contain all parties.

The situation was so complicated, the nationalist urge so strong, the frustration about freedom so deep and long-delayed that even Gandhi, who was more strongly opposed to Partition than any other Congress leader, did not oppose Partition in the way he could have opposed it. He could have opposed it with a great and final gesture of satyagraha; he could have even gone on saying 'no' till the end and absolved himself and it might have influenced other Congress leaders On the other hand, he advised the A.I.C.C. to accept the Partition scheme so that it would not seem to be repudiating the Working Committee. He realized that he had failed to persuade Jinnah to accept anything short of Partition; Nehru too had failed. The game of appeasing Jinnah had gone on too long; freedom too had been postponed too long. There were urgent and great tasks awaiting an Indian nation state and the Congress leaders, apart from Gandhi, had been thirsting for freedom, and spoke as representatives of the people, not as office-seekers. They did not accept the Two-Nation Theory. Nehru was keen on fighting it in Kashmir and it is still being fought. It was seen the Muslim community would remain in large numbers in India, though now without separate electorates, and be treated with special consideration.

The principal parties were thus involved in Partition, and it is no use wasting time in apportioning the blame for it. It is better to deal with the consequences of Partition. After the initial bloodshed and bitterness, there is now not only Pakistan but Bangladesh. If a confederation scheme would have avoided Partition, confederation is still possible and can be considered, beginning with economic cooperation. But even that does not seem possible. At least it should be possible to avoid conflict and war. An odd thing about Partition is that it is Pakistan that has not been reconciled to the consequences of Partition.

Partition has made it a smaller, weaker state, a prey to party politics more than India, and uneasy about her defence. She came quickly under military dictatorship. India cannot rejoice that there are now two Pakistans instead of one. Partition meant one more Muslim state and subsequently two, but every trend indicates that the subcontinent has an underlying unity. While the question, who was responsible for Pakistan, can be discussed as one of the pleasures of scholarship, the present question is whether it matters if there is one Pakistan or two Pakistans and if they are not inside India, provided they are content to remain smaller and do not want parity. But Pakistan has developed a permanent inferiority, a permanent India complex.

5

PAKISTAN AND BANGLADESH

Pakistan developed a permanent India complex from the time of her creation. If Partition was a cruel act, the consequences of Partition were even more cruel. The killing, extermination and expulsion of millions were terrible; the bitterness bred among the two peoples has been even more terrible. From the beginning, Pakistan's leaders were not reconciled to the consequences of Partition, for it left them with a smaller, weaker and poorer country than they had expected, so in Kashmir they found a permanent bone of contention. There is a perpetual desire to be strong, if possible stronger than India, and hence a perpetual demand for more arms from abroad.

To understand the real needs of Pakistan's defence, one must go back to the days of Partition and of the Partition Council Auchinleck, who has been considered by Mountbatten and others as the greatest Commander-in-Chief India has known, was mainly responsible for the reorganization and unity of the Indian armed forces. It had to undergo somewhat arbitrary division as one of the consequences of Partition. It was generally thought by Mountbatten, Auchinleck and others that there could be no splitting of the Indian Army before the withdrawal of the British. Mountbatten said: "The mechanics won't permit it and I won't." But the League leaders, Liaquat Ali Khan and others, forced it, and Auchinleck's supreme command had to be wound up and Auchinleck had to go, accused by Pakistan of being pro-India and by India of being pro-Pakistan.

From the beginning, Auchinleck maintained the view that "the armed forces of India, as they now stand, cannot be split

up into two parts each of which will form a self-contained armed force. The formation of two separated armed forces is not just a matter of redistributing certain classes of men . . ." But gradually Mountbatten came to the conclusion, which was elaborated in the Mountbatten Plan, that India had to be divided and the armed forces too, though only the Muslim League advocated it. Auchinleck was asked by the Viceroy to give his opinion on the strategic implications of the setting up of Pakistan, and his view was:

> From the purely military and strategical aspect, which is the only angle from which the problem has been viewed in this paper, it must be concluded that the provision of adequate insurance in the shape of reasonably good defensive arrangements for Pakistan would be a most difficult and expensive business, and that no guarantee of success could be given.

This was prophetic, but prophecies apart, Auchinleck enclosed a note prepared by the Deputy Chief of the General Staff setting out a view which might well be taken by the advocates of Pakistan, though in Auchinleck's opinion it was a short-term view and did not take into account the potentialities of the future. The Deputy Chief's conclusion was:

> It will be agreed that Pakistan is economically a poor country, and that her resources are small. But it can be argued that she will be no poorer than Afghanistan or Persia, who have successfully retained their independence and preserved their nationality through two world wars.
>
> At the worst, Pakistan can have an army equal to the armies of Afghanistan, Persia or Burma. Within the whole international set-up, why then should she be in a worse position to defend herself?
>
> I suggest that the above is, in outline, the sort of view of the situation that the advocates of Pakistan will take. They will refuse to consider the situation in terms of any threat from a first-class power or in terms of armed forces

> or air offensives. They will regard their defence problem in terms of some local third-class war which will be settled one way or another with infantry and artillery.

It was correctly argued that the advocates of Pakistan would take the view that she could be an independent sovereign country like Afghanistan, Persia or Burma, when even tiny islands in the Pacific also were becoming members of the United Nations with sovereign equality. But the practical problems of dividing the armed forces consisting, besides the British, of Hindus and Muslims and of dividing the defence of this subcontinent were not considered. Besides, Pakistan was not content to be an Afghanistan, Persia or Burma; even after the creation of Bangladesh. she has no intention of being so considered. From the time of Partition and her first attacks on Kashmir, she has been envisaging a kind of parity with India. She launched aggression several times to assert this parity. It is because of the repeated failure in this attempt and the loss of the eastern wing that Pakistan's leaders may say now and then that Pakistan does not claim parity.

There may be no parity complex after so many knocks, but there has been an India complex. Pakistan has added to her potentialities by her role as an agent of the United States, as an agent of China and as an agent of Islamic countries. A large minority of India's population is Islamic and India has no differences with Islamic countries bilaterally or on issues like Israel. India's Muslim minority is a permanent refutation of the irrational Two-Nation Theory on the basis of which Pakistan was constituted. The consequences, as envisaged by those who opposed Partition, are complex and the problems that arise are endless.

The economy of the subcontinent too has been artificially divided, as a result. Coupland and other advocates of confederation are outdated but there was some sense in their proposals, and gradually, if not immediately, this subcontinent may come to be treated as one economically. Progress from economic cooperation to economic confederation cannot be ruled out. From the point of view of defence needs, Ayub Khan talked incoherently of joint defence, though explaining it sensibly in his autobiography, but the sooner Pakistan ceases to look upon India as a

potential enemy, the easier it would be to arrive at disengagement in defence, if not at common defence. Pakistan is not thinking on those lines. India's Prime Minister has made it clear that even if Pakistan makes an atom bomb, India may not react in a similar manner and join in a nuclear race. Kashmir, though a standing refutation of the Two-Nation Theory, is perhaps the sole barrier between India and Pakistan, which keeps tension unresolved. As long as there is no settlement on Kashmir, Pakistan's India complex will remain.

The separation of East Pakistan became inevitable when West Pakistan's minority trampled down East Pakistan's majority, when the Bengali language and Bengali culture were suppressed. India would have preferred both Pakistans reconciled to each other but it was not possible. Even now Bangladesh has not settled down to a definite course, with the threat of military intervention and unsettled constitutions, while Pakistan has not known democracy since Ayub Khan intervened with his basic democracies, and the future is uncertain, with the Frontier and Baluchistan as restless as ever.

As late as 1938, Jawaharlal Nehru said: "In India today no one thinks in terms other than those of national unity.... It is difficult to conceive of any separatist tendency which can break up this unity." This optimism was widely shared and was realistic at that time. The political and economic unity of India seemed natural, in response to geography and geopolitics. The geophysical configuration of Europe led to the growth of separate nations. In India too, apart from the underlying cultural unity, in the early days of British rule, Madras had no more in common with the Punjab, Bengal no more with Bombay, than Germany had with Spain, or Italy with Poland, in Napoleon's time. John Bright and others had thought in 1877 of the 'nations' of India drawing together under a group of states which would be able to stand by themselves, as had five or six states in Europe. But under complete British domination, India ceased to be comparable to Europe. India was no longer continental, though she was more than a subcontinent. Territorial integrity with stable borders became possible which had not been possible under the Moguls though they had gone as far as Samarkand. India escaped the kind of wars that were fought in the battle-field of Europe. Jinnah was, however,

comparing the disparateness of India to the sovereign states in the Balkans and he once likened the Muslim minority in undivided India to the Sudetens in Czechoslovakia. Did British rule forestall the prospect of different nationalities? It only undid what it had done.

As long ago as 1862 Acton had talked of multinational states. The Welsh and the Scots are nations but are joined to England; the Swedes and the Norwegians had not lost their nationhood when they united and did not regain it when they separated. The Germans, the Italians and the French of Switzerland are nationalities, not nations, but they maintain their national traditions. In an article at the beginning of 1940, Jinnah had expounded the theory of two nations but envisaged that the two nations "must share the governance of their motherland". From March 23 that year, however, with the Muslim League resolution at Lahore, he stuck to Partition. Federation was rejected.

There was what was known as the Punjab plan. In his presidential address to the League session in 1930, Sir Muhammad Iqbal had advocated "the creation of autonomous states based on unity of language, race, history, religion and identity of economic interests" as the only possible way "to secure a stable constitutional structure in India". He wanted to unite the Punjab and its neighbours in "a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim state"; he did not want a Muslim state separated from India. Sikandar Hayat proposed regional grouping. There were many such regional groups; they were to be federal, not unitary; they were to be groups of federal provinces and states in the region. Such grouping seemed to fulfil the test of economic identity.

From these schemes emerged Sir Reginald Coupland's scheme, based on the suggestions of a member of the Indian Civil Service, of river valley basins, on the basis of the Tennessee Valley Authority, then a popular subject of study. The Indus, the Ganga, the (Brahmaputra) Delta, apart from the Deccan, were to be the economic and political units. Regional division on an economic basis confirmed the political demarcation of the Muslim "homelands", the Indus and Delta regions corresponding with Pakistan and North-East India and the Vindhyas bisecting dominantly Hindu India into the Ganga and the Deccan. There would, in spite of disproportionate populations, be two

Hindu majority and two Muslim majority regions. But could not discussion and cooperation between the existing divisions be a good substitute for regionalism?

There had to be an inter-regional centre, if regionalism was to be acceptable to those who wanted Partition. But it would not be federalism. The minimum powers which an Indian centre must possess would have to be foreign affairs, defence, external trade and tariff policy, communications, and currency. Apart from common nationality, each region could establish a second nationality. This kind of inter-regional union would be a loose federation, though federations have not been a success. The state in America, the canton in Switzerland, the province in Canada cannot stand alone. The regions would be big states and semi-independent. The central government, according to Sikandar Hayat Khan, would be a coordination committee or of some such name. It meant that there would be no government at the centre but only a mechanism of consultation and cooperation. This would be a confederacy. Coupland wanted an inter-regional centre to be a government, more than a confederacy, less than a federation.

It is not necessary to consider the constitution of a legislature and an executive for such a centre. Would those who rejected such ideas then accept them now, on the basis of three nation states? Will India, Pakistan and Bangladesh be able to establish political cooperation, apart from economic and other cooperation, and will such cooperation lead to a confederation or at least a confederacy?

Now we reach the vast constitutional bog of federalism. The term "confederation" in modern political use is generally confined to a permanent union of sovereign states for certain common purposes, like the German Confederation (Bund), established by the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The distinction between confederation and federation, which were synonymous in their origin, has developed in the political terminology of the United States. Up to 1789 the United States was a confederation; then the word federation, or federal republic, was introduced as implying a closer, "more perfect", union. This distinction was emphasized during the Civil War between North and South, the seceding states forming a confederation (Confederate States of America) in opposition to the Federal

Union. Confederation means a union of sovereign states in which the stress is laid on the sovereign independence of each constituent body (Statenbund); federation implies a union of states in which the stress is laid on the supremacy of the common government (Der Bundesstaat). The distintcion, however, has not been universally observed.

In the history of western society we find many confederated unions in which power was shared by the member states with a central Government: ancient Greece, the Swiss Confederation, the United Provinces of the Netherlands. The American provinces themselves had experimented with this sort of arrangement in the New England Confederacy of 1743; there were variations on this idea as in William Penn's proposal of an intercolonial organization. During the troubled years after 1763, several thinkers on both sides of the Atlantic suggested that the American colonies be joined into an extremely loose federal structure in which they would be substantially self-governing but linked to England by loyalty to the Crown and by common interests. Finally, the Articles of Confederation, adopted under the stress of war, at last brought the American states into a formal union which, weak though it was, represented a step towards federation.

In the present cont t the coming together of the three countries, with the role of religion reduced, need not be chimerical, but it can only be a process, not an event. The reunion some Indian parties talked of soon after Partition and which made Pakistan's leaders afraid and nervous is remote. But pan-European movements which have led to organizations like the European Economic Community and the Common Market offer parallels. If cooperation replaces confrontation, it might be the first stage in "this subcontinent", and its fringes, in making peace positive and substantial. As in Europe, it will open a vista of possibilities in federalism, starting with a confederacy, with a loose consultative machinery at the centre; followed up by a confederation with machinery which will evolve according to needs, leading to closer forms. The nightmare of nuclear power, even the peaceful uses to which it can be put, should make at least some part of man's dream of peace come true.

6

KASHMIR

The state of Jammu and Kashmir has become a *sine qua non* for both India and Pakistan, for India as a refutation of the Two-Nation Theory and for Pakistan to establish it. Nearly six hundred states should have been left to India as the successor state according to the British theory of paramountcy. But all of them, the British declared, were free to join either India or Pakistan at the time of Partition. The British held the view that there were two successor states, though India succeeded to more including membership of the United Nations. The ruler of each state was left with the choice to decide whether the state should join India or Pakistan. Mountbatten annotated the plan to mean that the principle of contiguity would operate in this constitutional operation. But other principles came into play. While neither India nor Pakistan could have islands, the position of states which were contiguous to India or to Pakistan was ambiguous if the ruler of a state and its people belonged to different religions. Junagadh was a border state; its ruler was Muslim, its population Hindu; it was contiguous to Pakistan by land and to India by sea. The ruler acceded to Pakistan but the people rebelled and, though under the auspices of Indian political leaders, nullified the accession. Jinnah dallied with Jodhpur, whose ruler and people were both Hindu but the ruler resisted temptation in the end. The ruler of the biggest state, Hyderabad, was a Muslim, its population Hindu; he was tempted by Jinnah to join Pakistan but the local population would not allow it and India had to take police action. Travancore, contiguous by land to India and by sea to Pakistan, though by a long distance, toyed with the idea of independence under its intrepid dewan, C.P. Ramaswami Aiyar; but with a Hindu

ruler the Hindu population would not allow it and Aiyar had to resign and leave the state.

Kashmir proved to be far different from any other state and the most difficult of all in the process of accession. The state was predominantly Muslim, the ruler a Hindu, and the state contiguous to both India and Pakistan. Had the ruler acceded to Pakistan, the subsequent trouble could have been avoided. But under the pressure of the people's agitation for self-rule which had been going on and the temptations which Jinnah offered, he dilly-dallied and appointed interim governments under successive interim dewans who could neither negotiate peacefully with either country nor rally the state people's leaders. He entered into standstill agreements but could not purchase peace. Under the provocation of uncertainty and to force the ruler's hands, tribesmen from the northwest were organized and they made raids, killing people and destroying property. With the raiding parties approaching Srinagar after occupying Uri and Baramulla, the maharaja was alarmed and sought India's help. In the negotiations, Mountbatten played a part as the adviser on accession, though he was then only Governor-General of successor India. The maharaja decided that the state should immediately accede to India; the accession instruments were hastily signed and Indian troops were hastily flown to Srinagar to fight on its outskirts and save the city. Along with accession, a declaration was made that when peace was established, there would be "a reference to the wishes of the people of the state". This declaration was later criticized as a blunder on the part of India which Mountbatten persuaded India to commit through the agency of Nehru. According to all evidence Mountbatten might have given the advice but nobody in the cabinet, not even Patel, opposed it. It was a collective decision and it seemed right then, for while Nehru was identified with the people's struggle and was a friend of Sheikh Abdullah the people of the state were predominantly Muslim and it seemed to accord with India's thinking that accession should follow not only the ruler's but the people's wishes.

The second decision, which was also taken when Mountbatten was Governor-General of successor India, and which has been criticized by Indian critics of India's Kashmir policy which Nehru was supposed to be running according to his whims or

under Mountbatten's advice, was India's reference of the problem to the Security Council. The complaint was that Pakistan had interfered in Kashmir and the plea was that Pakistan should be asked to see that not only the raiders but Pakistan's troops also were withdrawn. The reference led to interminable debates in which the big powers, especially Britain and the United States, played politics, the plain issues were twisted into knotty and complicated issues, and the faith which India put in the United Nations proved unjustified. The reference was an idealistic step taken because of India's faith in the United Nations but it was also realistic. Nehru was to regret the step later as much as anybody else, but the failure of the United Nations could not be called the failure of India, Nobody in the cabinet opposed this step too. The fighting in Kashmir had reached a deadlock. Indian forces had driven back the raiders and Pakistani forces, and the deployment of Pakistani forces was later admitted by Pakistan in the course of negotiations. Some Indians thought that there was a good chance of driving the Pakistani forces completely out of Kashmir, but military opinion was certain that it could not be done without India destroying the bases in Pakistan. Such a step would have meant war between India and Pakistan. This neither Nehru nor the other Indian leaders desired, and it seemed the way to avoid a stalemate was to seek a solution under the auspices of the United Nations. The debates in the Security Council were prolonged and infructuous and led to subsidiary issues which gained in importance because of the sympathy which Pakistan secured from Britain and the United States, in its claim of parity with India. The complaint of aggression and the request for withdrawal of Pakistani troops were forgotten, and cease-fire and a settlement became the paramount aim of the meddling powers.

The complicating factor which developed from consultations and negotiations through U.N. agencies was that, at some indeterminate stage, the idea of a reference to the people became twisted and distorted into the idea of a plebiscite in its European connotation: which had bccome a formula for self-determination in the welter of the post-Versailles system. Plebiscite meant neutral auspices and irrational irredentist appeals. Still, India accepted the idea, hoping that U.N. auspices would

be impartial and that no religious or irredentist appeal would be allowed. But Pakistan seemed to believe in such appeals. Another basis of plebiscite in Kashmir was to be that, as acknowledged by the U.N. Commission, it would be held within the framework of Indian sovereignty in Kashmir which meant that the bulk of Pakistani troops would be withdrawn and Indian troops would be responsible for maintaining peace and tranquillity. The conditions of plebiscite and the posting of impartial observers, including the induction of a plebiscite coordinator, involved much bargaining and speech-making. First the Canadian MacNaughten, though Admiral Nimitz also was mentioned, and later Sir Owen Dixon and Dr. Graham, who survived for several yearss as an innocuous academic in the corridors of the United Nations, were to be plebiscite administrators or mediators. In the end no plebiscite could be held because Pakistan would not fulfil the conditions of a plebiscite, there could be no agreement on the quantum of Indian troops in Kashmir and the extent of Pakistani withdrawal from the state. When Eisenhower and Dulles drew Pakistan into a military pact with the United States the international situation changed and India had fresh security problems. By 1950 itself plebiscite was dead and every attempt by Pakistan to revive it was like flogging a dead horse.

There has been a st.'emate in Kashmir since 1950, though a cease-fire line had been established under U.N. auspices. But a cease-fire line could mean peace or war, and, in 1965, Pakistan not only violated it but made a massive attack on Kashmir. It had been made clear by Nehru and Krishna Menon that an attack on Kashmir would be considered an attack on India, and this statement of policy led Lal Bahadur Shastri to direct an attack on Pakistan herself when Pakistan attacked Kashmir. The cease-fire that followed, the withdrawals under U.N. auspices and the Tashkent Agreement under Soviet auspices led to an understanding. The Kashmir question could be settled only in bilateral negotiations and not by recourse to arms or through outside or U.N. intervention, though within the framework of Security Council resolutions. The Bangladesh war and Pakistan's attack in the west in 1971 did not disturb this position in Kashmir. The subsequent Simla agreement confirmed the Tashkent agreement.

There are advocates in India and Pakistan of a rapprochement between them and there have been conciliatory statements from Gen. Zia and his instruments. How far this is real and how far it is meant to draw a veil across the disturbed conditions in Pakistan without the prospects of democracy is not clear. The United States has again involved Pakistan in her security network with the pretence of safeguarding the frontier against Afghanistan and strengthening her defences against the Soviet Union. The supply of sophisticated weapons for this alleged object can only lead to arms rivalry in this region The obstacle to lasting friendship between India and Pakistan, apart from diplomatic professions, is what happens in Pakistan and what happens in India. The foreign policy perceptions of the two countries are still conflicting and there can be no thought of joint defence.

The basic uncertainty arises from Kashmir, where an uneasy cease-fire line is a perpetual provocation to Pakistan. There can be no true understanding and sense of security unless there is an international boundary. It was suggested as long ago as 1950 by Nehru, among others, that the two countries could settle to stay where they were along the lines of control. But Pakistan has for thirty years kept alive the uncertainty to use it at appropriate times and threaten India with repeated prospects of uncertainty. The Valley of Kashmir is the most beautiful valley on earth and any country may desire it, but the valley has settled down for thirty years, and settled things cannot be allowed to be unsettled now. There can bc no Pakistani claim to the valley merely because it is predominantly Muslim, for there are large numbers of Muslims in India too. Pakistan has disqualified herself by her repeated aggressions, by her security alliances, by her succession of dictatorial regimes and her permanent, pernicious India complex.

7

WILD WEST WIND

The impact of the West on India was felt in this faster age with telescopic changes greater than any made by earlier contacts and has been as abiding as that of the coming of the Aryans or the Islamic conquests. The West meant centuries of civilization of a kind different from the evolution of Indian civilization till then, and meant more than the Egyptian, Assyrian or Babylonian civilization, which had flourished, declined and perished; it meant Greece and Rome, the Christian civilization of Europe, the spirit of faith and of doubt, the rediscoveries of the Renaissance, the conflicts of the Reformation, the inventions of science, the literature of experiment and revolt. It shocked, vitalized and created a new ferment in a society which had been sequestered and had become stagnant in parts and as a whole. The Turko-Afghan Delhi Sultanate had lasted from 1206 to 1526 and the ordered Mogul empire from 1526 to 1761. Yet the period from 1761 till now has been more challenging and its effects more lasting than the more disturbing but less pervasive age of Muslim rule from 1206 to 1761.

The Portuguese were the first western influence. The Moguls had come by land, but they came by sea. Vasco da Gama and Albuquerque and a few others do not exhaust the Portuguese theme. The Portuguese expansion was quick and in spite of being thin, though spread out, their rule was pacific and lasting, for the Portuguese settlers became natives and intermarried, carrying their proselytizing mission more seriously than other western powers. In establishing their *Estado-da-India*, they used force by land and their then superior sea power; and the lingering remnants of that civilization which acted as a carrier of many

things are still to be found in Goa. There is a Portuguese India, with its pieces of architecture, sculpture, music and painting.

The French and the Dutch to a smaller extent also left their imprint, as illustrated in Pondicherry and Dutch relics in Kerala, but the English, Sir Thomas Roe and others, came in a royal way as emissaries of the court of Elizabeth and James to the court of Jahangir. They came to trade and remained to rule, as in other parts of the world, cringing, bullying and fighting, changing the map frequently and colouring it as they liked. Yet, while the benefits of British rule as they are enumerated in textbooks written by British writers for Indian students have to be weighed against the colonial exploitation and the long economic drain, which are now established, the repercussions of the impact cannot be denied. British rule had taken over much from the Mogul period, including the Persian tags and the imperial idea, which had also come from Hindu India. But to say that Britain made a gift of democracy or self-governing institutions would be an exaggeration. The liberalizing influence of English literature and English political thought and the modern medium of contact which English has provided for intercourse with the rest of the world are lasting. The last enchantments of the English language remain, depriving a large nation of national articulation and postponing the complete liberation of the mind which only articulation through a national language can achieve. But even the most patriotic and nationalistic elements accept the advantages of English and the inevitability of the gradualness of wholesale nationalization in the intellectual and cultural spheres. It is not English exactly that has made solution of the language and other problems difficult or confused. The Curzon Roads and Dufferin Hospitals, though renamed, are visible symbols of a British rule not easily forgotten, though statues of British Viceroys may be consigned to museums. The British were agents of western civilization and India can absorb more of it without ceasing to be Indian.

Hindu and Muslim socio-religious reform in India has owed much to western influence. There had been protest movements in Hinduism and Islam before but British rule made its impact socially too, apart from culturally and intellectually, not merely religiously. The two wild west winds which affected India and entered her spirit were Hellenism and the Portuguese. Several

centuries later Greek art and thought entered the cultural blood of Spain, Gaul, Rome, Egypt and Palestine, Syria and Asia Minor, and along the shores of the Black Sea. It cannot be said that the Indian people can speak of a similar Greek heritage, though soon after Alexander's invasion, north-west India up to Bactria was swept by the wind from Greece, and it reached the climax of its influence at the time of the Kushans. Buddha as we have known is a masterpiece of Indo-Greek art, rivalled or outrivalled only by Nataraja from the South. The Byzantine Empire probably wedded Greek to Asian culture, though it may be an exaggeration to say that all civilized nations, in all intellectual activities, are colonies of Hellas today. In India, the Greek heritage lives both in science and art and in the portals of her best universities.

Following Vasco da Gama's pioneering venture, the East India Company, founded in 1600 in London to buy cheap in India and sell dear in Europe, announced by 1686 its intention "to establish a large, well-grounded, sure English dominion in India for all time to come". The company which had come to trade stayed to rule and the consequences of this act of imagination and banditry are scattered all over India, stronger than the Hellenic heritage. The deeds of Clive, Warren Hastings and others need not be recalled here. The attempts to impeach them are a brighter chapter showing the prickings of the British conscience. Economically the company and the Crown robbed India till Independence, though British companies and consortiums may be still looting India in subtler forms. But without forgetting the wrongs, India can afford to recall the advantages of the British impact through men like Bentinck, Munroe, Elphinstone, Canning, the Lawrences and others, and the line of scholars which Sir William Jones began and which has come through Max Muller and Basham helping Indians to discover and rediscover India. The course of Christianity in India and its effects are a part of the western impact, though St. Thomas, one of the Apostles, began his mission in India long before the Christian powers competed with one another for influence.

Apart from what the religious, literary and political movements owed to the Christian and western impact, there is the extraordinary case of Ram Mohun Roy, the morning star of the

Indian Renaissance. He founded the Brahmo Samaj, and helped Bentinck abolish sati and carry out other reforms, along with Dwarkanath Tagore, the grandfather of Rabindranath Tagore. Roy was an indefatigable pioneer, learning Sanskrit to read the Vedas, Pali to read the Buddhist texts, Persian and Arabic to read the Islamic texts, Hebrew to understand the Old Testament and Greek to understand the New. He took up English and wrote magnificent, moving prose. He was a pioneer in journalism. He was a student of Bentham and the first Mill. The next great influence was Ramakrishna, wholly indigenous, who produced in Vivekananda the apostle of his syncretism. With his mastery of English, Vivekananda could be said to have conquered the West with the ardour of his spiritual quest. Rabindranath Tagore was a further advance in India's kinship not only with the West but with the rest of the world, rendering his Bengali songs into haunting English cadences. Earlier Vidyasagar rendered immense service not only to Sanskrit but to reform. Dayananda Saraswati is recognized as the Hindu Luther and the Arya Samaj is still a force. Bankim Chandra Chatterjee, Tilak, Ramakrishna were in the mainstream of reform. While reform was acquiring adherents, revivalism also took shape. But Vivekananda gave a practical shape and social content to religious reinvigoration by organizing the Ramakrishna Mission. Aurobindo Ghose, Lajpat Rai, Ranade and Gokhale carried on and their influence worked till Gandhi's emergence, giving political unrest the tranquil spirit of religious understanding and social and economic appeal. Gandhi, India's outstanding nationalist leader, was also a product of the West but he found the solution for India's subjection in complete repudiation of the West. But the West clings and in Nehru probably India has become a meeting place between East and West with no glass curtain or any other curtain now between them.

There is eloquent evidence of early contacts between India and Europe, long before Alexander's invasion established modern Indian chronology. Pythagoras, who was known to have travelled widely from his island home of Samos, was acquainted with the Brahmins of India. Between Greek thought and Indian thought there were many parallels. From Megasthenes onwards India's links with the West have rarely been

broken even when the western horizon contracted to Bactria. The Kushan Empire turned the contacts into almost a synthesis and by then Rome's eastern boundary was the Euphrates. The Arabs maintained the bridgeheads between India and the West, and much Indian thought went to the West in Arab guise. This communication extends to folk stories containing much folk wisdom. Grimm or Hans Andersen has Indian sources. India has looked eastward also from the early days. The traces of Indian civilization are seen throughout East and South-east Asia and Angkor Vat and Boro Budur are lasting memorials. With Buddhism India travelled far, to Japan and the farthest islands of the Pacific, influencing everything on the way in the far and remote past, and in Communist China giant Buddhas stand in undisturbed repose. It all makes the future as fascinating as the past.

8

A NATION IN THE MAKING

The idea of national integration grew when the nation was partitioned; nearly six hundred states had to be integrated and secularism, democracy and political unity had to be incorporated in a nation in ruins. The age-old diversities had to be given a new harmony in a new context.

What kind of integration did India ever achieve and how was it lost? For centuries India was first a legend which lived in the vision of her sages and then a river-valley civilization, without physical or political boundaries, which attracted the wandering conqueror. There were many invasions, but India absorbed the impact of every one of them; only the Turks in the early Middle Ages, and the Chagtai Moguls later, established permanent empires. Muslim conquest brought about many political and cultural changes in the old societies of India, but the foundation and structure of the old culture remained. Even the Mogul political system was founded upon a socio-economic base which retained substantial identity throughout the ancient and medieval periods till the nineteenth century.

India's racial mould, unlike that of Europe, was set once for all, from Aryan times, and was little disturbed in the succeeding centuries. There had been revolts, religious protest movements, but no revolution in the European sense for there were no nation states, no social tensions which caused explosions. Later a synthesis of the Aryan, Dravidian and aboriginal elements was formed and was little upset. The ethnic and economic base underwent the least change. So did trade and industry. Village and caste meant stability as much as stagnation. There was cultural rapprochement between

Hinduism and Islam, but it failed to generate national consciousness and the state did not foster it. Economic and social change was slow. As the Mogul structure crumbled, the weakness of the central authority reacted upon the economic life of the state and centrifugalism and localism dominated. It was at this time that the agents of European powers intervened, interrupting more than one synthesis.

The India of the Moguls disappeared rapidly with the death of Aurangzeb. The country was a static conglomeration of villages, castes, classes, tribes and principalities loosely held together. The economy was agricultural, its technique primitive and its aim subsistence production. Industry was organized on a small scale; money played an insignificant part. In Europe it was the age of science and reason and new technique. The consequences of the impact of the West on India have been variously assessed. It was a mixture of good and evil, the economy was organized to supply raw material for the Industrial Revolution in England, while poverty and pressure on land increased. The growth of national consciousness was a certain consequence; a renaissance was another, though it was accompanied by revivalism. The emergence of national societies is a recent stage of social development, and for a country like India, which till the end of the nineteenth century, retained conditions amounting to feudalism and even now had not eliminated semi-feudal conditions completely, the nation-building process is not easy. But it is an inevitable process.

Why did India lose independence? Did India qualify for freedom? Europe, says Tara Chand, progressed from independence to freedom, from the settlements of the Teutonic tribes in the provinces of the Roman Empire to the eighteenth century, without experiencing foreign occupation and rule, while India had to surrender sovereign power and then struggle towards self-government, completing the process in one-fifth of the time taken by Europe. There is another difference between Europe and India. The achievement of freedom by India is the transformation of a civilization into a nationality and the fulfilment of nationality through the establishment of national sovereignty. It was a dialectic process; the first step was the destruction of the older order culminating in 1857; the second

step was the emergence of a new order which gathered momentum during the following half-century; the third step was one of conflict and synthesis and the emergence of the Indian nation state.

The political map was changing; the history books indicate Wellesley's India, or Dalhousie's India, with increasing patches of red. There were many political units, but there was one broad civilization and one socio-economic structure. With territorial integrity and political sovereignty, the problem is to pull together that civilization and to adjust institutions to social and economic change. The language problem is that Indian languages are struggling to take the place of English as media of education and of expression of long-standing cultures. The states reorganization problem is that, with historical memories, old subcultures want to regain their identity as part of the national structure. The econmic problem is that there should be enough production, equitable distribution and large-scale employment opportunities. The political problem is that parties should be secular national parties preserving the spirit of parliamentary democracy and reconciling the socialist and democratic processes. The minorities problem is that there should be cultural safeguards and social and economic equality. These are not insuperable problems. The British were the unconscious instruments of revolution; the Indian people have to make that revolution complete.

There were many moments when independence seemed near according to some indefatigable controversialists. Maulana Azad, in his slender autobiography, sought to show that if the Cabinet Mission scheme of 1946 had been accepted by the Congress, Partition could have been avoided. Partition cannot be the only criterion for judging the value or quality of independence, but Partition has been treated in many quarters as a great defeat for Indian nationalism, as an irreparable disaster or as a wholly avoidable development. If this view were correct, it would not be enough to throw the blame on the Congress; there should be a deeper probe into the underlying social and economic processes which led to Partition, whatever may have been the faults of the British, the Congress, or the Muslim League. Ultimately, history concerns itself with fundamental forces and not merely with what parties or individuals do.

To pursue the imaginative logic of Maulana Azad far enough, Partition might have been avoidable, if the British had been in a mood to part with power after the end of the First World War or at the time of the Round Table Conferences in the early 1930s. Like Maulana Azad, many leaders in those days argued that if the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms had been accepted by the Congress in 1919, the safe and slow process of transfer of power which was later in operation in British colonies in Africa would have followed in India; if the Government of India Act of 1935 had been accepted, there would have been safe and leisurely progress towards dominion status and independence. But what kind of independence? In either case, freedom would have been fettered, with safeguards entrenched in the constitutional structure and duality embedded in the national structure; freedom would not have been full. The British were in no mood or position to give up their connection with the six hundred and odd princely states of India, and nationalities may have emerged from the larger communities among them. This was not the freedom which would have satisfied the elemental forces which Gandhi had released. Though Partition has left India as the third largest Muslim country in the world and Indian nationalism remains composite in its character, the Indian people were struggling to statehood so that they could do what they liked with their freedom, and they accepted Partition as the secession of unwilling elements consisting of contiguous Muslim communities. They took the risk of being free even to lose that freedom.

There were many who looked upon freedom as an anticlimax to the freedom movement. But critics of Indian freedom, who criticize freedom without criticizing the nationalist movement and criticize the Congress without criticizing Gandhi who largely made it what it was, are guilty of contradiction. In invoking the forces of freedom, Gandhi knew he was invoking much that was good and much that was bad which had to be made good by feats of endurance, vision and leadership. His direct action could not but provoke direct action from others: his fasting was bound to be followed widely. There was reaction and imitation. He is now scripture, but merely to quote him is to be holistic but unhistorical. Much that has happened and has been happening is reaction to Gandhi, and it is a

measure of his greatness. Freedom did not come with a bang; it came along with much pain, but it came and it was freedom. It is useless to criticize it for not coming more violently than it did.

The beginnings of the Indian National Congress in retrospect look like a Victorian burlesque; its leaders made obsequious references to Providence, and loudly swore their loyalties to the Queen Empress. The history of the Congress has been written and rewritten, and has been interpreted in various ways, including the merciless Marxist way. Some obscure points have, however, remained obscure. It is little known that the political movement was accompanied by an economic movement and by a social movement, which the leaders wanted to be left to the several major communities so that they could be brought together easily on a common platform for political reform. The Social Conference was started in 1888, and while political pioneers established economic projects ranging from soap to steel, the Industrial Conference was inaugurated in 1904. The Congress Constitution of 1908, amended in 1911 and 1912, stated in article 1:

> The objects of the Indian National Congress are the attainment by the people of India of a system of government similar to that enjoyed by the self-governing members of the British Empire and participation by them in the rights and responsibilities of the Empire on equal terms with those members. These objects are to be achieved by constitutional means by bringing about a steady reform of the existing system of administration and by promoting national unity, fostering public spirit and developing and organizing the intellectual, moral, economic and industrial resources of the country.

The Congress accomplished, with impressive irony, the first of these objectives. India is free and stays within an empire converted into a commonwealth. But the objectives of "promoting national unity, fostering public spirit and developing and organizing the intellectual, moral, economic and industrial resources of the country" have yet to be fulfilled. In 1915 Ambika Charan Mazumdar, who was to preside over the

Lucknow session of the Congress a few years later, could call his history of the Congress "Indian National Evolution". Now, everyone thinks of revolution, and the question is whether any party is revolutionary enough.

The revolutionary phase of the Congress started with Gandhi, who released elemental forces, sometimes not knowing it. But it would be unhistorical to consign the pioneers to a portrait gallery. The poverty of the Indian people was a thesis which Dadabhai Naoroji propagated with the help of the evidence of Secretaries of State. Dutt, Ranade and Gokhale carried the economic interpretation of British rule further. If the worst aspect of the regime was that the resources of the country were left undeveloped and the people were deprived of the benefits of the Industrial Revolution, the economic absorption began with Gandhi's predecessors; he invested it with urgency; and it was Jawaharlal Nehru's task to bring the temper of industrial revolution to the people and to give an economic bias to Indian understanding of progress.

There have been, in spite of the seeming sameness, many approaches to Indian integration. There is the non-economic approach, which is not a complete one, and there is the conservative approach, in which integration leads to monolithic nationhood, with the kind of simple process which made Sanskritization and westernization effective in the past. Neither history nor economics, neither language nor class can be ignored, and it is good that Indianness as broadly accepted allows for diversities of religion, community, tradition, mood and expression. It is only those elements which insist on the Indian nation being one in the sense of being single-stranded and not composite that are threatening the nation-building process and encouraging fascist trends. Integration should not be strained to the point of denying the right to the innate diversities. People can be simultaneously members of many different groups without being anti-national.

India's nation-building does not seek the stimulus of external threat and wants to avoid the crucifying experience of a conflict like the American Civil War. The conflicts between languages, between regions, between communities would be mere irritations and abrasions of the integration process if

economic sense and secular temper were to prevail. There is no need for pessimism, though mistakes have been made. If the several recommendations of the States Reorganization Commission, meant to emphasize the underlying unity of the country, had been accepted along with its recommendations for reorganization, many troubles could have been avoided. The opposition came from unenlightened people in the states, and even now there is some unenlightenment both in the North and the South about language and about script. Education is a vital means of the long-term process of integration, and the rights of linguistic minorities are to be safeguarded. The present discussion on integration has resulted in many good forgotten recommendations, like the creation of more all-India services. Any integration, or education for it, can be only as a part of the social and economic revolution.

Hinduism and Islam, with not only their religious but social differentiation, are the two major strains in the make-up of the Indian nation. The coming of Islam made a difference to Indian history and nearly one thousand years of history cannot be erased. Islam did not conquer or convert all the people; Hinduism, in spite of social decay, had vitality and large parts of the country were beyond the influence of Islam. Three hundred years after the first battle of Panipat it was clear that the two major communities were coming together and were, in spite of change of dynasty, becoming parts of the same social evolution, praying in temple or mosque Neither religion could remain uninfluenced, though the orthodox tradition was maintained by Hindu and Muslim divines. It would not be correct to simplify the processes at work by saying that Akbar worked for unity or that Aurangzeb destroyed it. The processes of unification were interrupted by foreign interferences, and while two hundred years of British rule left its impress, the British regime by its policies contributed to the mutilation of the very unity for which it could take credit. The nationalist movement had its factionalism and the upheaval of Gandhi had its reaction in the upheaval which Jinnah caused. The leaders of the majority community made mistakes; when they could be generous, they were niggardly. The leaders of the minority community too made mistakes; when they could be rightly insistent, they were irrational.

No one now wants religion to be banned, not even in communist countries. But there is recognition even among the sacerdotal classes in India that, while religion in the sense of respect for God and fellow beings should govern all activity, it should be relegated to its proper place. It should not be a differentiating factor in the exercise of political or civil rights. The greatest agencies of secularism are economic. The communal and caste conflicts are a part of the frustrations of an underdeveloped economy. When the people are drawn increasingly into the production processes, communities will cease to think of themselves as communities. There will have to be a common civil code as there is now a common criminal code. The most creative process of the present is the economic process. And, whatever might be the troubled processes, a nation has teen in the making.

9

GANDHI AND NEHRU

Gandhi, who has left a lasting impress on modern India and whom many Indians consider to be the greatest Indian since Buddha, was an extraordinary man; a man who could arise only once in several centuries. It would be wrong to reduce him to godhead. He should be followed or rejected at least in parts, not placed on a pedestal and worshipped. Both mummification and deification have muffled him in a mist of mahatmaship. It is necessary to rescue Gandhi the man to realize, over thirty years after his death, that such a man walked on this earth. To know Gandhi, one has to get to his beginnings, his early struggles, the ceaseless effort and striving and experimentation by which a mere man, with modest qualities and strong appetites, evolved into a mahatma. He was not an incarnation of virtues assuming moral authority and sermonizing his people into satyagraha and feats of self-purification. From self-inquest to self-mastery, Gandhi went through a strange transfiguration, reflected in his changing dress from tail coats to loin cloth. It was a prolonged agony involving risks which required courage and utter indifference to life. At the climax of his career, Gandhi was a mahatma, but what had transfigured a mere man into a mahatma makes a fascinating story.

In the preparatory years of his struggle in South Africa he worked out principles and techniques which needed little change in the more spacious arena of the freedom struggle in India. Not only intellectually but physically too he suffered, was thrown out of railway compartments and once nearly beaten to death, and by all this he was being transformed. At Phoenix and Tolstoy Farm, he lived like a practising communist, making sandals, hewing wood, washing clothes, printing newspapers, with bare

sustenance, and trudging long distances. In India, he was further transformed. After a life-time of service, he wanted to live but he was killed by the bigotry, hatred and evil of centuries.

The manner of his living and the manner of his death have clouded the simple lesson of his life, that a man could reach the grandeur of true greatness by his effort. But however great Gandhi was, he was not a god. He was human, and he was as close to the people as any man could be. His admirers should not make him distant, a remote star to the people. Gandhi has suffered blurring in other respects too. He should not be classed among the religious teachers or moral philosophers who crowd the Indian calendar. He was essentially not a teacher; he was rather a rebel. His primary instinct was not to philosophize and reduce life to maxims, his instinct was to revolt against evils in society, subjection, injustice, inequality or wrong. His struggle in South Africa was against racial discrimination; in India, it was against the subjection of centuries. To many his greatest achievement would remain the winning of national freedom by devising a non-violent rejection of the insidious rule of the British. This national freedom he annotated into the larger social and economic freedom. In this prolonged struggle were embedded several moral strains inherited from India's long tradition, truthfulness, non-violence, renunciation and confession. But Gandhi was not a preceptor, a moral guide, for there were many others of this kind, even better trained and enlightened than he was. He was partly all these and for him life was an experiment with truth, but he was essentially a political and social revolutionary, who emphasized moral values to make means and ends as pure as possible, and the revolutionary forces which he released and to which Jawaharlal Nehru gave shape guided the Indian Revolution and have made it the most constructive of revolutions. The present collapse of public morality and growth of gigantic corruption cannot obliterate the underlying forces.

Gandhi did not seek to find a new church; he wanted no temple in his name. The world has not changed much since his death and this has added to the impression that he can be classed as one of those teachers who have effected no change in the world. If Gandhi were to appear in India now, all the religious

bigotry, communal hatred, sectarianism and social evils which still prevail would assume the shape of a bullet and kill him again. It would seem a futile task for anyone to foster morality, particularly political morality. Gandhi would not be of much value as a saint or a moral genius. Yet the moral equivalent to war which he devised in satyagraha and practised on a large scale in a subcontinent is a great and original contribution to social and political developments in the world. It is this aspect of Gandhi that should interest the world, while for India he would be of unceasing interest. If India were to benefit by his inspiration, it is not enough to remember only his contribution to the improvement of man and forget that he also wanted the environment to be transformed. No one of his stature has been as caricatured as Gandhi, and the worst caricatures have lived in Congress ministers. Congressmen have used him as their talisman without developing either truthfulness or the sense of non-possession which he held so vital for individual and national life. Non-Congress parties use Gandhi to criticize Congressmen asking them to practise Gandhian principles. Conservative parties twist his theory of trusteeship and use him to support the principle of predatory self-interest. No one has a right to establish a monopoly of the Gandhian heritage, and what are known as Gandhians are probably the most acquisitive closed shop among political workers. To Gandhi, there was no Gandhism.

The two men who were looked upon as closest to Gandhi in spirit, though in different respects, were Nehru and Vinoba and they were no monopolists. These two were carefully selected by Gandhi in 1940 for individual satyagraha against the war effort, Vinoba the constructive worker and Nehru the political worker. Nehru had state power and Vinoba was later mobilizing social power. Nehru with his state power tried his best to project Gandhi into the working of a modern nation state. In his life-time, he could maintain some standards, though the limitations of the party and the people asserted themselves. The whole of Gandhi could not have been absorbed in a nation state of India's dimensions. But Nehru could be said to have laid the foundations of secularism, democracy, planned development and socialism and a foreign policy of peace and non-alignment, which essentially means independence—all projections

of Gandhi. The economic ideas of Gandhi were knocked out in the process; for while they could be applied to villages or a pastoral society, they could not be woven into the fabric of a large modern state. If Gandhi's economics and ethics must go together, there is now only a clinging to his ethics and a fragment of his economics as in khadi and cottage industries. The Indian economy is now more in accord with world economy than with Gandhi's ideas. In the troubles of a traditional society in transition, the consequences of Gandhi have become mixed with the consequences of Nehru, and the consequences of Gandhi and Nehru have become mixed with those of Indira Gandhi. Both Gandhi and Nehru are becoming a submerged part of the Indian consciousness, as large as the Indian nation. Vinoba's bhoodan movement suggested revolutionary possibilities in the land situation. Political leaders like Jayaprakash Narayan joined it. In the end, it ceased to be a dynamic movement and even undermined the value of voluntary effort. Vinoba has settled down in a monastic seclusion establishing a moral authority which has been shrinking in its appeal and power. There is now a new cynicism, with the combination of money and politics as an increasing factor, which is sweeping aside old values, and it is difficult to see what will emerge, and what will remain of Gandhi or Nehru. But how much will remain will depend on the present and future generations. There are rival attractions of tin-gods and temporary ideologies, which show the way to power and money; and the youth, drained of idealism, are being organized into shock troops. But these are passing fashions too fragile to last into the eighties of advanced science and technology.

10

SECULAR OUTLOOK

The secular idea had to be propagated in India at the time of Partition, when the country was divided on the basis of religion and when Pakistan was being proclaimed as an Islamic state. It was also a repudiation of the separatism of the Muslim community, which had grown enormously since separate electorates based on communities had been accepted by Minto who was the Viceroy when Morley was Secretary of State. The *Cambridge History of India* says: "The name for India in the Avesta is Hindu, which like the old Persian Hi(n)du, is derived from the river Indus, Sanskrit Sindhu—the designation of the stream being transferred to the territory adjacent to it and its tributaries." The name "Hindu", for the people and for the religion, was given by the Muslim invaders. It could be applied to all Indians before Islam and other religions came, but it can no longer be so applied. The increasing integration of the diverse elements of the country can only be based on secularism, and socialism is a secular idea whether it is called social transformation or socialist transformation. Unity in diversity is the essence of national integration, and a unity based on a monolithic structure as Hindu revivalists would want it, is contrary to this concept. To them all Indians are Hindus, which would mean that if India is Hind, Hinduism is the religion of all religious denominations. This is anachronistic linguistics.

Secularism should mean that no one following any particular religion would suffer any disability in the eye of law and that men of all religions will have equal opportunities, privileges and rights under the Constitution. Gandhi was the most religious-minded of men and his attempt was to spiritualize politics,

but following Vivekananda and Ramakrishna, he affirmed the universality of all religions and did not think that all religions were equal only in the eye of law. Hindu conventions and Muslim conventions apart, what has been happening in several places in India should impress people with the dangers of religious denominations, distinct from the need for religion or the value of any religion. Not enough has been done to secularize life in India because of the need for vote-catching by political parties, and the Muslim vote is important even for predominantly non-Muslim parties. Even if the priestly castes do not intrude into politics directly, their hold on the minds of people is great and not apolitical. After sectarian warfares and Christian and Protestant martyrdom in Europe the Christian Church has had a long record in secular progress everywhere, but people are not free from the influence of the organized church. There has been greater timidity in India after freedom towards separation of religion from politics than there was.

There was a tradition of secularism in ancient India along with the stranglehold of religion and philosophy, which were more intertwined than in any other country. The kinship with nature which is reflected in the Vedic tradition was as much secular as religious, and the epics and the puranas reflect the same twin trends. There was always an emphasis on human rights and obligations and kinship was hedged by the need for moral sanctions. There was a strong strain throughout and almost every episode in the epics and the puranas emphasizes the ethical aspect. The Dharma-sastras and the Arthasastras continued the dual strain, as law and the judicial system developed and tolerance was the rule and persecution the exception in the conflict of religions, codes and castes. Manu, Yagnavalkya and others compiled their codes when India was settling down into social and economic strata. The sages and seers formulated the rules to be followed at every stage of life. While the Dharma-sastras treated social life from the point of view of religion and morality, the Arthasastras, of which Kautilya was the best compiler, studied contemporary states in their political and social setting, which could have been possible only from a secular outlook, for if *artha* is the object of man religion has little to do with it. Kautilya, the king-maker, was the forerunner of realistic politics of governance and of

methods of diplomacy. There was a parallel movement in the South, especially in the Tamil region. Asoka's reign forms a landmark in the history of the Indian state in its relation to religion. His personal faith was Buddhism and a few of his edicts proclaim him as head of the Buddhist church but he was not unfriendly to other faiths. Indian rulers, like Darius or Cyrus in Persia, allowed their subjects to keep their own religion. The tradition of tolerance remained even after Asoka. Akbar was the next great example of this tolerance, though his attempt to evolve a new religion, Din-e-Ilahi, did not succeed. But the Mogul state could not be an Islamic state with the Hindus as the majority of the subjects, in spite of Aurangzeb's aberrations. The Hindu ideas of state and non-state are modern, and there was a strain of secularism in the Indian tradition even before the British brought the spirit of the West.

There has been, of course, the process of secularization as there was in the West not only because of the Protestant movement against the Papacy but because of the progress of science and the spreading spirit of inquiry. The predominantly religious culture of the Middle Ages gradually vanished with the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment. From the discovery of the United States till the time of man's first landing on the moon, theology had to make way gradually but with grim inevitability. Secularization was a major social process for five or six centuries, though the term may have been used only in the nineteenth century. It may have been partly only a decline in the power and wealth and influence of organized religion or partly de-Hinduization in India like de-Christianization in the West. The impact of Christianity along with the impact of Islam on Hinduism and of western thought and literature was reflected in the several reform movements, the most powerful of them being the Brahmo Samaj, the Arya Samaj, and the translation of religion into organized social service as in the Ramakrishna Mission. The nationalist movement, in which all communities and religions took part, was a powerful secular influence. As the Renaissance in Europe led to unlocking of the treasures of paganism in Europe, in India the spirit of protest and reform led to the dethroning of religion and the priesthood. To the

Greek and Roman influences were added the intellectual processes of Western Europe, later of the United States, with the history of dissent and manifestations of the modern scientific spirit. The modern age, aided by scientific discoveries and inventions, has been also the age of sceptics. Revivalism was a by-product but its influence was not great. The rise of the press and the increase in the publication of rational literature were also energizing the secular outlook, which is not anti-religious but means impartiality towards all religions.

The increasing belief in the universality of all religions has helped disestablishment. Apart from its tortuous history of faith, dissent and persecution, Britain's established church does not mean any bias towards Protestantism. The British church is part of British history and though Catholic emancipation took time, nobody can say that Britian is a religious state. This secularization has become the practice in all countries not only of the West but of the East, because the advance of science has meant relegation of religion to its place and there could be no discrimination between persons professing different religions. The Indian Constitution contains provisions which protect the right of religions to run educational establishments, but in spite of reservation and other temporary safeguards for certain communities, the temper of the Constitution is secular. The temper of society is not so secular, and when two major religions like Hinduism and Islam had after tensions and conflicts agreed through their leaders on partition of the Indian territories, and the hangover of differences of outlook remained, secularism as a policy had to be emphasized. This was what Gandhi and Nehru did. Nehru was not a religious-minded man and he went further and annotated the secular outlook to mean the scientific outlook. He believed in science and spirituality.

India's secularism is not secular enough. It is not even strident anti-clericalism. The priesthood of all religions still exercise power and their help is sought at the time of elections and in pursuit of power. Hinduism, which was known for many protestant movements, was losing its philosophical inspiration and had become ritualistic and Islam in India had lost its capacity for introspection. Since these major religions were becoming petrified, they were becoming an inert, though influential,

background and ceased to have any relation to social and economic change, which are an inevitable mark of a modern state. The Pope was propagating democratic socialism through encyclicals and Hindu and Muslim politics were becoming double-faced, looking both to change and religion, which means caste, conservatism and priesthood. Even Marxists, who should be bold sociologically, are afraid of attacking the social fabric because they are afraid not only of the law which prohibits promotion of enmity between religious communities but of the hold of religion on life. Religion predominates in all contemporary philosophy, especially Indian philosophy. The religion of man has not yet replaced the religion of gods or their demi-god deputies like Sai Babas.

The progress towards secularism has not been spectacular, in spite of apologetic talk at seminars. Hindu law has been stripped of its scriptural formalism which made it a dead weight on the evolution of Hindu society, but secularism should mean a common civil code, and though Hindu personal law has been codified from usage, custom and multifarious moth-eaten codes, personal laws remain. There may be no discrimination or persecution, but India has not yet put religion in the place where it should belong. The failure of political parties to adequately absorb people of all religions into their fold and the failure of religious communities to spread themselves in all parties are shortcomings of Indian secularism. Indians are still distant from the secular idea as a non-religious attitude to life's problems. The secular outlook should be nothing less than the scientific outlook.

11

DEMOCRACY IN INDIA

Modern Indian democracy has been based on the democratic experience of the world. What is democracy? It can be easily defined, in Abraham Lincoln's words, as government of the people, by the people, for the people. But it has had such a long and varied and troubled history that no definition can be wholly adequate or can completely describe it. To many it is a way of life, not only political but social and economic. The political aspect has taken the form of struggle for liberty, for equality, for fraternity, struggle against power and privilege built on birth or wealth, race or creed. It means a struggle against monarchy or oligarchy, and their extreme forms like dictatorship of a man or of a group of men.

The essence of democracy, as it has been affirmed in theory and proved in practice, is equality. Aristotle, the father of political science, said that it was the denial of equality that was the cause of revolutions. The demand for equality may take many forms, equality between men of one colour and men of another, between class and class, between men and women, between one people and another. It is often a demand for economic equality, not merely political equality. If the American Revolution established the right to freedom, the French Revolution made equality a permanent part of the democratic creed and the Russian Revolution established economic equality as the basis of political equality. As political power should be diffused, economic power too should be diffused. If democracy is to be real, economic equality has to be real.

Democracy can take different forms and has acquired different meanings at different times. It was sometimes a form of

government where a whole body of citizens took political decisions, as in the city states of ancient Greece, small states which made direct democracy possible. It was at other times representative democracy where the citizens took political decisions through representatives chosen by them and responsible to them. Under constitutional democracy, where the constitution was often a written document, freedoms like freedom of speech and expression were guaranteed and the rights of minorities protected. In more modern democracies, social and economic rights are enumerated and guaranteed.

The word "democracy" is derived from the Greek *demokratia*, from *demos*, the people, and *kratos*, rule. The beginnings of the idea of democracy are associated with the city states of ancient Greece. It was only one of the five or six main types of government. Aristotle wrote of democracy in his *Politics:*

> A democracy is a state where the freemen and the poor, being in the majority, are invested with the power of the state. The most pure democracy is that which is so called principally from that equality which prevails in it; for this is what the law in that state directs, that the poor shall be in no greater subjection than the rich nor that the supreme power shall be lodged in either of these, but that both shall share it. For if liberty and equality, as some persons suppose, are chiefly to be found in a democracy, it must be so by every department of government being alike open to all; but as the people are the majority, and what they vote is law, it follows that such a state must be democracy.

Aristotle wrote on the basis of the political experience of ancient Greece. But that direct democracy was based on slavery and was not open to all citizens. Though it was treated as one of the forms of government, along with monarchy and oligarchy, did it not work in reality. From the city states and direct democracy to modern constitutionalism, it took nearly 2,000 years.

The idea of democracy acquired some definable form with the 1688 Revolution in England, the American Revolution, the French Revolution, the American Civil War and the Russian

Revolution. In England, guilds and local self-governments gave rise to the power of Parliament bequeathing what has come to be known as parliamentary democracy with its many variations. John Locke was the main philosopher of modern liberal thought. Rousseau and his *Social Contract* (1762), apart from Thomas Paine, was a great influence on the American Revolution, giving the thoughts enshrined in the American Declaration of Independence, and on the French Revolution, with its ideas of liberty, equality and fraternity. Lenin put his signature to the work of the anonymous masses in the Russian Revolution, which made economic equality a reality.

In England, the tradition of Parliamentarianism was strong from the Middle Ages, since Simon de Montfort summoned the Model Parliament in 1265. In spite of wars with other countries and the Wars of the Roses between rival sets of dynasties, the foundations of Parliament stood, though dynasties and kings were changing. In the middle of the seventeenth century, conflict over religious and constitutional issues, which had risen but was controlled under the Tudors who respected Parliament, led to an open break between king and Parliament. When Parliament won in the Civil War, the king, Charles I, was executed, but after ten years of Cromwell's rule by major-generals, called the Protectorate, monarchy was restored under Charles II. The Restoration, as it was called, was only in name, for the king was weaker and Parliament stronger. When James II tried to assert himself, he was driven out of the country and the power of the English monarchy was finally broken. The principle of parliamentary responsibility was established, and under the Hanoverian kings, the cabinet system and collective responsibility developed. Till the end of the nineteenth century, the sovereign still interfered. But in the twentieth century, representative democracy with collective responsibility under a Prime Minister was fully established and the franchise was gradually widened.

John Locke's treatise, his second one, *Of Civil Government* (1690), became a classic of modern liberal thought, establishing that property, defined as life, liberty and estate, is a natural right of man. When rulers violate the terms of the social contract by which governments are created, society has

a right to depose and replace them. One way of preventing governments from abusing their powers is to separate legislative powers from executive powers and see that they never fall in the same hands. Montesquieu popularized the theory and added a third power, the judicial one. This separation of powers became a basic doctrine of the American Revolution.

At that time, *The Social Contract* of Jean Jacques Rousseau had a great influence on men's minds. According to him, no law is legitimate unless it is an expression of the general will, a consensus of the whole community. Each man must participate in the expression of the general will, and must assume the responsibility of voting for a government to carry out the laws, a government subordinate to the general will. Rousseau may have been unrealistic and may have gone back to the direct democracy of ancient Greek city states, but his emphasis on the collective will, human dignity and moral responsibility was a contribution to modern democracy.

The British colonies in North America were provoked by many acts of colonial domination to assert stridently that there could be no taxation without representation. The Declaration of Independence, largely drafted by Jefferson and owing its inspiration to Locke, was a demand first for constitutional and then for democratic government. The American Constitution had to be a written one, and the elaborate system of checks and balances was eloquently justified by James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay in *The Federalist.* It is not a systematic theory of politics but is still a source of inspiration for republican and federalist ideas. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the outcome of the American Revolution was to create the first successful example of modern constitution and democracy, though slavery still existed.

The French Revolution was not based on a constitutional tradition but was a revolt against absolute monarchy. The Revolution derived its inspiration from Rousseau, Voltaire, the Encyclopaedists and the Enlightenment. It was a violent and disorderly revolution based on the Rights of Man which led to constitutional monarchy, then to absolute democracy, and finally to imperialism and dictatorship. The contribution of the French Revolution to democracy lay in the ideals of liberty, fraternity and equality, from the Declaration of the

Rights of Man to the Napoleonic Code. The ends justified the means.

The Russian Revolution owes its main inspiration to the theories of Karl Marx and the leadership of Lenin. Marx in his *Das Kapital* elaborated the earlier socialist position but in a revolutionary way. Its main doctrine is that all men have a right to enjoy the fruits of their own labour and capitalism rests on the expropriation of the surplus values created by and properly belonging to labour. Private ownership of the instruments of production cannot lead to economic justice. Ownership of the means of production must be shared by all the people. Economic relationships are the decisive factor in human life. Politics, law and religion are superstructures. Liberal constitutionalism is not democratic. Equality is the essence of democracy. Lenin's greatness was that he believed in Marx, created a revolutionary party to carry out his ideas, and in spite of opposition succeeded. A large part of the world, apart from the Soviet Union, is now based on Marx's ideas. It is a one-party democracy, based on the theory that all differences are expressed within the party. Marx and Lenin represented the Jacobin tradition. Indian democracy is heir to all this history.

The political organization of the Aryans can be only inferred from their legends. The rise of monarchies was natural at the outset, supplemented by the tribal assemblies, the Sabha and the Samiti, one a council of tribal elders and the other a general assembly of the entire tribe, both probably only with advisory functions when there was no elected monarch. When he was yet a tribal chief, the tribal assemblies carried out the functions of government. The kings were essentially military leaders, later expected to possess moral attributes, maintaining a moral law described as *Dharma*. The rudimentary administrative system consisted of the tribal kingdom, containing tribes, tribal units and villages. With the development of Brahminism, the priests, particularly the chief priest, came into their own and exercised not only spiritual but sacerdotal influence. The caste system provided the social structure gradually.

By 600 B.C. republics and kingdoms arose in northern India. The monarchies were concentrated in the Gangetic plain, while the republics were ranged around the northern part of these

kingdoms, in the foothills of the Himalayas and in north-western India. The republics varied in size and position. They either consisted of a single tribe like the Sakya or were a confederacy of tribes like the Yadavas. The republics were successors to the earlier tribes. The confederate tribes were often equal in status. The republics had more of equality among their citizens and were free from Brahmanical influence; the elective principle was observed. At the time of Buddha, republics were flourishing. At the time of Alexander's invasion, there were strong monarchs. Later empires emerged.

"Have you heard, Ananda," Buddha is represented as asking his St. John, "that the Vajjians foregather often, and frequent public meetings of their class? . . . So long, Ananda, as the Vajjians foregather often and frequent the public meetings of their class, so long they may be expected not to decline, but to prosper." This was his tribute to independent village communities governed by assemblies of family heads.

The view of western historians largely has been that the interest attaching to the gradual evolution of political institutions is lacking in Indian history. The early tribal constitutions of a republican or at any rate oligarchical character, which are known to have existed among the Malavas and other nations in the time of Alexander the Great, as well as among the Lichchhavis and others at a much later date, all perished without leaving a trace. Autocracy is substantially the only form of government with which the historian of India is concerned. Despotism does not admit of development. Individual monarchs vary infinitely in ability and character, but the nature of a despotic government remains much the same at all times and in all places, whether the ruler be a saint or a tyrant. There has been little dissent from those who take a sympathetic Indian view.

The phenomenon of the state from the time of the Rigveda onward has drawn the attention of students of Indian history. Yudhistira asked of Bhisma: "How is it that the king who is one is obeyed by the people who are many?" In ancient Indian thought the state is defined to contain the conditions of order, law, justice, security, and welfare, which are summed up as *Dharma*, though the state was the embodiment of *danda*, the force through which all laws are made effective. Whatever the

highmindedness of ancient governments, it could not be called democracy. Kautilya's *Arathsastra* was more a manual of administration than a textbook of political philosophy. The king was bound by duty, by justice, by mercy, and the system of administration might have been human and taxation might not have been rapacious either under monarchies or in the oligarchic republics, but it could not be called democracy and nobody even of the Buddhist fraternity called it so. Ancient Indian society, like all other such societies, was not static, except for certain things like caste. Next probably was the village community. Even in the time of Sir Charles Metcalfe, sometime Acting Governor-General, it remained the same. He wrote:

> The village communities are little republics, having nearly everything they want within themselves, and almost independent of any foreign relations. They seem to last where nothing else lasts. Dynasty after dynasty tumbles down; revolution succeeds to revolution; Hindu, Pathan, Mogul, Mahratta, Sikh, English, are masters in turn, but the village community collect their cattle within their walls, and let the army pass unprovoked; if plunder and devastation be directed against themselves and the force employed be irresistible, they flee to friendly villages at a distance, but when the storm has passed over they return and resume their occupation. If a country remains for a series of years the scene of continual pillage and massacre, so that the villages cannot be inhabited. the villagers nevertheless return whenever the power of peaceable possession revives. A generation may pass away but the succeeding generations will return. The sons will take the place of their fathers, the same site for the village, the same position for the houses, the same lands will be reoccupied by the descendants of those who were driven out when the village was depopulated; and it is not a trifling matter that will drive them out, for they will often maintain their post through times of disturbance and convulsion, and acquire strength sufficient to resist pillage and oppression with success.

Sir Henry Maine later idealized it. The Regulating Act of

1773 and Pitt's India Act of 1784 were the major British constitutional links with India. The Regulating Act bound Bombay and Madras to Warren Hastings in Bengal in uneasy association and Hastings himself was busy in warfare with his own council. The India Act set up a double government by which the East India Company, the greatest ruling company in history, was overseen in London by a minister known as the President of the Board of Control and in Calcutta by a Governor-General in whose appointment the state had a dominant voice. Thus British India came under the British Parliament's control. Cornwallis, who followed, was a reformer but he believed that "every native of India is corrupt". Under Wellesley and Dalhousie, the boundaries of British India were extensively extended. With the Great Rebellion of 1857, the company's rule passed to the Crown. The Board of Control disappeared in favour of a Secretary of State and the Governor-General added the honorific of Viceroy. The period from Canning's proclamation of the Crown's assumption of control to the Partition of Bengal in 1905 is known as the hey-day of British rule in India.

The Viceroys pranced about like prancing pro-consuls; there were reform movements and revivalism; there were political movements like the Indian National Congress with its moderates and extremists and there were increasing demands for political, economic and administrative reform. The Indian Councils Act of 1892, also known as Lord Cross's Act because Lord Cross was the Secretary of State, following the 1862 act, gave increased representation to Indians in the Viceroy's Legislative Council and introduced elections based on nomination. Even in this moderate step, great legislators like Gokhale, an able parliamentarian, emerged and crossed swords with Viceroys like Lord Curzon. The emergence of a strong Liberal Government in Britain led to the Indian Councils Act of 1909, usually known as the Morley-Minto Reforms. Indians had already been appointed to the Viceroy's Council and the India Council in London; now Indians were members of the provincial executive councils as well. The Imperial Legislative Council was enlarged from twenty-five to sixty members, twenty-seven of whom were elected. The Viceroy still presided but there was no official majority. Supplementary questions

and general resolutions in addition to questions and the annual budget discussion were now allowed. The provincial councils had similar changes. There was direct election for non-official seats and separate or communal representation for Muslims. The Muslim League had emerged. Indian moderate opinion was satisfied and the Delhi Durbar of George V in 1911 healed the wounds of Bengal Partition, which was annulled. The capital was transferred from Calcutta to Delhi. The war was an interlude which witnessed much cooperation and led to political unrest, the emergence of Gandhi, and new forms of Indian demands.

The Government of India Act, 1919, which followed the Montagu-Chelmsford Report, was called the Montagu-Chelmsford Constitution. The Preamble embodied in substance a declaration made in 1917 by the British Government that their policy was to increase the association of Indians in every branch of the administration and that their ultimate goal was "responsible government in British India as an integral part of the British Empire". This was not popular in nationalist India. The main provisions of the act seemed to amount to a half-way house towards a fully parliamentary government on the Westminster model. In the provincial sphere, the diarchic system was established, by which certain subjects like law and order were reserved for the Governor-in-Council, while other subjects like education and agriculture were transferred to ministers appointed by the Governor from among the elected members of the Legislative Councils. The Governor could choose ministers or members of the council from outside and he had power to certify an act or a budget or other demand for money which the Legislative Council rejected. At the Centre, it was provided that three members of the Viceroy's Council of seven should be Indians and two legislative chambers were established, the lower called the Legislative Assembly, the upper the Council of State. In both, the majority of members were elected and non-official. The Viceroy retained overriding powers similar to those exercised by the Governors and he was also head of the Chamber of Princes.

In 1928, the Simon Commission was appointed to review the working of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms. It was called upon to report "whether and to what extent it is desirable

to establish in British India the principle of responsible government or to extend, modify, or restrict the degree of responsible government now existing". The Commission was boycotted by most major political organizations because its terms were restricted and it was an "all-white" Commission. Its report was published in 1930 and considered at the three Round Table Conferences in London, called by the Labour and National Governments, between 1931 and 1933, to find the greatest measure of agreement. A white paper was issued and exhaustively discussed by a joint committee of both houses. The Government of India Act was passed in August 1935.

The two main features of the act were autonomy for the provincial governments, increased to eleven by the separation of Sind from Bombay and Orissa from Bihar, and a federal government at the Centre. Emergency and social powers were reserved for the Governors and the Governor-General, Aden was separated from Bombay and became a crown colony. While the act came into force in the provinces in 1937, it never came into force at the Centre and the Central Government remained unchanged. Thus for ten years two widely different systems coexisted in India, the 1919 act at the Centre and the 1935 act in the provinces. The princes who, at the Round Table Conference, had broadly supported the idea of a federal Central government, were reluctant to accede to the federation, and the act provided that federation should not be complete till half the princes had acceded. The outbreak of war in 1939 interrupted the process and produced a new constitutional situation in which there was a war-time emergency; the Congress had formed ministries in most provinces, and though they resigned on Britain's war policy, they had acquired administrative and constitutional experience. At this time Hindu-Muslim differences, especially Congress-Muslim League differences, were developing, and these became enlarged during the war, when the threat of invasion by Japan made assumption of responsibility and power nearer. During the war, the Cripps Mission which was meant to secure the co-operation of the Indian political parties in the war effort had failed, and the Quit India Movement which the Congress started in 1942 was suppressed. An uneasy stalemate prevailed till the end of the war.

In 1946, the British Government, in pursuance of their policy, sent a Cabinet Mission of three ministers, led by Lord Pethick Lawrence, Secretary of State, and consisting of Cripps and Alexander. Long and patient negotiations failed to produce a result. The mission produced an ingenious and complicated scheme for a federal centre with two groups of provinces, rejecting partition, but the mission's proposals were rejected by the Congress for some reasons and by the Muslim League for others. The mission's proposals, however, probably laid the foundations of the two new governments through Constituent Assemblies and they led to the formation of a government at the Centre, first by the Congress and then by a coalition of the Congress and the Muslim League, which ultimately led to Partition by a decision of the British Government. They announced that authority would be transferred in June 1948, and then, after efforts by Lord Mountbatten, the new Viceroy, advanced the date to August 1947.

12

PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY

England is the Mother of Parliaments, said John Bright, and whether it is literally correct or not, what is known as parliamentary democracy had its origins in Britain and has been largely shaped by the history of the British Parliament. It is distinguished from direct democracy which prevailed in ancient Greek city states, the presidential system in which the head of state is the chief executive, the collectivist system in which there is only one party which is identified with the state, the oligarchies, and the theocratic states. Based on British practice, and that of most members of the Commonwealth of Nations, as it is now known and was once the British Commonwealth, parliamentary democracy means representative government, in which the executive is responsible to the lower house of Parliament, as different from the upper house of elected, nominated or hereditary representatives; the head of state is elected or hereditary but only reigns and does not rule unless he is given exceptional powers of intervention, and there is an independent judiciary. There may be variations but parliamentary democracy is supposed to be the safest and the most refined form of representative government.

The Model Parliament which Simon de Montfort summoned as the virtual ruler in 1265 in the time of King Henry III, who was engaged in a struggle with the barons, may have been a good beginning for parliamentary democracy. But there were earlier parliaments. In medieval times a *parlement* or *parliamentum* was usually a meeting of the king in council to which judges were summoned for consideration of pleas, and petitions. Under the Norman kings, the *curia regis*, the king's court or council, considered and delivered judgments on petitions.

When courts were created for judicial business, the word *parliamentum* was applied to meetings of the clergy of the lords or the representatives of counties and boroughs, or merchants, or all of them. Edward I summoned knights and burgesses to the Parliament, of 1275, when the Statute of Westminster I was enacted with the assent of archbishops, bishops, abbots, priors, earls, barons and commoners. The first known use of the word *parlement,* for what was the king's council, came in the later years of Henry II. The Parliament rolls and the statute rolls began in 1278. The summoning of representatives of counties and boroughs was Simon de Montfort's idea; Edward I refined it by summoning two knights from each shire and two burgesses from each borough. Later the King's Council was separated from Parliament, and still later Parliament developed its legislative powers, while the bicameral system developed with the practice of archbishops, bishops, abbots, earls and barons sitting in one chamber and the knights and burgesses in another. If from the beginning the main use of Parliament was to raise resources, its importance increased under the Tudors who showed formal respect for it. When the Stuarts did not respect it, there was civil war, and Charles I was beheaded and James II had to flee the country. It was gradually that Parliament stopped exercising jurisdiction as the High Court of Parliament. The party system can be said to have begun in the time of James I and Charles I, in opposition to the king. The evolution of the cabinet system under the Hanoverians was another big development in the growth of parliamentary democracy. The extension of franchise, the growing power of the lower house, the assertion of the privileges and powers of the houses, the evolution of the office of Prime Minister from the time of Sir Robert Walpole to modern times are later developments. The British system is still evolving and it is difficult to incorporate the whole of the British system in any other country, if it has a written constitution. The British constitution is unwritten and flexible; when it is copied in other countries, it tends to be rigid. Lord Morley, the nineteenth and twentieth century statesman who was for some time Secretary of State for India, compared the transplantation of parliamentary institutions to India to the use of the Canadian fur coat in tropical conditions.

Yet, parliamentary institutions have been working in tropical countries, in Asia, in Africa, in the Pacific, or in the Caribbean.

Parliamentary democracy did not come to India with Independence. From Lord Cross's Act of 1892 to the Minto-Morley Reforms of 1909, to the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms of 1920, and then to the Government of India Act of 1935, Indians had been accustomed to legislative work, and this long training produced a good number of legislators, who had not only command of legislative procedure but eloquence in English. Gokhale and others could be outstanding legislators in any country, where the English language was known. Sinha, Sapru and others rose to high positions and showed that they could be cabinet ministers of high calibre. Motilal Nehru was the best leader of opposition India has had. Jinnah showed himself to be a great parliamentarian. But all parliamentary eloquence and ability were wasted for lack of power.

Independence revealed new possibilities with transfer of power. Even to those who had enjoyed wilderness and boycotted legislative councils, the Constituent Assembly and Parliament were attractions to which they adapted themselves easily. To Jawaharlal Nehru and others, parliamentary democracy was one form of democracy, and probably the best available and in which Indians had had long practice, because other forms of democracy, apart from the American democracy or the Soviet democracy, were not shining successes. Parliamentary democracy was not wholly British; it permitted local variations. It did not prevent democratic decentralization; there could be a broad base of local self-government with substantial devolution of power to sustain it and give it vigour. These experiments were made, though not always with success or with sustained enthusiasm, and they could be improved upon. Parliamentary government was government by discussion; it was responsible government. In the Constituent Assembly, Jawaharlal Nehru and others, who had been accustomed to open spaces, could show a flair for discussion, and were prepared to exercise responsibilities. He was easily the best parliamentarian because of the respect he unfailingly showed to Parliament. He had to face several general elections and he faced them

successfully. As Prime Minister, he had a commanding position, not only because he had high aims and had a great hold on the people, but he never showed dictatorial tendencies. He was a leader, and while he always respected the democratic process, he thought more of the spirit than of the formalities. He can be said to have established firmly the basis of parliamentary democracy in this country, giving it a secular socialist basis.

Jawaharlal Nehru was not the first to articulate the idea of a Constituent Assembly but he was the first to realize and propagate its revolutionary implications. In spite of the limitations under which it met, he sought to endow it with revolutionary temper and made it an instrument of revolution not only political but social and economic. It was not enough to have a constitution, a concept of territorial integrity and armed forces to defend it. His speech on the Objective Revolution was one of the greatest he ever made. Thereby he made Parliament realize its responsibility to carry the social and economic processes to the climax of a social and economic revolution. He saw the democratic process against the long drama of India's past, and the problem was to make a nation from a confused distraught people and all problems had to fit into this framework of national unity. The diversity of India's composite culture with its mary languages and religions was rather welcome to him because it meant a rich and colourful nation and he could not accept the concept of a monolithic state in the name of oneness of culture.

Parliamentary democracy demands many virtues as any democracy might, Nehru said once. It demands, of course, ability. It demands a certain dedication to work. But it demands also a large measure of cooperation, of self-discipline, of restraint. Whatever its aberrations and its moods, parliamentary democracy has functioned with a large measure of success in this country. The main defect of Indian democracy has been that, for whatever reason, one party remained in power at the Centre and in most states for nearly thirty years after Independence. While this may be understood or explained as fulfilment of the people's urges and needs; expressed repeatedly in several general elections, it had led to corruption of many kinds and opposition parties are getting increasingly frustrated

and obstructionist. As long as they feel they would never be an alternative Government, they will have a tendency to become irresponsible and take to direct action. With the 1977 elections, the situation seemed to have changed. The opposition parties had a chance of forming the Government and the ruling party was forced into the opposition. This made parliamentary democracy viable and workable. It had, of course, to satisfy the aspirations of the people. It could lead to tolerance, which is very necessary for the development of a proper parliamentary temper. But this was a short experience, and the country is again where it had been.

13

THE CONSTITUTION

The Indian Constitution was the result of long accumulated, if slow, revolutionary forces, not an act of the British Parliament, as the creation and the working of the Constituent Assembly which created the Constitution might make it seem. Gandhi was a political and social revolutionary, and the revolutionary forces, which he released and to which Jawaharlal Nehru gave shape, constituted the most constructive of revolutions. Any measuring of freedom merely by an act of Independence or by the frustrating fact of Partition would be incomplete. The idea of a Constituent Assembly as the assertion of the people's will and as the best and most valid form of creating a Constitution had been suggested from time to time, at least from the time of Dr. Annie Besant. It was Nehru who elaborated the idea as a revolutionary act, and when Gandhi blessed it, it became the most widely accepted forum for making the Indian Constitution. There had been many draft constitutions, apart from the drafts of the Round Table Conferences, and like the inventive Abbe Sieyes of France, there were many Indians who produced paper constitutions on this model or that. But the Constitution that emerged from the long, learned and interesting debates of the Constituent Assembly was accepted as the work of the collective wisdom of the best minds that were available in India. The Congress was in power but it chose many from outside its ranks for the Constituent Assembly and even included some of them in the first governments after Independence.

The idea of a Constituent Assembly had come from the American, the French and the Russian Revolutions, but constitution-making had to be initiated by an act of the British

Parliament and was accompanied by the bloodshed of Partition. There could not, therefore, be a covenant among the Indian people or their representatives to make a constitution when the Constituent Assembly met towards the end of 1946, amidst controversy. It was free to draw up any constitution it liked and it deliberated fully; in the process it borrowed from the letter and spirit and experience of many constitutions, or Precedents, as B.N. Rau, the Constitutional Adviser, collected and called them. India's foremost lawyers and politicians, who were for the Westminster type of parliamentary democracy, of which the country had had some experience, worked at it, borrowing from Britain, copying from the Government of India Act, 1935, and added to it the Fundamental Rights, the judicial review and separation of powers from the United States, and the Directive Principles of State Policy from Eire. Many critics said that the Constitution was a hotch-potch or was too long and cumbrous and might prove to be unwieldy and unworkable, but nobody could suggest how it could be wholly indigenous and Indian or short and simple or leave much to posterity as the Philadelphia product of the American founding fathers had done. By 1950, it was not possible to prepare a short and simple democratic constitution for a complex country like India with many diversities in her unity and with the compositeness of her culture or its haphazard political divisions with historical memories and subnational cultures. A short and simple and clear constitution like the Soviet or Chinese constitution was possible only with a simplified social and economic system. It was legitimate to judge the Indian constitution by its possible economic consequences and argue that it did not provide for easy social and economic change. But till that change took place, the Constitution had to provide for existing social and economic relations, and it had also to provide for complex, and artificial, federal relations taking over many of the provisions of the Government of India Act of 1935. It was with the acceleration of the social and economic forces that frequent amendments became necessary and there were differences between the executive, and later often Parliament, and the judiciary.

The Constitution was the work of many minds, most of them legal and not revolutionary minds, but they reflected largely

the political wisdom, knowledge of constitutional theory and practice, and the dominant economic interests of the time. Long-term social and economic development was envisaged through the Directive Principles. At the moment of Constitution-making, the dominant concern was the possible political consequences of the question which Abraham Lincoln had asked: Must a government, of necessity, be too strong for the liberties of its own people or too weak to maintain its own existence? Another main preoccupation was to maintain the unity behind the Union without weakening the federal relations, especially the relations between the Centre and the States.

The problem was to become complex and crucial with different parties in power at the Centre and in the States. It was not possible to provide for all contingencies of the impact of the political process and the working of parties on the constitutional process. The Weimar Republic of the Third Reich was based on high ideals but it could not withstand the attack on it of Hitler. The Spanish Republic before the war raised great hopes but it could not withstand the attack of Franco. It was not only the flexible spirit of the British Constitution which could withstand the vagaries of the party system but the responsibility and constitutional sense of the parties themselves. The democratic process has to reconcile the political, constitutional and economic processes.

The Indian Constitution provides for the parliamentary type of government as against the presidential type. The drift away from democracy in several countries takes the form of a presidential type of democracy. There have been dictators who have been voted to power through a plebiscite but without the reality of a democratic process. When political parties discredit themselves and distrust spreads against them, there is often the easy short cut of the dictatorship of a person, class or elite, or the armed forces. It is often a search for strong Governments as in Asian, African, South American countries which turn from the parliamentary executive to the non-parliamentary executive, with none of the American respect for equality, law, or fundamental rights. Even republics could succumb to overwhelming bursts of ignorance or popular prejudice. When Mehemet Ali of Egypt asked what a republic was, he was told: "When Egypt becomes a republic, you will

be the people, and the people would be the pasha." In a written constitution like the Indian Constitution, much constitutional practice had to be incorporated but everything could not be. The result is that Indians have to draw also upon American constitutional law and even incorporate it in amendments. The parliamentary system will work only if its underlying spirit is understood and respected. In Britain, the Tudors had a correct understanding of Parliament and the Stuarts had not, and that made a difference.

It is said that it is usually a little donkey that leads a caravan of camels. Leadership in a young republic is important. The Indian Constitution will depend for its success not only on the soundness of its provisions but on the temper of political parties reflecting the temper of the people. Spain at one time had 60,000 people who paid attention to politics, 20,000 of them in office and the others out of office, and this was the core of Spanish politics. Indian political parties have yet a flimsy basis. The threat to integration can come only from the selfishness and callousness of political parties which deny or decide what is known as the supremacy of the Constitution. It is the task of political parties to annotate the democratic process, or even the constitutional process, from day to day. Constitutional government is often threatened by war or absolutism. Lack of clear thinking, ignorance of the constitutional process or irresponsibility of parties can also pose threats.

If India is constitutionally a union, the political, social and cultural structure is essentially federal in character. National integration is, therefore, a necessary process. The task of overriding the States is as unnecessary as the campaign against centralization. Like other countries, India too has a solid south, but the north-south polarization is not a special problem for India. In this country, there is also an eastern problem. The Confederate flag still flies in Atlanta and other places as a matter of sentiment but it is not a threat to American unity. There can be no monolithic nationhood in India. The Indian nation is not one in the sense of being single-stranded. There are bound to be groups and communities within a nation and people can be simultaneously members of many different groups without being anti-national. National integration should not be strained to the point of denying the right to these diver-

sities. It is only a correct understanding of the nation-building process which can lead to a correct understanding of the constitutional process.

The conflicts in India between languages, between religions, between communities would be mere irritations of the integration processes, if economic sense and secular temper were to prevail. The Constitution tries to reconcile the conflicts and provide for economic development and secular temper, if the people are not forgotten. Hinduism and Islam, with not only their religious but social differentiation, are the two major strains in the Indian nation. The coming of Islam made a difference to Indian history and over one thousand years of history cannot be erased. The processes of unification were interrupted by foreign interference; the British regime by its policies contributed to the mutilation of the very unity for which it could take credit. There are now two independent Muslim countries on either side of India and cooperation between all three could be envisaged, as it was envisaged in the paper confederations once produced by Coupland and others, to preserve the unity of this subcontinent.

14

LEGISLATURE, EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIARY

The theory of the separation of powers is rightly attributed to Montesquieu (1689-1775), the famous French philosopher and man of letters. After nearly a lifetime of study, he brought out his *Spirit of Laws*, a political treatise often compared to Aristotle's *Politics*, in which Mentesquieu made three notable contributions: classification of governments, the theory of the separation of powers, and the political influence of climate. In his theory of the separation of powers, he divided political authority into the legislative, executive and judicial powers and formulated that in the state which effectively promoted liberty, the three powers must be entrusted to different individuals or bodies acting independently. The main example was England, though some said he exaggerated what he superficially saw in that country. This particular chapter, the most famous in his book, at once became the most important piece of political writing of the eighteenth century. The accuracy of the theory had been often disproved in the eighteenth century, but it was admired and held authoritative in England. It inspired the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Constitution of the United States. The argument for separation of powers were ably expounded in the learned writings which some of the founding fathers contributed to *The Federalist* to be later accepted in the Constitution. The separation may have been carried too far sometimes but it has operated well on the whole.

In Britain, there has been no rigid separation, but it cannot be said there is no separation at all. The Cabinet is separate from Parliament, though it has to be responsible to it. The

judges are appointed by the king, in later days on the advice of the Government. The Chief Justice and Lord Chancellor might be partymen, but as judges they are expected to act independently. In the United States, the separation is more formal. It has been said that separation has been carried so far there that Congress is almost a legislature adhering to the executive. In practice, the Senate has acquired vast powers in some matters. The President appoints the judges, and in Franklin D. Roosevelt's time, there was an attempt at what was known as "packing" the court to save the New Deal legislation, but the judges are selected in a non-party spirit and they act with independence, as they did in the Watergate affair. Chief Justice Burger had been appointed by President Nixon but his judgement went against the President's interests. The scope for independence was strengthened when the founding fathers left the Constitution to be interpreted by the Supreme Court, and Chief Justice Marshall asserted this authority in a striking manner with far-reaching consequences.

The discussions in the Indian Constituent Assembly followed the usual lines. The founding fathers accepted the theory of separation of powers but wanted to avoid rigidity. The scope of judicial review was comparatively restricted, but neither the amending process nor the scope of judicial review could be rigidly restricted. From the view that the Constitution was supreme, not the legislature, the executive, or the judiciary, it is now largely accepted that Parliament is supreme. As a body elected on the basis of adult suffrage, it could claim to be popularly more representative than the Constituent Assembly elected on the basis of restricted franchise. Into this amending process, the Supreme Court has introduced the theory that the basic features of the Constitution cannot be changed by Parliament and that only a new Constituent Assembly could adopt a new Constitution, a view laid down by Chief Justice Subba Rao and a majority in the Golaknath case. The view held by the majority in the Kesavananda Bharati case is that the basic features cannot be touched and that the right to property is not a basic right. Parliament's supremacy to amend the Constitution is accepted but not its right to amend the basic features. But if basic features are not to be what the Supreme Court decides they are, they have to be formulated clearly. The effort to get

round the difficulty that the Constitution is what the Supreme Court says it is continues, under a Janata Party Government or a Congress Government.

There has been no doubt among most jurists, judges and legislators about Parliament's power to amend any part of the Constitution, including Part III of it concerning Fundamental Rights. From the first amendments to the Constitution till the Golaknath case, it was accepted that under article 368 of the Constitution, Parliament had the right to amend any part of the Constitution under the procedure laid down under that article and that article 13(2) of the Constitution, which says that "the state shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this part and law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void" is no bar to it. "Law" is not an amendment, and Part XX of the Constitution, which contains only article 368, is entitled "Amendment of the Constitution" and should be held to govern all other provisions. Confusion had been created in several judgements because the marginal note to article 368 described the article as one prescribing the procedure for amendment. Considering the heading of the chapter containing only this one article and the practice of disregarding legislative proceedings, speeches and marginal notes in interpreting statutes, article 368 has been generally held not only to confer on Parliament the power to amend any provision of the Constitution but prescribe the procedure for it. If any provisions were intended to be saved from amendment, the exceptions would have been expressly mentioned. Besides, the power to amend is not directly mentioned anywhere else. Article 368 seems to be clearly self-contained. The proceedings of the Constituent Assembly also support this view, and this was the view held by the Supreme Court till the Golaknath case, which applied the doctrine of *Stare decisis* to all previous amendments and held that only future amendments should not encroach on the Fundamental Rights, a stand for which there is no wide support. The decisions taken by the Supreme Court previously should not be disregarded. After the Golaknath and Kesavananda cases, the issues became controversial, extending to political controversy. It became a case of Parliament versus the judiciary, and the scope of judicial review

and the nature of judicial outlook and prejudice have been increasingly discussed.

In discussing the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles, harmonious construction is important. The framers of the Constitution gave due place in the Preamble to the unity of the country, to the democratic way of life, to liberty, justice and fraternity. The Fundamental Rights are important but they have to be reconciled to the Directive Principles. "The Indian Constitution", says Granville Austine, "is first and foremost a social document. The majority of its provisions are either directly aimed at furthering the goals of the social revolution or attempt to foster this revolution by establishing the conditions necessary for its achievement. Yet, the core of the commitment to the social revolution lies in Parts III and IV, in the Fundamental Rights and in the Directive Principles of State Policy. These are the conscience of the Constitution." If Parliament and the judiciary, besides the executive, are agreed on this, there would be no conflicts between them. Democracy does not believe in dogmas even in the sphere of socio-economic activity. In the achievement of this objective, law has to play an important role. The courts interpret the laws and test them in the light of the objectives of the Constitution.

It might seem that the Indian Parliament has liberally exercised its power to amend the Constitution. The U.S. Constitution came into effect in 1789 and only 22 amendments have been made in it over a period of more than 180 years; the Indian Constitution, which came into force in 1950, has been amended over 40 times. But the criticism of too frequent amendment is fallacious and not well-founded, because of the different conditions in which the U.S. and Indian Constitutions came into being. The American conditions were propitious. The Indian conditions are those of a developing country. Besides, the 1789 world was static and the 1950 world dynamic. The Indian judiciary showed too legalistic an attitude and the Indian Parliament suffered from a sense of urgency. Whatever could be said of recent amendments, most of the earlier amendments would seem to be justified in the social and economic and even legal conditions in which they were made. Justice Gajendragadkar, for some time Chief Justice of India, takes this view, though he agrees that several additions made, and the manner in which

they were made, in the Ninth Schedule from time to time deserved sharp judicial comment.

It is not possible or proper for one generation to bind another generation. As Tom Paine said: "There never did, and there never will, and there never can exist a Parliament, or any description of men, or any generation of men, in any country, possessed of the right of the power of binding posterity to the end of time. The vanity and presumption of governing beyond the grave is the most ridiculous and insolent of all tyrannies." But if a Constitution is too rigid and difficult to amend, it is also tyrannical, or, as it has been said, it places the sceptre over a free people in the hands of dead men. According to Jefferson, each generation has the right to determine the law under which it lives. The machinery of amendment should be like a safety-valve, according to a leading jurist. Article V of the U.S. Constitution is such a safety valve. The amending process in other written constitutions is similar to that outlined in article 368 in the Indian Constitution.

The highest courts have been given safeguards for non-interference by the executive or the legislature by the security and immunity they enjoy and by special procedures of impeachment. Yet the executive can interfere at the stage of appointment, at the stage of promotion and after retirement. There have been also cases of gross and crude interference. The safeguards need to be further strengthened. The best of them lie outside the Constitution, in the inner integrity which each branch of the Government has to develop. For this, there should be better understanding of the role of each. Judges interpret the laws, including the Constitution; it is open to the legislature to amend the law and to Parliament to amend the Constitution, if it is a fact that a particular law or a particular article of the Constitution has been wrongly interpreted. The legislature, the judiciary and the executive which includes the far-spread bureaucracy—each is supreme in its own sphere. They are all instruments. The rule of law means the supremacy of the ordinary law, equality before the law or the equal subjection of all classes to the ordinary law of the land administered by the ordinary law courts, and, contrary to Dicey's view, it may include administrative law. Everyone may be said to be a prisoner of his prejudice, but barring aberrations, there should be no conflict between the executive

and the judiciary, though the executive sometimes can give a wrong lead to the legislature.

Justices Black and Frankfurter said: "While the language of the Constitution does not change, the changing circumstances of progressive society, for which it was designed, yield new and fuller importance to its meaning". Judges are expected to remember this principle in interpreting provisions of the Constitution. Justice Cardozo said: "My duty as a judge may be to objectify in law not my own aspirations and convictions and philosophies, but the aspirations and convictions and philosophies of men and women of my times." Justice Learned Hand said: "I often wonder whether we do not rest our hopes too much upon constitution, upon laws and upon courts. These are false hopes, believe me, these are false hopes. Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can save it; no constitution, no law, no court can do much to help it. While it lies there, it needs no constitution, no law, no court to save." This is wisdom which Indian democracy should absorb as its moving faith, that democracy must be a synthesis of legislative, judicial and executive functioning, though separate in their spheres. Under present procedures, however, there seems to have been too much of law, too little of justice in India.

15

PARTIES

It is now accepted in practice that political parties are essential for democracy, parliamentary or non-parliamentary, and for any other system, and not many believe in partyless democracy. Burke expounded party more eloquently than any other statesman, defining party as "a body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest, upon some particular principle on which they are all agreed". Thus, party came to mean principled politics, and each party is distinguished from other parties by a set of principles or interests, basically economic interests, though John Sturat Mill wrote his book on "Representative Government" without referring to party.

In Britain parties arose, after dynastic wars like the Wars of the Roses, in the struggle between the king and Parliament. In their origins, these parties hardly used parliamentary language. In the time of Charles II, the Tory was described as "a monster with an English face, a French heart and an Irish conscience, a creature of a large forehead, a prodigious mouth, supple hams and no brains", and the Whig was called "a snivelling saint with cropped hair and demure looks, a Jesuit disguised in a Scotch bonnet". Party invective slowly improved in skill and elegance, and even outside Parliament it could be described as largely parliamentary. Describing the characteristics of the British party system in 1960, Jennings, an authority on the British Constitution, says that, while the parties are parliamentary parties, members of Parliament are elected in a wider sense by organizations in their constituencies with whom the candidates pledge themselves to support a particular parliamentary party. The national party, the parliamentary party, and the constituency party support a party policy, which varies

from general election to general election, but which depends in some measure on a set of political principles or perhaps prejudices, which change more slowly. "Party" is thus a complex idea which has deep roots in British political history but has changed its nature in the process of evolution and is changing even now. Like Topsy and the British Constitution, it just "growed". Most of its characteristics are derived from the nineteenth century practice, but the legal theory on which it is founded dates from the Bill of Rights.

The party system varies in other countries. The constitutions of one-party states like the Soviet Union refer to party. In the United States, party was looked upon as faction and derided, but the party system established itself, with two parties, after some confusion and realignments, into the Republicans and the Democrats. These are usually state parties but function as national parties at the time of the Presidential election. Attempts at forming a third party have failed. In France, the weaknesses of the multi-party system led to a balance in favour of a presidential executive. In Holland, Belgium, and the Scandinavian countries, too many parties have not meant too weak governments. In Canada, there are two major parties, but no cabinet can be less than cautious because of the balance of race and language. As the history of countries with parliamentary democracy has shown, the party system has meant that, whatever might be the tendency to degeneration and its contribution to corruption in public life, it is the soundest possible basis for democracy, at least for parliamentary democracy. It implies a statement of principle, however evasive or ambiguous, a known course of action, whatever the aberrations, and public answerability, however limited.

Indian political parties were not easily distinguishable from one another till recently, and though ambitious in their aims and Platonic and pietistic in their approach, they were multi-class and predominantly middle-class. In a capitalist or predominantly bourgeois society, with a few socialist groups, it did not seem to matter, and they continued to represent middle-class morality, middle-class interests and middle-class ambitions.

The peasants form about seventy per cent of the population, and the peasant outlook was projected in all parties. The rich peasant is conservative, the middle peasant is inert and does

not know what the next land reform will be like, and the small peasant is unorganized. The working class was not only divided, it was not even effectively organized under any of the Communist or Socialist parties or groups. When parties were behaving like groups and groups were becoming factions for sectarian or personal reasons, socialists of many kinds, Marxist, semi-Marxist, pseudo-Marxist and anti-Marxist factions, feudal remnants, industrial interests, working class interests and peasant interests were all promiscuously organized. Almost every political leader was a cynical practitioner of the party system, and this country has produced almost no political philosophers in modern times.

Under the long rule of the Congress, there was the corruption of long one-party rule, on one side, and the irresponsibility of a long-frustrated opposition or oppositions opposed to one another, on the other side. The predominance of independents, who are independent not only of others but of principle, was a new danger, added to splits and mergers, repeated and duplicated on no discoverable principles. The united fronts against the Congress were not successful either as oppositions or as governments. Among the parties, only the Swatantra Party seemed to offer a feeble alternative with its conservative, and sometimes counter-revolutionary, slogans. The rest of the parties, apart from the Jana Sangh, claimed to be socialist, yet they were as ranged against each other as they were all ranged against reaction. Everyone seemed to be fighting against everyone else. From the confusion, only the Congress seemed to derive considerable benefit; it had been tried and tested and not found wholly wanting. In spite of four general elections, the people could not yet be said to be experienced enough to vote for party and not merely for candidates, for if the candidate becomes more important than the party, not only personal but caste considerations might prevail.

The difference between one-party and multi-party systems is important, though each system depends on the environment and on the country. The basis of a one-party system as it began in the Soviet Union is that in a state of one class, there are no class conflicts and, therefore, there is no need for parties based on economic interests, which are the basis of political differences. The present one-party systems which exist in Africa are

not based on economic theory but on the common goal and the common programme. While the Soviet Union can be said to have achieved inner-party democracy throughout its sixty years of struggle for socialism and can claim to be no longer totalitarian with the imposition of a class dictatorship, this cannot be applied to the new one-party regimes in other countries.

Britain and the United States are classic examples of the two-party system, though it may be accidental that no large third party has emerged in either country. The emergence of the Labour Party and its displacement of the Liberal Party in Britain is rather an exceptional development, though usually third parties have been weak. In larger countries with more complicated social and economic set-ups, the multi-party system has emerged and seems to answer complex urges. It is sometimes a case of excessive intellectualism as in France and pre-Hitler Germany. In countries with multi-party systems, coalition governments are the rule, and so also coalition oppositions. The two-party system is comparatively simple permitting easy alternatives, though a two-party system might conceal more than two parties by inner-party struggle between groups. The vagaries of the voting system have led to a demand for proportional representation and other reforming devices like referendum and recall. But it is difficult to lay down ideal rules for division or working of parties; they are governed by historical developments and the needs and urges of the people. For countries like India, the choice is not theoretical. The essence of the problem may be whether the differences between parties are fundamental or the parties differ on particular points within the framework of fundamental agreements. It is possible to work by consensus and achieve agreement on fundamentals.

The Emergency made the difference in India and led to a breakthrough in all aspects of Indian democracy, including party. The Janata Party was a party of parties and only achieved a little more coherence than the S.V.D. Governments of 1967, trying to produce an economic policy for the times, laying more emphasis on rural reconstruction than on industrialization. It had a ready-made foreign policy, which it had accepted with some new accents but with no departures from the old directions. The Congress was a viable opposition, but it later broke

up, making the opposition as weak and divided as it had been before. It was clear the Janata Party would not remain solid and united, with the contrary pulls of its different constituent units, and the Congress, in its different disguises and labels, is moving to new alignments. There are other parties, especially the Communist parties, and some regional parties. There is now more of a semblance of a party system than before, for there is less of frustration and, therefore, of recourse to direct action, among the opposition parties. But still there are not only groups within parties but groups within groups. There are such groups, particularly in the Labour Party in Britain and in other countries too but they do not threaten to destroy the identity of the party.

India is full of party activity as usual, but it may be too early still to talk of a party system. The impact of this political indiscipline remains a threat to the Constitution and constitutionalism. Even prophets cannot prophesy whether the present situation will lead to a two-party system, a multi-party system, or a one-party system, as in some African countries where they claim to be practising parliamentary democracy with a presidential system.

16

THE VOTE

Parliamentary democracy is representative democracy and its success depends on how the people vote. It is not merely a question of choosing representatives but of choosing parties. With more than one party, the art and science of parliamentary democracy lies in the agreed game of the opposition allowing the government to govern and of the government allowing the opposition to oppose. In Britain and other countries, the leader of the opposition is as much respected as the leader of the government, for he is the alternative Prime Minister, and today's shadow cabinet may be tomorrow's cabinet. At ceremonial functions, they sit side by side. In the several general elections in India, the people have been learning how to vote. There can be no going back on adult suffrage, on which all parties were agreed at the time of Independence, though it has multiplied the vagaries of the vote. In Britain local self-government is the base on which parliamentary government rests; in India, apart from the old surviving village communities, self-government with elections is being established at the base. The vote thus operates at every level. How to choose is a problem; how to choose in such vast electorates in highly expensive elections is the crux of the problem of elections in India and in a way of the problem of corruption.

India plunged into adult suffrage in conditions of mass illiteracy. The electorate has voted in many elections for the Lok Sabha and State legislatures and they have not only been free and fair but peaceful. The Indian voter may be illiterate largely but he knows his interests. When the constituency for the Lok Sabha represents nearly a million people and the constituency for the State assembly anything from two to three

lakh people, election expenses cannot be met within the legal limits. This basic question has to be solved by all political parties. Among Indian parties, the main consideration in selecting candidates is not only their intellectual and moral calibre but their ability to secure success at the polls. The power of local appeal and, in the case of political leaders, the power of personality would be an asset. As three or four constituencies for the State assembly make a constituency for the Lok Sabha, candidates for the State assembly can carry on their backs the candidates for the Lok Sabha and not unoften a strong candidate for the Lok Sabha can give a pull to the candidates for the State assembly. In the large Indian constituencies, few candidates can afford to contribute fully to the organizational and election expenses; the burden falls mainly on the party exchequer. Election expenses are a crushing burden. The Congress has had an advantage because it has had larger resources, but not all candidates can win on their own. Party propaganda and appeal may or may not help. All parties talk of limiting election expenses, but even legitimate expenses would be large enough in large constituencies. The election law is strict, but direct elections on such dimensions are bound to be expensive. No party now suggests indirect elections, though Gandhi suggested them at the Second Round Table Conference and Jawaharlal Nehru did some loud thinking about them after the first general election. Legislators are for increasing their salaries and allowances as they may have to contribute more to the party funds. Even then, unless parties are equally affluent, they cannot hope to fight elections on equal terms. Elections have become a major, even the main, source of corruption, and it is corroding the democratic process.

The people, however, stick to parliamentary democracy, in spite of its expensiveness, its slowness and its ritual. The experiment of guided democracy or basic democracy has been shown to be nearer to dictatorship than to democracy and far more imperfect than parliamentary democracy. The presidential system, a fashion in Latin America and now being practised in Africa, has grave uncertainties; though it has worked well in the United States and is being practised with mutations in France, it deprives the people of ultimate initiative and gives no guarantee of a succession of good popular

leadership. The alternatives of indirect elections, rule by committees, referendum and recall have all only emphasized that politics is the art of the possible. It is not possible to think too literally of May's *Parliamentary Practice* outside Britain. British democracy has, of course, some archaic features, which need not all be copied. The Indian people do not possess the long British experience, but they have common sense, and they can discuss their problems. It is not certain that parliamentary democracy can solve pressing economic problems immediately in developing countries, but it only means that no democracy can. There has been faith in parliamentary democracy and it may have increased with the Janata Party's brief spell of power and there is also faith in the freedom and fairness of general elections. Irrespective of party, this is a great gain.

The people are important in any democracy, and they are naturally more important in countries with large populations than in countries with small populations The Indian Constitution puts the emphasis on "We, the People". This should not mean mere trading in their name at the time of general elections. Even in Britain, there was much trading in popular fallacies not long ago. Joseph Chamberlain referred to honourable members opposite who professed on all occasions to speak for the people with a capital 'P', and added, "The honourable members tell us it is a shameful thing to fawn upon a monarch, so it is, but it is a more shameful thing to truckle to a multitude." In countries like India where there is a wide gap between the ruling classes and the people at large, the multitude is not to be jeered at. When the Constitution-makers, elected on a limited franchise, referred to the people, they not only sought to widen their base but knew their ultimate masters, who, howsoever illiterate or uninstructed, could be mobilized for effective political action. Freedom for the country had been won by truckling to the multitudes.

Gandhi made the people fashionable. His approach was derided, criticized and opposed, and his appeal was considered unintellectual by moderate leaders who thought in terms of Victorian liberalism, when that liberalism was dynamic. In the non-violent but revolutionary processes he released, Gandhi made many leaps over short-term methods like terrorism and

slow-motion strategy like remonstrances, resolutions, adjournment motions and token cuts. In the Gandhian context, the people could only be the millions of people in the lakhs of villages and Gandhi concentrated on them at a time when the industrial proletariat was not yet significant. Village economy, village sanitation, village handicrafts, and the classes and castes of the villages became Gandhi's absorptions. It did not seem revolutionary, for it was difficult to force change in the villages when no encouragement was given to violence, but it was as revolutionary as in the Chinese situation in places where feudalism was a far more powerful incendiary factor which Mao seized for his revolution. The abolition of zamindari was an item in the Congress programme under Gandhi, and if it did not lead to the revolution which was implicit in it, it was because it was not followed up by changes in the social and economic set-up. The Gandhian approach did not lead to the Gandhian revolution.

Yet the people were emerging to the forefront. Adult franchise was a part of the faith in the ultimate power of the people. The people were not expected to exercise sovereignty directly, though no distinction was made by Dicey's Indian followers between legal sovereignty and political sovereignty. There was not much of a corpus of constitutional sense in this country. Adult franchise was adopted in one big step and the consequences were not probably fully calculated. Yet nobody could say it was a wrong step, for if it had not been adopted, the franchise would have become a plaything of party politics. Adult franchise, of course, created difficulties in Indian conditions. As long as Indians voted for cows, bulls, trees, huts, lamps, and other things or even put marks on the ballot-paper, they could not be said to constitute an articulate democracy prepared to indicate their choice clearly, if not correctly. It might mean that they were not capable of voting correctly. It might even mean that they were not capable of being instructed well in the issues of an election or even in the broader issues of politics. There were large areas of dangerous indolence and ignorance in such a democracy. It was far from the mass communication methods of American democracy and the highly mechanized system of voting for a multiplicity of offices; nowhere near the door-to-door canvassing of British democracy. In both countries,

the uncertainty of voting behaviour had been reduced through long experience, apart from the simple design of a two-party system. In India, there are naturally more uncertainties even now. Without full literacy, the value of the vote is limited. It is still a less dangerous form of expressing the people's choice than the hysterical process of plebiscites, by which Louis Napoleon or Hitler could rouse the people to indicate thoughtless votes of confidence. Without plebiscite, demagogues like Lloyd George could make the people vote in a coupon election, though even after victory in war, Winston Churchill failed to win.

There are several hurdles between the people and their objectives. The rights, privileges and powers of Parliament can become unreal in terms of the unexpressed urges of the people. This is because the people are not yet fully articulate and cannot elect the kind of Parliament they would like or because of the interposition of the party system between the people and the political and constitutional processes. It has been said that British parliamentary democracy worked at its best in the third quarter of the last century when the franchise was limited. The quality of democracy depends on the franchise, but it has become difficult to affirm that there is no fundamental right to vote, and in large, uninstructed democracies, the risks of adult franchise have been cheerfully taken. The parties impose a sifting process and the instruction of the electorate and the working of the democratic process are their responsibility. It is not easy to correct either voting behaviour or the voting system, but it is possible to foster faith in broad-based action by making parliamentary democracy representative, reliable and efficient. The swing towards a presidential type has taken many forms; it is called direct democracy, guided democracy, or basic democracy. It is a swing towards dictatorship. The trouble with these manifestations is that they truckle to the multitude to disregard it ultimately. The world is not yet safe for democracy, several years after Woodrow Wilson made it the main aim of the Allies in World War I, but it is equally true that democracy is not yet safe for the world.

17

THE SPIRIT OF DEMOCRACY

The spirit of democracy is more important than the letter of democracy. Even when formal democracy was established, it took time for it to be broad-based and to be sufficiently representative and fulfil effectively people's aspirations. More than a century after the emancipation of slaves, equality is not fully realized in the United States. It has been gradually that British democracy has been made real by extension of suffrage, and the question of reconstituting the House of Lords radically is not yielding an easy solution. The reality of the suffrage is one test of democracy; effective participation by the people or their representatives is another. There can be no end to reform or efforts to improve the mechanics of democracy. The Republic of India, which started with adult suffrage under great limitations, will require the flesh and blood of social and economic transformation which, apart from what is contained in the Constitution, starting from the Preamble onwards, depends on the people realizing their rights of common citizenship and asserting them in an organized and peaceful way. It is by the vigilance of the citizens that the Constitution can be an effective instrument of their needs and urges and the Republic can be made safe and strong. The increasing articulation and participation of the people can make democracy real and endow it with spirit.

Even among democracies in old times, there are examples of the spirit giving effect to the letter, as in Periclean Athens (roughly 480-399 B.C.). Athenian democracy, the best example of democracy at its best in ancient Greek states, reached its zenith under Pericles, militarily, culturally and politically. It was, however, a limited democracy because only a small

minority of the people could read and because it was difficult to reach Athens from the remoter towns of Attica. The franchise was restricted to those sons of the free Athenian parents who reached the age of twenty-one and only they and their families enjoyed civil rights or directly bore the military and fiscal burdens of the state. It amounted to a small circle of 43,000 citizens out of an Attic population of 315,000. Political power was formally equal, each citizen enjoying equal rights in law and in the assembly. The citizen not only voted but took his turn as a magistrate or a judge; he was free, ready and able to serve the state at any time. The manual worker was usually unfit for citizenship, though the peasant proprietor enjoyed the right. Nearly 115,000 slaves of Attica, all women, and nearly all working men, all resident aliens and consequently a great part of the trading class, were excluded from the franchise. The voters were loosely divided into oligarchic and democratic factions and the dividing issues were usually the franchise, whether it should be extended or not, the powers of the assembly and the government's attitude to the poor and the rich. Among the clubs which existed, religious clubs, military clubs, workers' clubs, actors' clubs, political clubs, and clubs devoted to eating and drinking, the strongest were the oligarchic clubs, against whom stood relatively democratic parties. The conflict between oligarchs and democrats went on from the time of Solon, and Pericles tried to bypass them by a subtle mixture of democracy and aristocracy.

Every voter was of right a member of the basic governing body—the assembly, which met four times a month and voted by show of hands, unless someone called for a secret ballot. The assembly was said to be a difficult audience; a bad speaker was hooted off the rostrum. Above the assembly in dignity but inferior to it in power was the council which was originally an upper house but in the time of Pericles was in effect a legislative committee of the assembly. To perform its varied tasks, the council divided itself into ten prytanies, or committees, each of fifty members, each prytany presiding over the council and the assembly for a month of thirty-six days. This democracy has been called the narrowest and fullest in history, narrowest in the number of those who shared its privileges and fullest in

the directness and equality with which all citizens controlled legislation and administered public affairs.

This democracy produced glorious results. It had its weaknesses: an assembly without a check on its moods, encouragement of demagogy and wasteful ostracism of able men, the lot and rotation system for public offices which led to confusion, and factional disorderliness. But it was a democracy which could call into existence Aeschylus and Euripides and Sophocles, Socrates and Plato; it was no laissez-faire state; it financed the Greek drama and built the Parthenon; it was responsible for the welfare and development of its people and opened up to them the opportunity of not only living but living well. The faults of Pericles and of Athenian democracy have been generally forgotten in remembering one of the golden ages of the past.

It is not possible to take refuge in the golden ages of the past. The golden age of Asoka or of the Guptas is among the golden ages of Indian history. The Republic of India has to think of the present and enable all its citizens to live up to the ideals of the Preamble to the Constitution. For this full literacy and other goals embodied in the Directive Principles of State Policy have to be realized, so that the citizen can exercise his full rights in a democracy and feel that he is equal to all other citizens. He has to participate in the nation-building process which goes on at many levels. Fear prevails in the present tension-ridden world, and freedom from fear is necessary.

The Indian Revolution reflects this temper. It is a temper of peaceful change, social change and economic change. The greatest possible sensation at present, which Parliament and the press can increasingly reflect, is the sensation of social and economic change. A revolution is a process, not an event, though some happening or person becomes associated with it. It does not matter whether the Indian Revolution started with Raja Ram Mohun Roy or with Mahatma Gandhi. In Indian conditions, and under British rule, it was largely a peaceful change, but it is no less a revolution than other revolutions because it is peaceful. Like other revolutions, the Indian Revolution has had its own renaissances and reformations, and both Gandhi and Nehru were social and economic revolutionaries.

The amount of social and economic change, which India must achieve as rapidly as possible for its health and strength, is summed up as social transformation, which others call socialism. Whether the word is retained in the Preamble to the Constitution or not, it is only through socialism that a country like India can strengthen its independence and achieve self-reliance. It is almost a common programme of most parties now, though the emphasis differs and even definitions differ. But there is general agreement under any definition that people must own the means of production and distribution. This is democracy, looked at from another point of view. It has been clear after years of planning and the policy of non-alignment and peace in foreign affairs that for rapid social and economic transformation, Indian planning has to be socialist planning in Indian conditions. Besides, it has been increasingly realized that while socialism can exist only in conditions of democracy, democracy in Indian conditions can exist only in conditions of socialism. There need be no inconsistency between socialism and democracy. In terms of the people's needs and urges, the processes are the same. The democratic process will be real and can enhance its value with socialist advance.

This has been the Indian experience after Independence too. Almost every social and economic legislation has been an attempt to reconcile the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles. Property, which was once an insignia of citizenship, is no longer held to create fundamental rights and stand in the way of realization of the removal of vested interests for the exercise of equal rights. After long debates it seems the legislature, the judiciary and the executive are coming to this common view. The socialist process can go with the democratic process, even according to the experience of India and her parliamentary democracy. There would be no need for totalitarianism if the nature of social justice is understood and accepted by all organs of government and by all political parties. The long road which began with adult suffrage in the 1952 elections, with an electorate of about one hundred and seventy-five million, has led to the participation of millions more by 1960 and to the prospect of a stable, secure, just and equitable democracy.

18

DISTORTIONS

The time has come for a broad impersonal analysis of Indian democracy at this stage after many elections and several, if not many, changes of government at the Centre and many, and even enough, changes of governments in the States. Thirty years is a long enough time for a growing generation, though short enough in the perspective of history. Compared to the United States thirty years after she adopted her constitution, the first of the written and federal constitutions, or Britain after the revolution of 1688, which was supposed to be glorious, India may not be doing badly. The United States was still busy expanding her territory and Britain had started developing the cabinet system. India could draw upon the experience of so many democracies in drawing up her constitution, though our constitutional experts and professors of political science, and even judges, do not seem to know whether the Constitution, Parliament, or the people with a big P are supreme. Whatever be the nature of its working and the present controversies which are conducted usually on personal or party lines, it is clear that Indian democracy has developed serious drawbacks and these must be removed, if it is to survive and not to be doomed.

The first drawback is that while "We the People" gave ourselves a Constitution and many attempts have been made to draw the people into the democratic process, there is nothing like people's participation now. Every party and politician talks of the people and trades in their name, but power is not based on the accumulated social and economic processes and government is a rather remote operation, unless one is near to someone in power or in office. India plunged into adult suffrage with mass

illiteracy and the results of this popular beginning of Indian political life after Independence have not yet been assessed. People may no longer vote for cows and trees and ploughs, but it is not certain how far they vote for parties and how far for candidates, how far on issues and how far for interests. People may know their interests, as they proved in the 1960 and 1980 elections to the Lok Sabha, and keep their minds to themselves, with the press repeatedly groping in the dark. But between one election and another, the people are nowhere in the picture. There is too much dependence on the Government, though we have not yet even a social welfare state, and promises about price stabilization remain only on paper. People have not been organized for self-help, as in consumer resistance, and they remain a prey to vote-catching. Panchayat Raj has remained a dream like Plato's republic, and democratic decentralization seems to have become an empty slogan. No political party seems to be close to the people, reflecting their urges and projecting their needs into the administration, though there have been signs of political activists organizing peasants or workers and agitating for their rights.

No party system as such has yet developed in this country; there has been only a semblance of it. Without parties, democracy can go about adrift. There were parties in ancient Athens or in ancient Rome. The United States began with the then fashionable factions which had respectability and were considered legitimate and necessary. In both countries there has been a simplistic, though precarious, two-party system, attempts at third parties faring badly. In India the Congress held supremacy for long because it enjoyed the confidence of most people as a party which had led the fight for freedom and represented national needs. It meant stability but it also meant stagnation, for the opposition parties could not present an alternative and became growingly irresponsible as the Congress, especially after Nehru, tended to become growingly unresponsive. There have been variations on this theme, and while the story of largely middle-class and multi-class parties continues, there is as yet no alternative. This cannot be the end of the story, and it cannot end in partylessness. The one-party system of Communist countries is still considered as invalid in a democracy, though the British, after initial reluctance, have

looked on the one-party states of Africa as democracies in their conditions. Nobody wants a one-party state in India. Opposition is considered necessary in a democracy, particularly in a parliamentary democracy, for an alternative government with the pendulum swinging offers the best hope to the people of a competition in policies, in progress, and in good government.

The party system has decayed in India before it has been established, but there is another system which has not been amenable to easy transformation. This is the caste system. Whatever be the legitimacy of its origin, caste appeal is not valid in democracy. In the United States, there is the Polish vote, the German vote, the Negro vote, the Jewish vote or the Irish vote which presidential and other candidates seek, but that is different from the caste system. Even if politically it may mean cross-voting, and economically it may adjust itself to pressures, socially it is not democratic, and social equality is an important condition which, along with liberty, democracy requires as its base.

Corruption is high in the list of the established evils of our democracy. When corruption has become a widespread social evil, only a wholesale social revolution is the answer to it. It is not merely an individual problem and it is no use asking people not to be corrupt. We have to deal with the sources of corruption instead of merely denouncing it as one of our deadly sins. The main source of corruption is the vastness of electorates and the costliness of elections. Every party and every candidate must amass resources to fight the next elections. Huge electorates mean expenses but they need not be so high as they are today. The expense limit prescribed in the election law is illusory; almost every candidate has to spend more than that and spends much more. The Congress as the main party should take the initiative and call a convention of all parties and seek to come to an agreement on how to make elections far less expensive. Yet no one has bothered about it. The expenses have been increasing and every party seeks to collect as much money as possible, and if it comes to power, it can do nothing against the commercial classes, usually big business, who supply the funds. This is one of the reasons why the prices cannot be brought down or stabilized. It was because

of likely corruption and other evils that Gandhi advocated indirect elections at the Second Round Table Conference, but he was brushed aside. After the first general elections of 1952, Nehru did some loud thinking whether indirect elections were not advisable but neither he nor others developed the idea. Unless something is done to check the corruption that our electoral system means, it may destroy the nation as in the last days of Pompei. Corruption is affecting every part of life, and black money, or the parallel economy which is a polite term for it, is aiding it, with the Government not making even a feeble attempt to eradicate black money. This seems inevitably a part of capitalism in countries like India, and no party aims at social transformation which is the only answer to capitalism. A suggestion which may be explored is that the state should take over the financing of parties, and the Chief Election Commissioner also has suggested it.

While we have not developed social equality to support democracy, we are not doing anything to buttress it with economic equality. One of the main lessons taught by Nehru, apart from secularism and other things, was that both socialism and democracy were inevitable in the conditions of this country and he tried to make them go together. He was not a sectarian socialist, but he saw clearly and made others see clearly that planning in Indian conditions meant socialist planning. It is obvious that democracy can become an empty ritual, if it is not socially and economically backed. It is not by swearing by May's *Parliamentary Practice* that we become good democrats or parliamentarians. Yet even those who believe in socialism say that they will be cogent with democracy: separating democracy from socialism.

Leadership in a democracy is important, but leadership has to be based, like power, on accumulated social and economic processes. Men of destiny have been disasters in history. We are all men and women of destiny, said Nehru. Unless every citizen of the republic feels that any position is open to him, whatever his means, there is no equality. The word charisma has been much misused. It generally means some holiness or mystic spiritual power, though usage has made it also mean that a person in authority has charisma. But there is no mystery about leadership, nothing that cannot be explained, and

when so many of our journalists refer to somebody with a charismatic appeal, they only mean his photogenic appeal. In a democracy, there is no holiness about anybody and no memorial can perpetuate anybody. Lincoln lives in spite of the Lincoln Memorial. The leader has to possess certain qualities, identify himself with a cause or a historical process, take risks and carry the mark of high integrity. When Disraeli was asked why he was not attending a meeting of his party to elect a leader, he disdainfully said that no leader was ever elected. It is expected that a leader should be like Caesar's wife.

This analysis of the drawbacks suggests the remedies. People's participation must be assured in an organized form, if democracy is not to be formal and ritualistic. A viable party system should be allowed to be built up, with at least some of the parties equal in strength, unless from nationalism we sink into tribalism. The caste factor, apart from what is known as the communal factor, should not be allowed to play the major role it is now playing in vote-catching or vote-selling. To take one major instance, it is an outdated step for the Muslim community to seek security in one party, when the wisest course for the Muslims is to spread themselves in all parties and achieve leadership or dominance in them. The corruption of the political system must be eliminated wholly or to a great extent, and this can be done by a wholesale reform of the electoral system. Nobody talks of indirect elections but we may think of direct elections up to the district or State level only and have indirect elections at the State or national level. This may not eliminate corruption wholly but it may reduce it. Any attempt at cleanliness must be supported by elimination of black money, which is allied to big business and other aspects of capitalism. Democracy cannot co-exist with capitalism.

19

CASTE AND CLASS

One of the most perplexing features of India to foreigners and socialists is caste, though it is not so perplexing to the Indian people themselves, for they live with it, even when not knowing what it is. It is now well established that caste developed from *varnas*, which could be loosely characterized as classes based on occupations. The word caste was first used by the Portuguese who, coming to India in the sixteenth century, found the separate groups of Hindu society and called them *castes*, meaning tribes, clans or families. There was such a proliferation of castes and sub-castes that about a thousand of them could be identified and all of them have been traced to the four *varnas*. The main castes have remained four, and these and others with their sub-divisions have been so much an essential part of Hindu social structure that they have remained a part of Muslim and Christian or other religious societies where there have been conversions. The most fascinating question for sociologists is whether class will re-emerge from caste. There has been a trend in this direction but it is no more than a trend.

Varna means colour and tribal cross-fertilization might have been one of its four-fold origin. The priest, the warrior, the peasant and the serf are the four great classes, which could be found in ancient Persia also, and this division was considered fundamental by the end of the Rigvedic period. The distinction between the three higher castes, and the Sudra may have been made because the Sudra was not originally an Aryan. There were divisions among the priestly class, the Brahmins, who assumed some privileges, his status depending on his religious, priestly and scholarly or secular pursuits. The rajanya,

later the Khastriya, was the fighter and sometimes claimed precedence over the Brahmin and usually the king came from this class. The Vaisya, though also twice-born, had to do with the earth and business; he was the businessman. The Sudra was in the worst position, "the servant of another, to be expelled at will, to be slain at will", a kind of second-class citizen till recent times when the concept of citizenship with some equality was established. Below the Sudras were the outcastes, the untouchables, performing menial and dirty work, unredeemed till modern times. The outcastes developed their own castes and sub-castes. This has been the miserable part of Hindu society. It was rarely that a member of a caste could reach a higher caste, for what was called "confusion of class" was never allowed. Hinduism became gradually Brahminized, ritualistic and stagnant. There was exclusiveness of all kinds, endogamy, commensality and rule-bound crafts. In many cases it amounted to a kind of semi-slavery. The occupational base became systematized when Brahminism developed exclusiveness and the social hierarchy became bound by a whole system of values extending from day-do-day life to law, by religion, and by ritual, more than by religion alone. Like the Islamic states of modern times, the Hindu world lived on petrified values which had no touch with life as it was changing and were largely Brahmin-bound. It is one thing to understand the origins or evolution of caste now but to seem to defend it is irrational. It must be made to disintegrate.

The plight of the middle classes in India, which has produced much pathos, is related to the plight of Indian democracy. High taxation and high cost of living are causing misery to the middle classes, while the rich are looking after themselves well and the lower classes have secured a rise in their earnings. What is "middle" about the middle classes? Aristotle stated their position in his *Politics:*

> Thus it is manifest that the best political community is formed by citizens of the middle class, and that those states are likely to be well-administered, in which the middle class is large, and larger if possible than both the other classes, or at any rate than either singly, for the addition of the middle class turns the scales, and prevents

> either of the extremes from being dominant. Great then is the good fortune of a state in which the citizens have made a moderate and sufficient property, for where some possess much, and the others nothing, there may arise an extreme democracy, or a pure oligarchy; or a tyranny may grow out of either extreme democracy, or out of an oligarchy. . . and where the middle class is large, there are least likely to be factions and dissensions.

Aristotle's logic sounds modern but his experience was limited. In modern times the middle classes first emerged in Britain and other European countries. They had their historical origin in trade, in the free professions, and in the Industrial Revolution. They were responsible for extension of the franchise. Cobden and Bright and Morley and the Chamberlains of Birmingham were the products of the mercantile and machine age. The people, who with their guilt complex were responsible for Lloyd George's budgets, who fought the Boer War, who manned the Fabian Society and who led the Labour Party, were their successors. They are now more extensively spread, more diversified and splintered in their economy, and seek their spiritual liberation in more multifarious ways than they did in the days of Ruskin, Carlyle and Morris.

The Indian middle classes did not come into their own through two centuries of foreign rule. They were largely foreign-created middle classes, most of them salaried, with no substantial economic base, and with no tradition. The Gandhis and the Tagores were exceptions to the rule of uncreativeness. But the middle classes are plural in India as in other countries, and there are the upper middle and the lower middle classes, the lower middle becoming the upper middle as a napkin becomes a serviette. There is no single middle class, upper or lower, and there are social distinctions even between members of the same class. The family and not the individual is the clue to class, and a class does not emerge from a mere economic condition but has a class style, a way of living and thinking. In the case of the middle classes, it is summed up in the term bourgeoisie who, whatever might be the applicability of Nancy Mitford's "U" and "non-U" to Indian conditions, can

be formidable as leaders of respectability, *smugness and stability*, and whose condition is the concern of those who want to dam revolution and prevent the rise of communism. The bourgeoisie *have their virtues, including Philistinism, but it is only* now that the Indian bourgeoisie are emerging, with the initiation of the Industrial Revolution. Even then the bourgeoisie are fragile, for a salariat standards of life can be swept away. It is a way of life represented largely by teachers, lawyers, doctors, engineers, officials and clerks; it is when the way of life is adopted also by artisans, businessmen and managers, shopkeepers and traders, and farmers, partaking of the flux of social mobility, that the middle classes acquire the character of the bourgeoisie. The process permits of much upstartism. Even permit-holders, who become rich overnight through the patronage of politicians, add to the process. The much discussed corruption of the day is largely a part of the struggle to achieve class, even transcending caste.

The stratification of the middle classes into the bourgeoisie has become the concern of sociologists and grumblers who have no taste for revolution. An Indian Finance Minister peevishly said that the middle classes are not being abolished merely because of the application of the taxation theories of Kaldor. The middle classes are hit by high prices and do not find their salaries rising equally high, but they are partners in the regime. The present attempt is for an equalization among the upper middle classes in the race for development and also as an insurance against revolution. It has been said that between England and revolution there will aways stand an army of bowler hats. But pauperization of the lower middle classes may lead to a revolution by them. It is a development which even communists cannot thoughtlessly encourage, for it may take a fascist direction. There has been so far one middle-class revolution in India. The 1942 revolution, which was a middle-class revolution betrayed by the middle classes, was not genuine because the middle classes were not genuine. The next middle class revolution, whatever working-class blood it may contain, may end in dictatorship, not of the proletariat.

In all the attempts made at a study of the composition of Indian culture, by Indian and foreign scholars, there is much frustration and half-heartedness, for the end of the road is not

clear. To study social change, one is compelled to study Indian tradition and gets bogged in Indian tradition. The social and economic change was always slow and even now, *in the age of scientific and technological change, is not rapid enough because* of the hold of tradition. There could not be a revolution in Indian history because India herself was not a single state till the British came, and the British too had to respect tradition and introduce tardy reform. The industrialization, and the accompanying urbanization, that have gained in tempo after Independence, have meant some economic change but less of social change; there has been an increase in fraternization in field and factory among the peasants and the working class, but as industrialization has not overridden the old social classes in Europe, the struggling Indian classes are still tradition-bound and caste-bound, and it may require social catastrophes, not physical quakes and a revolution of a resounding kind before class shows signs of re-emergence from caste.

It is difficult to think usefully of class without reference to Marx, whether one is a Marxist or non-Marxist. The discussion of this subject began with the *Communist Manifesto*'s observation in 1848 that the history of society, past and present, had been the history of class struggles. Class depends on exploitation, appropriation of surplus labour, surplus product or surplus value of the direct products by a class that owns the means of production. The authors of the *Manifesto*, basing themselves on Adam Smith and Ricardo, analysed the social anatomy of capitalist society into the bourgeoisie, the owners of the means of production, the petty bourgeoisie, the small owners of the means of production, and the proletariat, the wage earners who had no other means of livelihood. The several professions have become proletarianized, becoming subservient to the laws of wages, profits. There is both productive and unproductive, creative and uncreative, phases in this progression.

It is not necessary to go into the whole of Marxist dialectics to try to understand the classes that are being formed and reformed in this country. The hiatus between the manual labourer and the non-manual labourer still remains everywhere. The intellectuals, like professors or writers and even journalists, are given a high place in Soviet society. The great disparities in

wages in countries like India remain, and there are diversionary issues like bonus. There is a subsistence sector and a surplus-producing sector. The most progressive possible programmes have been outlined and discussed, but the proletariat has yet to rise to power. In this state of flux, it is difficult to identify class, though castes like the Scheduled Castes are a caste in themselves, and other castes are not thawing, in spite of stray inter-caste marriages and increased social mobility. It can only be said that, whatever else is growing or not, capitalism has been growing in this country, and that is a way not of destroying caste but of giving impetus to class.

20

CULTURAL TRENDS

There is an Indian culture, though it has many strands, and consists of many sub-cultures. Culture transcends all art forms, while containing all of them. There is nothing like Indian literature; there are Indian literatures. No person can hope to write a history of Indian literature, as one could write a history of English literature or French literature, because there are many Indian languages with rich literatures. In other ways, Indian culture, now ridden by tradition, presents common features, with only two main traditions of music, with half a dozen schools of dance, with hardly any schools of architecture, and with only individual styles of sculpture or painting. It can no longer be said that the middle class has not the will or the power to be creative; it is the maturing class. The effect of economic processes on culture cannot yet be exactly measured and anthropology, which shyly draws upon primitive and semi-primitive life, or sociology which is the science of culture, does not help in tracing cultural forms. The primitive is considered genuine and the search for genuineness continues, but it has led to florid imitations of folk dance and folk music. The folk are happy with their dancing and singing in their local habitations, but the town dwellers must remove their guilt complex and absolve themselves from their sense of sin and alienation by urban versions of what they think is folk culture. This culminates in the grand mixture of the genuine and the spurious in Republic Day folk dances in New Delhi, with State capitals arranging for regional mixtures.

The New Delhi elite reserve their ecstasies for genuine visitations, the Vienna Philharmonic, Berlin ensembles, Vietnamese dancers or Oxford players rendering Shakespeare. The native culture is promoted by organizations like All India Radio, the

national academies and an assortment of subsidized theatre groups. Everything is done almost in winter, a season which is not cold in most parts of the country and gives the folk of the capital the feeling of warmth and woollen insensibility. There is much trafficking in culture. Art is advertised more than practised, and many artists exhibit themselves and are not inspired by the spirit that lead to Broadway in New York or the National Theatre in London. Patrons look very patronizing. The genuine artists cannot afford to live in New Delhi, unless they are allotted flats, enveloped by the orient-minded curiosity of too many embassies. The result largely is a culture of sorts.

New Delhi, with its personality cult, is capable of producing culture almost like cabbage. It is mostly manifestation. Ministers are the new ogres of culture and a cultural show where the President or the Prime Minister is present is a success. In their desire to do everything possible, these and other patrons do not often know what they do. Every country has its metropolitan culture, but New Delhi is still a colony, a small town, with a small-town mentality and with small-minded hierarchies. In such a place, culture is like soilless cultivation. State patronage or any patronage is inimical to authenticity, unless state and people are one and culture is not a closed shop. Ram Lila, which presents in a popular form the Ramayana, the ancient epic which tells the story of Rama, perhaps is the only meeting ground between the classes and the masses; it is dated, but it lives. What else is possible? It should be possible to preserve the small virtues and some integrity. Newspapers indiscriminately deal in art criticism and have created a new class of art critics who clothe their inanities in English. The reviews are padded with the appropriate jargon, but there is no respect for standards. Blurb writers are in league with promoters and managers of culture.

It is sham amateurism. Indian culture needs the core of professionalism, except in music in which the professionals excel. AIR has made professionals of amateurs but it has also made amateurs of professionals. There is more twilight than light in a transition and the leading dancers and musicians who lent charm to feudalism are almost all gone. British Viceroys and Governors enjoyed waltz or foxtrot in banquet halls but the ruling princes arranged feasts of music by *ustads*, virile bass or baritone. Nautch was performed by genuine nautch

girls. Classical Indian dance has been rediscovered and re-presented, but the best that New Delhi can see comes from little-known places in the States where tradition has been preserved assiduously and with slender means. There are several schools of austerity, especially in the south, where artistic values are maintained with a sense of integrity, but this is not possible in New Delhi, where art is a series of shows to which school children are compelled to contribute their toddling footwork. Genius may be spreading like a disease under the propulsion of state patronage, but the show business is still a manifestation, beside which Elvis Presley would seem precise.

There is something to be said for sensations, and Indian life now has few sensations which are not political. A life of that kind cannot be a full life. There is feebleness of feeling and expression in a country which in its centuries-long placidity had its protests and challenges. Religion, among a people who have been proud of their popes, is divorced from philosophy and is more of a ritual than ever, and philosophers are mere professors. Literature, in spite of the prizes that are given, has no movement, apart from the self-torment of individuals with abundant egoism but no afflatus. The artist is a Van Gogh or a Picasso in pose, normal in his cultivated abnormality, imitatively original or an imitation of an imitation. Social unrest is sought to be mopped up by grants from social welfare boards. In science, shoddy solar cookers are slowly giving place to supersonic planes. For the world, this cannot, of course, be the age of Leonardo da Vinci or even of the steam engine. In Indian terms, this cannot be the age of Nalanda, where a great university flourished centuries ago, or even the age of Rabindranath Tagore, but it should be an age capable of sensations, and the artistic sensations are getting stifled by politics and crime and newspaper sensationalism.

The milder sensations are often transferred to Parliament because they can be best expressed in words or even expunged and do not find expression in the popular mood. The controversy over the history of the freedom movement will make no difference to Indian history or any other history, though if there had been lustiness in the Indian historical method, it would have been an event in historiography. No history of any freedom

movement, unless it is part of the history of a successful ideology, can be imposed on the people; it has to satisfy different standards. Nor can anyone hope to be a syndicate and produce detailed and learned but prolix chronicles like the Cambridge histories. It would be a one-man history if it were the work oı one man, a dull compendium if he were a mere literary agent, and controversial, even one-sided, if he were to enjoy freedom. Even the abridged Gibbon has its critics, apart from the original Gibbon, for wrong abridgement. It is good there is a public controversy on history, which in recent years has not been one of India's achievements and has remained largely unreadable.

India is not yet very modern but is overridden by what is known as modern art. The Academy of Fine Arts was blamed in Parliament for encouraging what is supposed to be alien, abstract, subjective, impressionist. The name does not matter, not even the cult, in an age of cults Modern art, as it has come to be known long after it ceased to be modern in other countries, is recognizable in the angular, piecemeal, Picasso-like shapes in painting and the bric-a-brac of bronze and plaster which signifies nothing more than what it is supposed to signify. Form emerges from formlessness, there can be expressiveness in all kinds of expression, and there is always a desire to escape from what is stereotyped. The counter-protest is probably against filling the land with ugly and meaningless forms. At an international art exhibition held in New Delhi, a canvas with over a hundred pen-knife incisions was considered an outstanding example of modern art. The number of incisions was counted because it was thought that school children going to the exhibition might be attracted to add one or two more. It is difficult to say whether modern art is the fashion of the moment, an inevitable projection of modern life or a reflection of an eccentric personality trying to be true to himself. The academy may not be able to control modernism of many kinds, if it is real, and it is good that there is some thinking about it, some sensation. There was modern art in all ages and it slowly became classical. It is not accepted wholly even in the industrially advanced countries. There something modern is found in the old, as at Konarak or Khajuraho, which modern dancers copy, apart from Bharatanatyam. Art criticism in India is not

sharp and nobody seems to know what is modern in modern art.

Musical taste also is under discussion. All India Radio has become a means of popularizing classical music which was popular before it became classical and an exclusive preserve of the elite. but film songs, which, too, AIR makes popular, have become distasteful for their erotic appeal and occasional vulgarity. AIR has been asked to be not only a mass medium but an arbiter of taste. Neither academies nor state-run organizations like AIR can undertake formulation or standardization of taste unless society is to be less free than it is. Even where the state or a subsidiary body can give a direction to art, it would be difficult to give a direction to taste, though the erring artists can suffer from contracted or closed means of communication. The state is depriving the elite of their influence without ensuring wider participation by the people. Art and art criticism are in danger of becoming straitlaced and losing their spontaneity. If art is to depend on contracts and mechanically done scripts, there may be utter lack of standards and what AIR and academies set may be the only possible standards. The qualities of Indian art will continue to be elusive till there is enough of sturdy, living art capable of excess, instead of suffering from neurosis and feebleness of forms. The lack of standards is not only reflected in TV, but is exaggerated by it, with its stale repetition of film sequences. This is eroticism but called entertainment.

The Indian Renaissance was a latter-day affair, and while it witnessed the efflorescence of the intellect, it has been limited by conformity first to nationalism and now to political doctrine. The Indian intellectual, who lustily sang "God Save the King", was willing to join the ranks of political sansculottism and is now willing to be conscripted in the name of culture. Aristotle thought man was a rational animal because some people could do sums, but man did many more things. With the scientific discoveries of Copernicus and others and the geographical discoveries of Columbus and others, new worlds opened, cosmology and other subjects were recovered from revelation, and the intellect struggled for liberty from dogma and superstition. It took nearly two centuries for science and philosophy to acquire the nationalist temper, and then the revolution in social and economic organization led to the bitter and prolonged war

for intellectual liberty. The war is not ended, for new gods and newly revealed religions have arisen.

The intellectual in India as elsewhere is now essentially a middle-class product. He is subject to the grinding machinery of mass production and is not independent of the laws of wages and prices. The industrial process, the planning process, the democratic process are not helping the intellectual process. Not all intellectuals are alienated from the people and not all of them are on sale, but there is usually no character among them probably because they are products too much of general education and too little of the spirit of science.

The Indian artist is perplexed and driven to cults and coteries. The state must see that artists do not starve or die indigently, but a socialist society should mean that no one, not merely artists, should die indigently. It is one thing to look after the artist physically, another to look after him intellectually. In socialist societies the Pasternaks have no life outside society, except that they can live wrapt in their vision, but the artists may claim the right to be unsocial in a society which is changing too slowly. The state may create an atmosphere of free communication, though it can become stifling, and arrange for recognition, but the machinery of recognition can never be adequate and all possible recognition need not mean that all the good artists are recognized in good time. The trouble with the awards given by the academies is not that they are inadequate but that they are artificial as evidence of recognition of values. The artist is no longer wholly the free spirit of the regenerate days of the Indian Renaissance, which produced a Tagore and many hairy imitations of him. The artist is now somewhat of a social figure, a socialite, who had been recognized and reprocessed in foreign countries for his devotion to cultural freedom or to peace. The economic well-being of a few artists is, however, different from the invocation of the creative possibilities of the people as a whole to produce artists from the widest possible social base. The elite is becoming wider now; it need not mean that it is necessarily more creative than the older, and smaller, elite. The growing means of mass communication offer the artist ampler opportunities; still he is not reaching a proportionately larger number of people. There are a larger number of devotees of art cults but the academies

and awards are a part of the speeding up of the processes of art communication, not necessarily of the processes of aesthetic communication.

Indian writing is divided in spirit. In a world divided in commitment, there is fear of commitment, and there is fear of freedom too, though the writer must be free to be creative. The detonation of war on the border did not help creation. It is only after a war that its literature is produced. Homer came long after the Trojan war, and the Mahabharata, India's great war epic, came long after the Mahabharata war. Yet the writer cannot be insensitive even to the undertones of war. The American Civil War is said to have been the first modern war and Walt Whitman, who responded warmly to it, the first modern poet. The writer in war-time is, however, essentially a propagandist, boosting somebody's morale, tightening his guts, or mourning his gutlessness. Indian writing, flapped drily within newspapers, reverberating hollowly through the radio or issuing with adjectival vigour in press notes and pamphlets, was propaganda; with little that was creative in it, it was not even good propaganda. Without the flesh of facts it was feeble, and without the blood of passion it was pallid. Neither was it positive, for all writers were busy reacting to Peking instead of making Peking react to them. It is not necessary that the aggressor should be more creative; shattered, disillusioned spirits should have something more to say. Only a soldier-poet from the Sela Pass could have given expression to the terror and sweetness of the loneliness and death among high snows, not people who were busy making something of their remoteness from bullets.

It was fear of commitment, of freedom, even of opportunity. The writer who withdrew into himself or the writer who wrote merely from ancient commitment would write little of value; the result was as barren as barrack-room ballads. The free writer is in a better position than the committed writer and the committed writer is freer than the mercenary writer, but no song of the day has yet stirred the Indian nation. There is something bogus about the limited circle of Indo-Anglian writers who pat or anthologize each other.

21

POPULATION PROBLEM

The population problem of countries like India and China is alarming enough whether by neo-Malthusian or Marxist standards. No other Indian problem can be understood except in the context of her growing population. Any progress she makes seems to dwindle when divided per capita. India's present population amounts to over 683 million according to the provisional figures of the Census of India 1960, the male population being over 353 million and the female population over 330 million. The increase in population from 1960
was over 135 million or 24.75 per cent. The density of population is 221 per square kilometre, which shows that in spite of the industrialization and urbanization that have gone on, the country is still largely rural, even a pastoral paradise. The literacy rate was 36.17 per cent, the males 46.71 per cent, the females 24.88 per cent. The census cannot be disregarded. From 1872 when the first census was taken, though it was from 1881 that India had a regular and synchronous census every ten years, till now, the census has been held twelve times, the fourth time in 1960 after Independence. By employing all the methods known to modern demography, the Indian census has become a very useful means of knowing as many aspects of the Indian people and their lives as possible. It is a gigantic operation, in which faults are inevitable, but to which there is no alternative.

India is among the four largest countries in the world. China with 957 million comes first. The Soviet Union with 267 million and the United States with 222 million come next to India. These four countries contain nearly half the population of the world. Among other countries, the most populated

countries are Indonesia, Brazil, Japan, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nigeria, Mexico, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Britain, France, Vietnam and the Philippines; these thirteen countries each with a population between 50 and 200 million account for 23.69 per cent of the world's population, the rest of the countries accounting for 27.97 per cent. India's density apart from the size of the population cannot encourage complacency. Nearly 15 per cent of the world's population is in India but the country accounts for only 2.4 per cent of the total world area, 3.28 million square kilometres out of the world's 135.89 million square kilometres. There are large spaces with relatively small or no population like Australia and Antarctica. Besides, India's population has been growing at a great pace. In 1901, it was over 238 million, in 1911 over 263 million, in 1921 it fell by 0.31 per cent, in 1931 it was over 278 million, in 1941 over 318 million, in 1951 over 361 million, in 1960 over 439 million, in 1960 over 548 million, in 1981 over 683 million. The growth rate has been high after 1951. India's population has increased by over 135 million in about 13 million more than the addition to the total population over the fifty years from 1901 to 1957. This is what has alarmed planners, economists and the government.

There have been changes in the rankings of the States through the years, Uttar Pradesh maintaining its first place with over 110 million now, Bihar, Maharashtra, West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh coming next. In increase and percentage growth rate of population, from 1957 - to 1960 , Andhra and Assam have led. Other States which have had faster growth rates during than in the previous decades are Bihar, Karnataka, Nagaland, Punjab, Rajasthan and Sikkim. The figures can be analysed from various angles. Population projection for the country and for the States was made by an expert committee for the Planning Commission on the basis of assumptions of mortality and fertility. The expectations were not fulfilled in many cases. In density Union Territories like Delhi with 4,178 and Chandigarh with 3,948 per square kilometre come first, followed by Lakshadweep with 1,257 and Pondicherry with 1,228. Among the States, Kerala is the highest with 654 and Bengal with 614 comes next. There is then a tapering off with Bihar with 402 and U.P. with 377 and

Tamil Nadu with 371. Andhra Pradesh has 194 and Karnataka 193. The States which have had densities constantly above the all-India density for each of the census years from 1901 to 1957 are Bihar, Haryana, Kerala, Punjab, Tamil Nadu, U.P. and West Bengal, apart from Union Territories like Chandigarh and Delhi. Except for Assam, the other States and Union Territories have had density of population consistently below the all-India density in the census year. There is a broad and extended belt of high density in the Indo-Gangetic plain and the districts of West Bengal where agriculture and industry are prominent.

The central part of India extending from the eastern half of Rajasthan to western Orissa and down to northern Karnataka and southern Andhra Pradesh is a large area of high density in the range of 101-200 with pockets of higher density as in the delta or industrial regions. The sex ratio has been generally adverse to women but in some areas it is comparatively better. For literacy tests, it would be meaningful if the age group 0-4 were excluded, but it has not been possible at this stage. In 1957 the literacy rate of 36.17, the males 46.74 and the females 24.88, compared to the literacy rate of 5.35 in 1901, males 9.83 and females 0.60 is commendable. While the number of literates has increased by about 82 million in , 48 million have been added to the number of illiterates.

The figures for the States and the ratio between males and females are worth serious study, particularly in the growth of literacy and other matters, but the country is one and has to be treated as one, and the growth of population affects every aspect of life. The economic aspect is the most important but whatever may be done for the economic growth rate and the demands for distributive justice, family planning has become more important than ever. In the United States, where demographeres once addressed themselves to the expanding populations of China and India, there is concern for family planning in order to be certain of maintaining the standards of living and to wipe out the fringe of poverty. In China, where there was some cavalier indifference soon after the communist revolution, there is a new concern for family planning with the emphasis on production and work. Europe is alarmed because

of the capacity of the Chinese millions to walk across frontiers. While there are large comparatively less populated areas and the developed countries would not willingly or at least non-violently part with their surpluses the Third World and the Fourth World may succeed to some extent at self-sufficiency. The containment of population is a national problem and family planning is a desperate national concern. This has become one of the Indian Planning Commission's serious absorptions.

India's population problems are reviewed against the population pattern of the world as a whole and against the background of demographic trends. To take up Europe, for which figures are available, it had, by the beginning of 1957, 670 million people or nearly 17 per cent of the world population. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, as far as it can be gathered, Europe had a population of 60 to 70 million or 18 per cent of the then world population. In the sixteenth century the four most densely populated countries were France, Italy, Germany, and the Turkish Empire, each with between 10 and 20 million, while the present figures are: the Soviet Union 260 million (or European Russia 190 million), West Germany 62 million, Britain 57 million, Italy 57 million, France 54 million; for the pre-industrial Europe of 1750, 140 million, of whom 30 million were within the present frontiers of the Soviet Union, is the figure. Only 10-20 per cent lived in towns then, only thirteen towns having a population of more than 100,000. Today 660 European towns exceed the figure; there are about forty agglomerations of over a million, and Paris, London and Moscow, apart from non-European cities, have more than five million each; about 60 per cent of Europeans live in towns. The reduction both in the birth rate and the death rate has been a phenomenon in Europe for several decades. The general conclusion is that there does not seem to be an obvious correlation between economic changes and the development of demographic systems.

There are several questions for which no answer has been found. Why did the first industrial revolution encourage demographic growth? Why was there a fall in birth rate between 1880 and 1940? Why was there a divergence between east and west Europe from 1950 onwards? The only thing that is clear is

that the whole of Europe is now involved in a demographic adventure from which it will not easily emerge. The social and educational policies and the structure of employment in the member countries will be affected by it for a long time, at least until the middle of the twenty-first century. Europe's share of the world's population, which went down in one century from 22 per cent to 17 per cent, may shrink further, Europe, including European Russia, accounting for only nine per cent of the world's births, a situation without precedent for thousands or tens of thousands of years, according to a European authority. Asia, in contrast, is running ahead. India, in the centre of Asia, occupies a crucial position.

22

PLANNING PROCESSES

The people have lost track of planning because there was a plan holiday or a period of planlessness, later called rolling plans. In a planned economy, the planning set-up attracts most attention, and even statistics come only next. Who is planning? The Indian Planning Commission is the central body for planning and there are no planning boards or even planning departments in all the States. The planners are supposed to be thinkers at large, and half of them are important members of the Central government, with little time to plan or think. The other half of the planners, who could be whole-time thinkers, have hardly more time to think. They are not like the Princeton thinkers who are left free for advanced study. Almost every day there are documents to be studied and discussed, and the discussions which are to be carried on with visiting experts and dignitaries can be exhausting. One plan leads to another and many plans are planned ahead in outline in what is known as perspective planning; the Planning Commission is throughout busy estimating the progress of one plan and projecting the next. There was dislocation of this process.

On one condition only can planners be free to plan as they like, and that is by having nothing to do with the execution of the plans. This is still suggested by some who want planning to be thinking and nothing more. In their view, the Planning Commission could be a subordinate or subsidiary body of experts, who would make recommendations for the government to accept or reject. It need not be an integral part of the government. The suggested implication is that a planning set-up of the present kind would lead to totalitarian

tendencies and subordination of policy and measures to a rigid system of recommendations and doctrine. Less polite people have called the Planning Commission a super cabinet. Yet, many are not satisfied with the present set-up because it is not rigid enough. Jawaharlal Nehru, who was responsible for the idea and the apparatus of planning, had begun his association with planning when he became chairman of the National Planning Committee set up by the Congress before the war. The committee and its too many sub-committees did much compilation and some thinking, but the many volumes of principles and programmes, which were produced on behalf of the committee, show that planning, divorced from responsibility and action, would be largely platonic.

There is nothing wrong, at the impersonal level, with the Planning Commission and the planning set-up, but everything is not necessarily right with planning because of it. India can draw upon the experiences of several countries, especially the Soviet Union. But as only communist countries have had planned economies, it has meant that either planning is totalitarian in concept and content or that only communist countries can plan successfully. Now even non-communist countries have planned economies. In Britain both Conservatives and Labour plan, though differently.

India's problem is to stick to processes known to be democratic and to constitutional ways, and to plan for turning an underdeveloped economy into a self-generating economy. The lesson from communist countries has been that underdeveloped countries can make rapid technological advances by planning and sacrificing, at least for a short period, the democratic processes and many consumer needs. Such planning is not easily accepted in India where socialism, even to many socialists, means only social and economic equality of some kind. For those who want to lead the largely inert people into participation in planned economic processes, people's planning has been a suitable catch-phrase.

Not many people can plan or think, though most of them know their needs. If these needs alone were taken into account, economic policies might mean a welfare state or a capitalist state depending on the profit motive but not a socialist or even a apidly developing state. The rate of development is important

for an underdeveloped people, but it would mean a high rate of investment. The people would not save and invest unless the aims are clear and ambitious enough. It was said that the Second Plan was to be the result of planning from below and the Third Plan also was to be a people's plan. But nowhere were the people drawn into discussion. This was more so in the Fourth Plan and the Fifth Plan. The state plans had as little of people's planning in them as in the overall plan. Nowhere do the people plan; somebody plans for them, whether in Etawah or Alma Ata. Only then is it possible to fix priorities and plan intelligently. The people come in very much when resources, especially manpower resources, are to be mobilized, and large-scale cooperation is wanted. It is the people that have to contribute the financial resources, too, and no people will want planning unless they know what it is and why they should make any sacrifices for it. Unfortunately, neither the Congress nor any other political party has been able to take planning to the people or the people to planning.

It should be possible to take planning to the people, even if they cannot be consulted in planning. For participation in planning, one should know one's share of the plan. The national income, the per capita income, and such formulas mean little to the people. Nor will mere bread or cloth, even at a reasonable price, mean planning to them. To comprehend the plan, especially the production figures, they must know their share in the production process. Each State plan has to be broken down into small bits, not according to development blocks but according to factories and fields. Each production unit should know its target and the means by which it is sought to be achieved and each member of the unit should know his contribution. Publicity must come from within the plan. Every Indian should be able to know what he is in the plan. Then will questions be asked. If one is to do his bit for the plan, what will one get in return? Thus planning and publicity will be one process. This is not totalitarianism; it is commonsense.

India's First Plan was not much of a plan; it took over several old projects and integrated them into a scheme of economic and social development. Its emphasis was on agriculture, irrigation, power and transport. But it was a substantial contribution to the principles of planning. The Second Plan

carried the basic policies further and aimed at a larger increase in investment, production and employment. Its emphasis on heavy industries, its assignment of a key role to the public sector and its provision of three steel plants pleased the more ardent advocates of planning. Socialist planning was projected for the first time. The total investment, public and private, per annum had at the beginning of the First Plan been Rs.500 crore; at its end it reached Rs.850 crore. At the end of the Second Plan the level was of about Rs.1600 crore. In agriculture the average level of production of foodgrains went up from 50 million tons in 1950-51 to 78 million tons in 1960 ; the yield per acre also rose significantly. The progress of industrial production was more spectacular in the ten years. All this was not enough.

India's 450 millions form one-sixth of the world's population. The land area is the seventh largest; of the 721 million acres, one-fifth is under forest and two-fifths under cultivation. Only about 20 per cent of the cultivated area was under irrigation, and in the struggle to be independent of the variable monsoon rains, irrigation was important. India has large reserves of high quality iron ore and 50 billion tons of coal; new oil-fields were being discovered. Abundant monazite sands provide the basic sources of atomic energy. There is endless electric potential in the river waters. But the population kept growing at the rate of 2.5 per cent per year, and about seven-ninths of the people were in the 570,000 villages. Among the towns, barely above a hundred had a population of more than 100,000 each; seven cities had a population of more than a million each. Seventy per cent of the working population, about 130 million, were engaged in agriculture, which contributes nearly half the national income, and by 1957 the working population was expected to increase to 250 million. The 1957 Census has upset many calculations. Planning must be ambitious enough. The achievements had been substantial, but there was much more to be achieved—a higher rate of savings, a higher rate of investment, and a higher rate of development.

The Third Plan aimed at an increase in national income of over 5 per cent per annum, self-sufficiency in foodgrains, expansion of basic industries, greater use of manpower resources and greater equality of opportunities and reduction in disparities.

There was hope of reaching the stage of self-sustained growth in the next two or three plan periods, when the national income was expected to go up by about 30 per cent and the per capita income by about 17 per cent. The effort for financial resources for the Third Plan, with an investment of Rs 8000 crore in the public sector and Rs.4100 crore in the private sector, had to be big. There had, however, been reluctance, especially in the States, to raise the additional taxation required. Foreign assistance is an uncertain factor and the balance of trade remained uneven, till the developed countries felt they could be generous. With so much outlay, a large part of the physical targets at least could be achieved. There has been waste and extravagance, but much of the investment filters through. After three years of the plan, however, industrial targets had not been achieved and the failure in agriculture was disheartening.

A plan is not a list of projects or a balance-sheet of resources. It is a blueprint for the allocation of all the resources available to the community for different uses. The process is complex and there are many stresses and strains. The administration is not equal to the task and the people have not been sufficiently mobilized, mainly because of party politics. Yet, everyone is agreed that without planning there can be no progress. The plans have been an experience and many lessons have been learnt. There is much expertise now, and the Fourth Plan, with its tentative target of a Rs.20,000 crore investment, pushed the perspective forward. Then politics intervened.

The take-off stage would still be not near and there were uncertain elements. There was no certainty how far planning should be rigid or flexible. By implication, planning in Indian conditions meant socialism, though it has come to be only slowly accepted. Divorce between planning and socialist thinking would be incongruous, but a mixed economy offers mixed incentives, and deficit financing, without controls, leads to inflation. Every part of the community is discontented. Whether about the salary scales of government employees, the wages of labour, the allocation of planning priorities, the price and supply mechanism, thinking has yet to be integrated.

There are contradictory conditions. Where production is socialist, the distributive system is still capitalist; where distribution is socialist or state-controlled, the production processes

are capitalist. Rent control is socialist but land remains a capitalist commodity. These inner contradictions within the bigger contradictions have caused confusion and without Jawaharlal Nehru and his strident pronouncements, the suspicion is spreading that, in spite of socialist professions, the Government are capitalist-minded, or that, in spite of what is professed, central ministers, State ministers, and the whole apparatus of administration are not only rooted in the past but are trustees for the capitalist class. There are bound to be shortcomings in a party and in an administration which have to meet the needs of a social and economic system which themselves need change. Some contradictions can be removed. The public corporations which are being set up in increasing numbers are not run as institutions of socialism. In the public sector, the contract system vitiates the atmosphere with its corruption. Elementary and secondary education has a semi-feudal set-up; conditions in the universities are chaotic. The public distribution system should be far more extensive, to cope with frequent periods of inflation, and now of rapid inflation. Planning has to be national at least in aims and execution.

India's First Plan ran to 668 pages and the Second Plan to 641 more closely printed shorter pages. The two plans had to explain much but the "approach" and the "objectives" were stated in too many words. The Third Plan did not carry such a heavy load of general, and often misty, statement; with 400 pages, it set a standard of slimness. It could not be reduced to a mere list of items appended to an outline of the plan. For whom are the documents known as "plans" meant? For the planners, for the Central and State governments, for those who execute the plans, and for the people. The plan is not one document; those who have to carry out the programme cannot find everything in it. But the plan is of interest to all people and it should be readable, which would mean that it should be clear, concise and short and possess style. The reports produced by Indian commissions and committees are heavy, prolix and long, but it should be possible even for Indians to produce intelligible reports. It is not composition that makes a good report, the mind behind it is important. As Samuel Butler said: "It takes two to say a thing—a sayee as well as a sayer, and the one is as essential to any true saying as the other."

The Fourth and the Fifth Plans went awry, the Fourth for lack of persistence and the Fifth for lack of perspective. The Third Plan objectives were eloquently set forth by Nehru; a plan holiday made a mess of the Fourth Plan and under the Janata Government planning became more apolitical than ever before and the Fifth Plan suffered. The Sixth Plan is neatly drawn up with no padding. In her Foreword, Indira Gandhi outlined the framework. Progress in a country of India's size and diversity depends on the participation and full involvement of all sections of the people. This is possible only in a democracy; but for democracy to have meaning in India's conditions, it must be supported by socialism, which promises economic justice and secularism, which gives social equality. These are admirable sentiments which can be summed up as socialism. It would require acceptance of the political implications, of which there is no awareness, and everything will depend on the resources and on the implementation, the impediments to both of which are inflation and corruption which are rooted in Indian politics more than in anything else. There can be no half-hearted steps. But socialism is not mentioned in the rest of the Plan.

The final size of the public sector outlay has been fixed at Rs.97,500 crore at 1957 prices, an outlay 80 per cent higher than in the Fifth Plan. There will be a mid-term review of the allocations. There is a new emphasis on energy, rural development and special programmes. But everything will depend on resource mobilization, for which there has not been sufficient political will because of electoral demands, for the very people who demand development refuse to pay for it. To see the progress from plan to plan, the achievement has fallen below the targets except in the First and Fifth Plans. The First Plan target was 2.1% and the achievement 3.1% of the national income, the Second Plan target was 4.5% and the achievement 4.0% of the national income, the Third Plan figures were 5.6% and 2.2% respectively; the Fourth Plan target was 5.7% and the net domestic product 3.3%; the Fifth Plan target was 4.4% and the gross domestic product was 5.2%. In the present international environment, the Indian economy faces a formidable task. If structural transformation is the aim, in the perspective from 1979-80 to 1994-95, the planners have not carried Indira Gandhi's mention

of socialism in the Foreword to its logical conclusion. The aim is smothered by tell-tale tables, and while the economic objectives are reiterated with a flourish, the substitution of capitalism by socialism remains buried under mounds of jargon, a kind of modern Mohenjodaro. The provisional figures of the 1957 census may have shocked people. Yet, there has not been sufficient emphasis on family planning.

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SOCIALISM FOR INDIA

There is something like Indian socialism. It is not that it is a revealed text or an adopted doctrine, but because anything that grows in the Indian soil cannot but be Indian. The only socialism which has inspired hope and fear in mankind is scientific socialism, which began with Marx and soon became international in inspiration and scope. In a big country, national tradition is bound to have an impact on the internationalism to which people like Trotsky clung fatalistically. The absolutism of the Romanoffs in Russia could not be discarded like a winter cloak; the Czars fought for security from the Baltic to the Black Sea, and so did Stalin. The Manchus and Confucius were deeply embedded in the fatherhood of Chairman Mao. Even in smaller countries, history has its hangovers, though the communism of the smaller countries has the character of a carbon copy. The separation of socialism from communism began with Lenin's hectic calumnies against the Social Democrats; and socialists and communists have since then followed their separate courses. Both have derived inspiration from Marx and both have been internationalists, but they have had their separate Internationals. The communists have had the advantage of a base in the Soviet Union, and this has made much difference to the fearful aspects of communism in its conflict with socialism. But even the Soviet Union has been changing under the impact of its economy and the pressure of international forces, and, therefore, communism has begun to change, though it has a Soviet stamp.

The association of socialism and communism as some kind of Siamese twins is still as popular among conservatives as their divergences are among communists and socialists. Apart from

the definitions given in dictionaries and the popular but not scientific description that socialism will ensure social security to each according to his work and communism to each according to his needs, socialism and communism have identical aims about ownership, income and planning. The differences which have developed suggest that they are differences only over tactics. Only communist parties, however, have been able to bring about socialist transformation, with the help of war and the Soviet Union, and not socialist parties. There have been other equally important differences. The socialists have grown to value democracy, while the communists with Leninism for guidance and the Soviet Union as their base have believed in a rigid application of dictatorship of the proletariat, which has degenerated in practice into dictatorship of the party and gradually of the central committee. Yugoslavia has tried to support its socialism with economic and social democracy through self-management. As the means have influenced the ends, socialism has become different from communism. The ideas have been simple but the ideologies have become complex, and sometimes it is like a Marx Brothers' version of Marx.

Indian socialists began as students of Marxism and admirers of the Russian Revolution. They were more in sympathy with Lenin's shock tactics than with the metaphysics which seemed to be a part of the non-violent revolution which developed under Gandhi's leadership. Gandhi was Indian in his whole being and they were not, and Jawaharlal Nehru alone understood his genius and found that he alone had a plan of action. The Congress socialists, who were not the original Indian socialists, wanted to convert the nationalist revolution into a socialist revolution, but they did not know how to set about it and became a sect of scholastic socialists. They had neither the patience nor the capacity for revolution; they became too individualistic and too ambivalent. The result was an ineffectual type of socialism, like the rigid idealism of the Independent Labour Party of Britain. The evolution of the Congress, disappointing though for doctrinal purposes, was more natural and has had the impetus of inevitability making it more Indian than alien. This was largely Jawaharlal Nehru's work. If theory and practice should go together for assured socialist transformation, socialism was safer in the hands of those who

could protect and implement it. But after Nehru, socialism of every type has received severe set-backs.

The search for Indianness has been a desperate struggle for communism. Louis Fischer and others, who sought to pit Gandhi and Stalin against each other, were as cruel to Gandhi and Stalin as Dange and others were in earlier years when they pitted Lenin and Gandhi against each other. The attempt to escape from Marxism, for avoiding the tortuous courses of Leninism, has led to much unscientific socialism. Utopian socialism led to genetics; what is known as Vedantic socialism, or socialism derived from the Upanishads, has meant revivalism. Those who made a socialism of Gandhi's economic ideas found that it was only compatible with an India consisting of a small population without industrialization and in a state of anarchy or cooperative commonness. M.N. Roy's cerebration resulted in Royism; others' cerebration led to nothing. Socialism would be simple, if it were not to serve a society as complex as that of the industrial age and a country as big as India, and it gives rise to concepts varying from centralism to statelessness. The variations in practice have become many, and it is possible to trace them all the way from United States capitalism to Soviet collectivism.

Sir William Harcourt said in the last years of Victoria's reign: "We are all socialists now"; it became a fashionable joke. The Swatantra Party sought to say: "We are all conservatives now"; it was also a joke. The conditions of an underdeveloped economy, the technological revolution all round, the tremendous urges of the people for better standards of living and equality make socialism inescapable. Capitalism is out of date in Indian conditions, though socialism presents as many problems as communism. Marxism has been muted in Soviet experience and is largely misunderstood, though it helps economic understanding. There is both international and Indian inspiration. A vast country like India with a long tradition cannot be imitative even in its socialism and follow what some Cominform decides. Indian conditions also impose the democratic process. Nehru showed that both democracy and socialism were inevitable in India and that both could go together. The peasant predominates in India and, without feudal conditions, he is not malleable material, as he was in

China. Even the growing proletariat will not be too responsive to total control. The task of socialist leadership is to face the facts, interpret social and economic forces correctly and guide them. Schisms will wither and the unity of socialist forces become real, if it is understood that power lies ultimately with the people.

Socialism, which is known to be authoritarian, though not absolutist, collectivist in tendency, ethical in motive, religious and philosophical in its sources, realistic, empiricist, total, integral and, as long as the world consists of sovereign states, nationalist, cannot be simplified in the modern state, though it leads to simpler social and economic structure. The schism in international communism has shown how nationalist are communist states and how they make theories of national interests. Communism's lesson that the democratic process is worth preserving wherever it is possible has been sufficiently reinforced, but democratic socialism, which in communist countries has been largely a self-contradictory term, has little hope to offer elsewhere if it ceases to be socialist. The existence of caste and class conflicts cannot be ignored even in India, though class is taking time to break from caste, in spite of some industrialism. The social power of the people has to be mobilized in support of socialist measures, if socialism has to survive the climate of capitalism and become a soil for the new man to grow.

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PEASANTS AND WORKERS

The peasants and workers of a country are the most distinctive classes, though there can be nothing like a homogeneous peasantry or homogeneous proletariat. In a country like India, there are diversities among them owing allegiance to religion, caste or tradition. Still, each class has a greater cohesion within itself than it has with groups or individuals of another class. In Europe too the overwhelming majority of the people lived in the countryside and for the most part worked on the land. Whether they constituted a social class or not, they reacted, whenever they were threatened, against their common enemies, the church, the nobility, or the townsmen. This has been the situation from A.D. 1500 till now, and this has been mostly the silent condition in India too, with variations.

There has been a broad division between those who have tilled the land and those who have rented it for various reasons. Till the disappearance of feudalism in Europe and landlordism in India, in spite of the thin disguise in which they have returned, the division on the land was calculated to promote conflicts, leading to a kind of peasant revolts, both in Europe and India, while among the peasants, the division has been between the rich peasant, the middle peasant and the small peasant. Industrialization and the economics of production have led to the preservation of large farms in Europe and America, but in India there has been a pressure for ceilings and redistribution of land, compelling cooperativization. While there has been capitalization on land, yeoman families were a large feature in Europe for centuries, and in India, the peasant is a factor, especially among communities like the Jats. Serfdom and forced labour still exist in parts of India.

But the revolutionary possibilities of the peasantry which Mao saw in China have been growingly reduced in India through stages of tenancy reform under the British and zamindari abolition under the Congress. Everything is not ideal and feudalism still lingers, for land reforms have been tardy and uneven, and the solid bourgeois state of Indian society is uniformly spread in the Indian peasantry. The cry of neglect of the village owes its inspiration partly to fear of class conflicts and socialism. Landless labour is not completely identified and floats into urban areas as jobless labour and conflicts are not real or bloody.

In Indian villages, the cactus keeps spreading in clusters beyond broken hedges into the homes built of mud. The scene symbolizes the endless trance and endless vigil of a people who have slumbered for centuries and become a part of the environment of slush and dirt and disease. To the upper crust of the caste-ridden village society, the plough is the symbol of life and harvests bring festival atmosphere; there is the hard lower crust of people to whom life and death are not different, and they constitute most of what are callously called the millions. Sometimes the rains do not come and there is drought, followed by famine conditions: at other times there is too much rain and whole villages are washed away. The cactus continues to spread, encircling the villages with its prickly grip. Not all the six lakh villages are now under the old spell, which Hindu or Muslim rulers did not break. With freedom, there were whisperings of change, and it was felt that to sleep-walk is not to live. This revolution in the mind is not known to the new community leaders who seem to come from another world. The village folk no longer listen to old wives' tales; they question, grumble, and ask for everything that the world can give. This is called the revolution of rising expectations.

The revolution has been going on, unrecognized by people in the towns. The villages are not content to provide the manure for urbanization. The towns have roads and water taps, though the dairy-man, the vegetable seller, the sweeper, and the scavenger who slave for others belong to a world of submerged fury. The unorganized urban labour finds its recruits in the village, where there are too many who have to live on too little land, and there is a link between rural needs and

urban needs. Beneath is a cavernous underground, of the lava and brimstone of raw emotions, dark, lustreless elements. Revolutions are silent and devour their children silently, till they are forced to be violent.

There were two parallel movements to resurrect Indian villages, the agrarian agitation organized by the Congress and the tenancy reforms which the British government introduced in spurts of reforming zeal. In some States, peasant proprietorships had been recognized by enlightened British rulers; in other States, land had been indiscriminately farmed out among middle men, who developed into a baronial class competing with the ruling princes for influence, privilege and power. In States like Uttar Pradesh, agrarian revolution seemed possible, with more than two million landlords, some of them with only small slices of land. With freedom, landlordism was abolished painlessly, which meant compensation in cash and in bonds. This was a burden which communist countries could do without, but India was working under a constitution which provided for compensation, though by amendment the amount of compensation was left to be decided by the legislatures. The difference between expropriation with compensation and expropriation without compensation has made a difference to the pace of land reform. In India all the tenants freed from landlordism could not be made owners of land in one stage; in some States they had to pay for ownership, a kind of contribution to the compensation funds. Landlords, who were deprived of their income as middle men, could keep some land of their own and some properties on it, and the smaller among them who were landlords only in name were given rehabilitation grants to be saved from pauperization.

The freed peasants had to deal with too many authorities, instead of the old landlords, who were exacting but could be identified. Instead of the oppressiveness of the middle man, there was new insecurity, with no end to land reform or the talk of it. Land reform is the most difficult of reforms to implement, and with even the promised land reforms not taking effect, the small peasant with an uneconomic holding has a hard and difficult life. The landless, whose number is large, do not find enough employment. To apply the classification which prevails in socialist countries, the rich peasant

and the middle peasant alone can get on. The Congress is dominated by rich peasants and land reform is, therefore, said to be tardy and unreal. There were to be ceilings on land, but there is no legislation yet for it throughout the country, and where there is legislation, ceilings are too high or too unreal. There was to be a drive for cooperative farming, but only rich peasants have the initiative to form cooperatives and manage to get fat government loans. Irrigation has been extended but irrigation rates are high and scare away the small peasant. Land is to belong to the tiller, but many who do not take interest in cultivation are allowed to own land. Agricultural production has increased but not at the rate at which the country needs it. There is endless talk of helping the peasant, but it is only now that incentives are being offered to him, and most of the incentives are only good intentions which do not reach him. And they never get the prices they deserve.

The Indian village has roused much romanticism and inspired much bucolic poetry. Any further idealization of the villages as scenes of pastoral peace with aged cows treated as sacred is recognized to be unhelpful. There was much hope when the movement for what is known as community development was started on a large scale under state auspices. It aimed at total transformation. The village community was to be organized for a new life, with health centres, recreation facilities, sales depots and agriculture and was to be supplemented with revived or newly established village industries. The results have been confined only to some villages. Roadside villages with good communications, villages which can sell their produce easily to towns, villages which have been electrified and villages which have produced leadership or in which the legislators of the district have taken interest, have gone ahead; they have industries, schools, and health centres. But there are villages in the interior which are worse than they were thirty or forty years ago. Communications are the first need; electricity has a revolutionary impact. The role of moneylenders must end. There has been as much confusion in theory as in practice, and there is no end to the compartmentalization of economic problems into rural economics, growth economics, labour economics, industrial economics and so on.

The reorganization of life in the village had to be based on its reorganization as a unit of self-government. The old village republics are now only a memory and it was necessary to legislate for the new life. There are now village councils, block councils, based on the area of development blocks, and district councils. The pattern cannot be uniform and many State governments have been reluctant to shed their powers in favour of local self-government. Amendment of the Constitution is suggested to give constitutional sanction to local self-government councils, but that would mean too much legalism.

It is better to build than to impose. In the village, caste has a more powerful hold than in the towns; conservatism and orthodoxy are unspent forces; the rich peasant is dominating; and the moneylender has an economic role. The credit system has to be introduced widely and uniformly and some change in social outlook has to come before the village community can feel it is a community. Party politics are a complicating factor. In Britain there was local self-government before there was national government. In India, elections at least at the district level and the block level mean political parties, and at the village level, there are the politics of caste, usury and the parish pump. In China, with a one-party system, the party operates powerfully even at the village level, but in India the official machinery and the party agencies are in conflict and add to the tensions in the village. The villages cannot live in isolation and they miss the impact of the industrial revolution.

The proletariat in India has had a misshapen history because of the slow rate of industrialization and the divisions in the trade union movement, which was a part of the national movement and was overshadowed by it. When the national movement was divided into sects and schisms, the trade union movement was not only divided but splintered. The working class at present consists of working classes according to the big public enterprises to which they cling and the classification they achieve under the awards of pay commissions. The working class is again divided between the public sector and the private sector and is, like American and British labour, developing the habit of being content as a partner in the profits of capital and not nursing a larger vision demanding partnership or

control in ownership and management. With a divided labour leadership, with ineffectual labour ministries and departments, and with no equality of bargaining power in sight, the prospect for the proletariat is not bright. But there is a demand for greater production and productivity, and the proletariat may come into its own, particularly if it can make common cause with the smaller peasants and landless labour.

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MASS MEDIA

The Indian press, in spite of its rapid growth after Independence, is not yet adequate for the people's needs because it suffers from severe physical limitations and may suffer from them for several years, the limitations of the high cost of machinery, which is wholly imported but for small machines, the limitation of restricted communication, and the limitation of restricted readership. The urges of the people under the stimulus of adult suffrage desperately demanded expression, and, with state-managed radio and TV, the press is yet the most sought after means of freedom of expression, especially political expression. The press has been growing in spite of its limitations, though unevenly; it is free to grow, its rate of growth corresponding to the rate of growth of the economy. But, whether physically adequate or not, there is doubt if it is equal to its social responsibilities, for without a social purpose, the press, with the still lingering attraction of the printed word for the public, is likely to do more harm than good.

The startling fact about the Indian press, as brought out by several inquiries, is that it is an industry owned by other industries. It is not so in any other country. India's press barons are also industrial barons and all the baronies are interlocked. Unless the press is free not only from government restrictions but from the grip of industrial and big business interests, it cannot serve the community and the community cannot participate in its operation. Almost all newspaper groups and combines and big newspapers are interlocked with business interests, and whatever the freedom they exercise there can be no freedom on economic matters, in news and comments on business, big or small, or on economic matters in general, or on

budgetary matters in particular.

The attempt to influence the policies and decisions of the government at all levels will continue, whether it will succeed or not wholly or partly, and there is thus a handicap in bringing down or controlling prices or in legislating for socialist, or even social welfare, measures. This aspect of the press is not at all discussed by information ministers. and there has been a suspicion in the public mind that the government, in this as in other matters, acts in collusion with big business interests, so that if there are few monopolies in the literal sense, there are enough monopolistic trends choking the democratic process. The bare statistics about the Indian press as given in the Press Registrar's annual reports do not tell anything. The reports repeatedly refer to common ownership newspapers, but it is a tell-tale phrase which hides the interlocking and other operations, which are again a misnomer for the hold of monopoly business houses.

In all the talk about freedom, there is little readiness to examine the foundations of freedom. The question that has to be asked is: freedom for whom and freedom for what? India's "free" press has been a haphazard growth in which business interests were to be developed in the nationalist fervour with which newspapers were started, and, after the alternate fits of repression and restrictions and of relaxation and liberalism, what had been once a mission became an industry after Independence. The crucial problems of the Indian press, as of any press, is how freedom of expression can operate within the framework of an industry. The profession of journalism has been slowly submerged in the industrial process and lost its primary purpose. The development of industrial conditions and the growth of techniques can be understood as a part of the process of industrialization. But when the industrial processes are applied to the sphere of freedom of expression, the newspaper industry should be treated as a special industry with special obligation or the profession of journalism should be freed from the grinding processes of industrial techniques, if not from economic laws. Gandhi showed in controlling and running *Indian Opinion* in South Africa, *Young India* and *Harijan* in India, how commercial considerations could be set aside and the papers run successfully and achieve self-sufficiency. Gandhi was, of course, no

employer. But the weeklies he ran were the greatest weeklies the world has known.

The normal industrial operations give rise to concentration, which is not good especially in the sphere of mass communication, in which everyone should be free to participate; and such developments are far more harmful in a developing country like India than in developed countries. In developed countries the capacity for competition is more evenly distributed in an industry in which competition is far more imperfect than in other industries. The Indian government have been too willing to serve unequal competition, for they have no awareness of the real problems of the press and their information ministers are content to be haw-hawing birds of passage serving their time.

The newspaper industry has shown itself to be incapable of self-regulation and the profession, utterly disorganized except for bargaining for wage scales, has made only feeble attempts to regulate itself. There are now half a dozen proprietors' organizations and half a dozen journalists' organizations, unable to articulate vigorously, purposefully, or unitedly. It was because of this absence of unity that the profession could not manage to have its say on censorship under the Emergency, while only proprietors of weeklies or monthlies could make a protest. There has been talk of delinking on which everyone is agreed in principle but about which nobody is serious. Diffusion, which can effectively help delinking, has been discouraged not only by the government but by some sections of journalists because to give shares to employees might seem to invite labour trouble, though it has been done on a large scale in a capitalist country like Japan without much trouble. In a country where much depends on government initiative, the government do not want to take the trouble of delinking because it may affect industrialists' interests or in giving the workers a share in ownership and control because it may lead to a socialist direction or control by militant labour. The government do not even care to help the smaller newspapers. They plan for everything at least on paper in their Plan documents, including the private sector, but they do not want even to plan for the required newsprint and machinery for the press in a short-term or long-term plan, without interfering with freedom of expression. The present

high degree of ownership and control by big business therefore, continues.

This cannot be democracy, yet, with the press repeatedly failing to judge the popular mood in election after election, it is not serving the democratic process. In its increasing craze for circulations, however, it is trying to sell vulgarity, sex and sensationalism. The only worthwhile sensationalism is the sensation of social and economic change. The press after Independence cannot be what it was before Independence, arguing, fighting and suffering for national freedom, but there is an equally grim fight now for giving social and economic content to freedom. There is scope for missionary zeal, for freeing the newspaper economy from the evils to which economism leads, to give a broad, social base to newspaper ownership and control, to replace the present monopoly houses which own and control the press with a widely diffused ownership pattern. There should be a strenuous effort to restore to the press its primary purpose and to endow it with the spirit of education and with the aim of ethical purpose. There is talk of an international information order following McBride, but there is no attempt at a national order.

The radio and TV are faster, sharper and more immediate media, capable of much quicker development. The question has often been discussed whether they should be taken away from government control and handed over to be managed by corporations. It is only with government help that these media can develop fast and be turned into powerful media for mass education in this country. The film is mainly under government control but is mostly wasted to cater to sex and sensationalism. Whether this country is yet fit to produce enough selfless and public-spirited controllers to run these media is doubtful, for there are not enough men of capacity and character at every level of life in India. It may not be desirable to introduce new types of nepotism. Unesco's advice that the first task is to improve standards of performance seems to be wholesome before the form of public corporations can be adopted in the sphere of mass communication. There is no justification for the way they are run at present under the indifferent care of authorities who are interested not only

in government publicity but for personal publicity, backed by the cult of personality. The test is provided by the people, how far they feel they are instructed, educated, entertained or guided. At present people's participation in any of the mass media is a myth.

26

EDUCATING THE MASTERS

The Indian Constitution laid down that the state shall provide (by 1957) free and compulsory education for all children until they complete the age of fourteen years. The objective remains distant, for lack of funds, lack of schools, and lack of teachers. The hunger for education is all-consuming and extends beyond the desire to be literate, and wherever there are schools, they are full, though classes may have no teachers and teachers may have no classes. The smallest per cent increase in education means millions of new literates and this is a revolution in itself. To maintain quality, along with this rate of physical expansion, is not easy. British or other reports on secondary education are not relevant to India where, apart from lack of funds and trained teachers, the medium of teaching and the languages, including Hindi and English, to be taught are problems. The standards of English in the secondary stage have fallen so low, since Indian languages displaced English as the medium, that they have affected the standards in universities and technical institutions.

Even the Sixth Plan treats education only in Chapter 21. The targets are fairly high. The total enrolment in elementary education increased from 223 lakhs in classes I-VIII in 1950-51 to around 905 lakhs during . Nevertheless, for every three children enrolled in primary and middle schools, one eligible child was left behind. Over 80 per cent of the children not enrolled so far are confined to a dozen States which were not in a position to allocate the necessary funds. Thus, despite a network of over 6.5 lakh schools and colleges, the employment of over three million teachers and an annual budget of Rs.3,000 crore, the Sixth Plan document admits that it has not

been possible so far for the educational system to achieve the goal of universal education for all children up to the age of fourteen. There are the social groups who are at a disadvantage like the economically poor, the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. In secondary and higher education, there has been vast expansion but there has been no qualitative improvement, the National Policy on Education (1957) remaining unimplemented. The aims of education are admirably stated from time to time with platitudinous piety but rarely followed, and high-sounding names like educational technology are irrelevantly used. The Sixth Plan further emphasizes the orientation of education to development and it is only science and some of the social sciences that are being mainly benefited.

The Robbins Report on British Universities was relevant to the problem of number and quality in Indian universities. Restriction on admissions has been often suggested but has not proved practicable. In 1957 the total number of students in the universities and colleges rose to 1,272,666, an increase of 10.15 per cent over the enrolment for 1957 since 1954-55 the enrolment had doubled. Since then the number of universities rose to over 100. There is need for more universities, but it costs less to expand existing facilities than to set up new universities. Instead of the unitary pattern, a federal-unitary pattern is becoming fashionable, wherever resources and circumstances permit. The defects of instruction and the vagaries of the examination system add to the wastage. Lack of facilities for study and recreation increases an unrest born of intellectual and political discontent. The student politician has added disturbance to the uncreativeness of the teacher politicians; both are products of wasteful conditions. Now, class IV employees are the main problem. The total number of teachers in the universities and colleges gave a poor teacher-pupil ratio. There is shortage of competent and experienced teachers and teachers are under-paid and under-equipped. The search for quality continues feebly; there are to be select centres of advanced study. The shortcomings are to be found also in technological institutions, which are not yet an adequate instrument for the technological revolution. It is difficult to get good Vice-Chancellors. Good men are scared. Yet to make it a rule to appoint

only teachers as Vice-Chancellors may produce good results in the long term.

Institutions grow with age, accumulating tradition, and Indian universities are not old enough. Taxila and Nalanda were among the oldest universities of the world, but they are now only ruins and memories. Oxford and Cambridge are ever venerable and ever new, like other old universities in Europe. American universities, even Yale and Harvard, are comparatively young, robust and affluent, and some of them, in spite of their large numbers, maintain high standards. Indian universities swung from liberal education to an education adapted to the needs of industrial life, but will take time to adjust themselves and wrest academic temper from contemporary turbulence. Some of the contrasts are striking. The Calcutta, Bombay and Madras Universities. which have celebrated their centenaries, have achieved a serenity which the younger universities lack. There are no startling manifestations in them of the petty politics of teachers, of student indiscipline, or of steep falls from standards. If this were true only of the old universities of what were known as the presidency towns, it could be understood, but almost all south Indian universities are free from the infantilism which marks some of the north Indian universities. Among the new universities, Central universities alone are gathering standards.

All universities now aspire to be central universities. The constitution-makers were right in making education a State subject, for the change in the medium of instruction from English to the regional language is important for the new generations, and the pace of displacement can be decided only in the State. State governments have, however, not been able to respect university autonomy to the extent that is possible, and they have extended not only party politics but personal ambitions into the campus. In the appointment of Vice-Chancellors, there have been few exceptions to political preference. Education ministers have not been enlightened people. Under the Constitution, the Centre has responsibility for the maintenance and coordination of standards and it can use its money power effectively, but it has no constitutional power to compel States to follow even agreed principles. The University Grants Commission has been a poor instrument of coordination. Education was to be made a concurrent subject by amendment of the

Constitution with the consent of the States, so that the Centre could legislate for education and the Central laws could override State laws. It was expected that concurrence could be achieved in a less startling way, but it has been constitutionally achieved. Even Robbins could not have suggested a simple pattern for a country like India. There is now general agreement that education should be in the Concurrent List. To throw the blame for the poor results on history textbooks is a poor excuse, for history has to weigh facts and there is no way of making history happy.

The hold of tradition is as strong on education as on other forms of social activity. The Brahmanic, Buddhistic and Islamic systems of education have much in common; the texts were important in all these systems, and these transmitted spiritual values. But Macaulay's eloquent advocacy of western education introduced new values, and while these carried with them the seed of liberation and revolution, old values have been discredited but new values suiting a new society have not emerged. There is some rock-'n-roll about our education, and while good students have always been good and pursued their avocations and won distinctions, these are not products of a conscious drive but exceptions in constantly shifting values.

The liberal grant-in-aid system which Sir William Hunter introduced in the last century has enlarged private enterprise in education till the evil of capitation fees for engineering and medical courses has brought about a distortion which has to be corrected before it is too late. The effort to raise standards has been going on. The Raleigh Committee of 1902 carried out a comprehensive review of the first five Indian universities of Bombay, Madras, Calcutta, Punjab and Allahabad, and made an endeavour to raise standards. The Sadler Commission of Calcutta of 1917 dealt with education comprehensively. But the objectives of national education and mass education were neglected. Independence brought new problems and since then there have been more problems than solutions. There have been several commissions but yet no national system of education, in spite of the Kothari Commission's comprehensive work. The Government resolution on national policy of 1957, on free and compulsory education, on the status, emoluments and education of teachers, on development of languages, on

educational opportunities, on work experience and national service, on science education and research, on books, examinations, literacy and adult education, on sports and so on, should be implemented. It may mean an enormous increase in expenditure on education. In spite of all attempts, standards and character in national life are coming down. There has been only expansion, including expansion in research, especially scientific and industrial research. The need is for a new system of values.

27

NATIONAL LANGUAGES

The Linguistic Survey of India, compiled by Sir George Grierson under government auspices (1903-27), enumerates 179 languages and 544 dialects. Grierson's effort seemed to have been to show that India was not a nation, for he included in his list 116 small speeches which mostly belonged to Burma, and he elevated dialects to the status of languages and speeches to the status of dialects. The Indo-Aryan group of languages go back to the speech of the period of the Rigveda. These include Hindi proper including Khari-boli and Brajabhasha, Eastern Panjabi, Rajasthani dialects, the north-western group including Sindhi, the east-central group including Awadhi, the eastern group including Oriya, Bengali, Assamese, and the Bihari speeches, the northern or Pahari group including Nepali, Garhwali and Kumauni and the southern group including Marathi. There are then the Darolic speeches, including Kashmiri, which partake of both Indo-Aryan and Indo-Iranian.

The old Indo-Aryan speech was brought into India by the Aryans during the second half of the second millenium B.C. It spread from Punjab into the Gangetic Valley, establishing itself in the whole of Northern India from Afghanistan to Bengal by 600 B.C. It was modified particularly in the eastern Gangetic Valley. In the Middle Indo-Aryan phase, represented by Pali, the old Prakrits of the earliest inscriptions and the later Prakrit dialects found in Sanskrit drama drawn on the literary speech which became prominent about A.D. 800, there was a decay of sounds and forms of old Indo-Aryan. These new forms became the modern Indian languages. When Sanskrit came to be spoken more and more widely, it underwent transformation under

the impact of linguistic laws, when printing had not been invented.

Speech is important in the origin and evolution of a language. The Vedic Sanskrit had rigidity because it depended on memory and recitation. As old Greek became modern Greek and as Latin with its rigid forms degenerated into the Vulgate and gave place to Italian and the Roman languages, India's modern languages followed the grammar and usage imposed by Sanskrit in the various regions, while Sinhalese and Maldivian, apart from gipsy dialects, were the offshoots of the New Indo-Aryan. The Dravidian languages did not develop from the Aryan but only incorporated Sanskrit vocabulary, Tamil incorporating the least. These languages did not develop their own link language like Hindi in the north. Tamil is the representative Dravidian language, with the earliest developed language and the oldest literature. Other Dravidian languages have a large Aryan element in vocabulary. Dravidian languages like Tulu, Toda or Gondi are uncultivated speeches Santali and other tribal languages belong to the Austric group and the Mongoloid languages include Tibetan and other speeches.

Sanskrit stands apart. It is in a way the mother of the Indo-Aryan languages and it influenced all languages in the country. It served the Indian people for more than three thousand years. It is the language of the epics and the Puranas, a unifying factor and whatever is Indian in the Indian people is contained in Sanskrit, though Islam brought Persian and Arabic. It is a treasure-house from which all other Indian languages draw. It is embedded in Hindi, which is accepted not only as the official language of India but will be the lingua franca of the country. Sanskrit also is the link with the "other" India.

In the Eighth Schedule of the Indian Constitution, fifteen major Indian languages are enumerated, leaving aside the minor languages and hundreds of dialects described in scholarly detail by Grierson. The fifteen languages are mentioned only for two limited purposes. These languages are to be represented on the commission which the President of India is to appoint every five years to make recommendations on the progressive use of Hindi, in the place of English, for the official purposes of the Union and as the language of inter-State communication;

in the development of Hindi, the forms, style and expressions in the other languages are to be assimilated without interfering with its genius. Apart from Hindi, Sanskrit and Urdu, the other languages are important because they are the major regional languages with highly developed literatures, some much older than Hindi literature, and each the language of a State of the Union with historical memories. These unilingual States were inevitable, as the administration had to be in the language of the people in a democracy. Sanskrit is included as the language of ancient Indian civilization, from which most of the other Indian languages are derived.

There is still a debate whether Hindi and Urdu are separate languages or whether Urdu is only a form of Hindi; this issue has been coloured by Hindu-Muslim cultural differences, though many Hindus treat Urdu as their language. Hindustani is the basic speech from which, according to some, Hindi and Urdu developed; to others, Urdu was the camp language of Muslim rulers. Gandhi advocated the cause of Hindustani, with Hindi and Urdu as its two forms with two different scripts; so did Jawaharlal Nehru. At the time of constitution-making, Hindi was adopted as the language of the Union, and an attempt was made to define its content, as a language representing the composite culture of India, assimilating the forms, style and expressions used in Hindustani and other languages. The Constitution was concerned with the use of Hindi only for the official purposes of the Union and as the language of communication between the States. But official purposes include the language to be used in the administration, in the law courts, and in the schools and universities, and official puposes could also enforce style and forms, whatever may be the usages of literature.

The displacement of English is not by Hindi alone, for at the regional level, the State languages take the place of English. There is thus a tussle not only between Hindi and English but between Hindi and the other Indian languages. The problem is complicated because Hindi is the language of many States, which are contiguous, and each of the other languages has only one State in which it could be the medium. Hindi fanaticism, which gathered force after Independence, created the impression that Hindi was to be imposed, and there has been resistance and even a threat of secession. But Hindi has not yet been used for

all official purposes even in the Hindi States, and it is admitted that like other Indian languages, it has to be further developed not only for official but scientific and technological purposes. The deadline laid down in the Constitution for the use of Hindi has had to be postponed by a law permitting the continued use of English.

Some Indian language had to take the place of English some time at the Union level, and by what was known as a constitutional settlement, arrived at after much debate at the time of constitution-making, Hindi was adopted, though it secured only a majority of one vote against Hindustani in the Congress. There is a consensus that there can be no hurry about displacement of English by Hindi, that the non-Hindi areas must be also ready for it, and that, apart from sentiment, there are questions of practical convenience, like the medium of examination for recruitment to the all-India services. The non-Hindi languages, because of their importance, are all called national languages, and these languages will take the place of English in the States, possibly as the medium even at the university stage. The unsettled questions are at what stage Hindi will take the place of English, at what stage in the universities, at what stage in the courts, at what stage in the administration. There is no clear answer. There has to be a time-table of displacement but there is none yet. The importance of English has been increasingly recognized as the most convenient international medium as part of the Indian heritage, and as the language of modern knowledge. Everyone wants it as a second or third language to be taught at as early an age as possible and learnt well for international use, but no one is certain when it can be given up for science or for the courts. English will be learnt and spoken by larger numbers of people, as literacy spreads, and there is a demand for cutting out the present literacy lumber and teaching it as a second language. It is being accepted as the second language in most non-English countries.

There are few lucid intervals in the unceasing war waged on English by some Indians, but the drive for displacing English finds it getting entrenched like the Duke of Wellington at Torres Vedras. A language, even where it is not the mother tongue, can be an intimate part of life, and its literature a part

of the make-up of the mind. But the Indian petite bourgeoisie find it necessary to do penance for their original sins; so English classes must be boycotted, English sign-boards must be removed, English letters must be defaced or blacked out. Even in China, the communists allowed sign-boards in English to remain over shops in Shanghai and Nanking and yet the Chinese language flourishes unenfeebled. English in India is, of course, different; it has become embedded in Indian life and it is easier for Indians to say in English what sounds like Greek in the Indian languages. The explosive eloquence of Indian delegates at the United Nations was buttressed with quotations from neglected English classics like Burke.

Too many Indians are Indo-Anglians. Thomas Babington Macaulay, with his rhetorical minute on education, decreed this destiny for them, and since then some Indians, behaving as if to their eternal regret their mother tongue was not English, want it also to be declared a national language. Every educated Indian becomes another Indo-Anglian when he is educated with the help of Nesfield grammar and Macmillan readers. It has meant mesmerized articulation, though at the end of it all, an Indian might feel only slightly more omniscient than Sam Weller who, after learning the alphabet, wondered whether it was worth going through so much to know so little. Indo-Germanic philology shows how English, by a proces of moulting, evolved from barbaric splendour into a free, simple speech as modern as anything that can be invented today. Indians have learnt it with passion for two centuries and they should not unlearn it, but some unlearning is involved in the deteriorating standards of teaching and textbooks following its displacement by Indian languages as the medium of instruction and in the disappearance of the English-speaking community. It required a national effor to produce an English-educated elite to run the country or to produce scientists who could become Fellows of the Royal Society. Such wholesale absorption was a tragedy of extravagance and waste. There are Indo-Anglians who think they can manufacture their own brand of English like Americans and other English-speaking peoples. Indian English can only be bad English.

The anti-English mood of fanaticism is gone for good, except among a few who think that if English goes Hindi will flourish and become the lingua franca; a more sober mood of living with English and its eccentricities permanently has developed. The three-language formula was a fair one to balance the interests of Hindi-speaking and non-Hindi-speaking peoples, but it has not been worked fairly in the north. English is recognized as a language which Indians should value for technological progress at least, and it will have to remain an associate language of Hindi as long as the people of the non-Hindi regions want it. The spirit of Kipling which still stirs uneasily in his Benmore home in Simla might rejoice over this consummation of British influence. The Indian people are expected to be fond of learning languages, and bilingual and trilingual feats are recommended to them. There is yet no disenchantment with English, and for a long time, the Indian languages, in spite of the prize money that is being pumped into them, might not offer half the enchantments of English. But their day will come.

28

BUREAUCRACY AND BUREAUCRATISM

Bureaucracy has become a much used and much abused word meaning many things. Primarily it means a system controlled by a bureau of full-time salaried officials, piebald professionals, organized hierarchically, bound by rules and red-tape; this is the sense in which it has been often used in a good or bad sense since the time of Max Weber. It has also come to mean a political system or other institutions, and so defined by Oxford and other dictionaries, a term like aristocracy and democracy, a mixture of myths originating in Greece and France but perfected in Britain since the introduction of competitive examinations for the Civil Service. All administrations, capitalist, socialist or practising welfarism, require a bureaucracy and it is when it breeds bureaucratism, waste, delay, corruption, as it usually does, that it comes under attack.

The etymological sense no longer matters, for through long practice, bureaucracy has ceased to be a system or an organization and, developing special manners and habits, it has become a state of mind, Lord Curzon calling it several years ago a mental hiatus. Its most outstanding products have many shining qualities, but they are also part of a system. Carlyle, who had a prophet's sense about the most prosaic of occupations, referred to "the continental nuisance called bureaucracy", and Lenin, with leonine violence, waged constant war on it. India, with imitative indifference, borrowed from Britain the concept of the neutral civil servant who serves his changing political masters with equal fidelity and equal contempt. Since the changing political masters do not change much and have practised personality cult, in small and big ways, there is utter confusion now, apart from sycophancy and corruption. One of India's

Finance Ministers thirty years ago found that one-third of the staff of the Central Secretariat was surplus and it has gone on increasing, the surplus fat feeding more waste, more delay and more corruption with increasing dearness allowance and other aids to inflation. The situation in India thus, with or without Prof. Parkinson's Law in operation, is similar to that in the later Roman Empire, when half the population worked to feed the other half who administered it. Yet, the battalions of peons who stand or sit or sleep like sentinels in the secretariat do not constitute bureaucracy. The bureau of officials, now dispersed and divided, who exercise influence behind the noisy bastions of political power is the source of some good and much evil.

The history of Indian administration, apart from Indian polity, in comparison with what happened in other countries, offers a clue to the present system. The central feature of Vedic polity was the institution of popular assemblies, the Sabha and the Samiti, but Vedic kingship was not constitutional monarchy or a public trust. Apart from the dominance of the Brahmins or of the purohits, the king's domestic chaplains, there is no evidence of an administration, except of tax collectors, apart from what went by the name of Dharma, traditional moral laws. But even before the Mauryan period, when the first of Indian empires flourished, there was organized administration in the political, economic and military spheres. The main aspect of public policy was the promotion of public security and welfare. This was elaborated under the Mauryas, as described in detail by Kautilya in his *Arthasastra*, presenting the picture of almost a modern state in the wide diversification of public welfare. There were departments and several bureaus though no central bureau. In Buddhist times, the polity and the administration were the same with a little variation. The Greeks found that some of the Indus Valley states achieved a high degree of equity and justice. In the pre-Gupta and Gupta periods also, the state was a welfare state, the kings taking a greater interest in the walfare of the people. Chinese, Arab and other travellers recorded the welfare activities of the state in the Harsha and post-Harsha periods. In the south, developments in polity and administration were similar. The king's spies and agents were everywhere, and there was demarcation

between the royal household and the general administration.

The two pillars of the administration, which was centralized whenever the state was of a suitable size, were a permanent revenue and a standing army. Kautilya and his successors with their own *Arthasastras* laid down rules for the recruitment of officials and their selection for specialized posts, a regular administrative service consisting of civil and military officials with more or less well-defined functions even in the pre-Mauryan period, the king exercising the supreme executive, judicial and military authority. The ministers only advised the king. There were other emblems of a modern state, like state registers and records, a system of law and justice, and state police. There was uniform local administration, though no uniform local self-governing institutions. Their variations in the pre-Gupta, Gupta and post-Gupta periods were not considerable.

Apart from the question whether the state was an Islamic state or a theocratic state, the main question that arises in medieval Indian history is whether the Delhi sultanate or the Mogul empire was a culture state or a police state. The guiding principle of the Delhi sultans was benevolence towards the population but only the Muslim population, and so they could not rise above the stature of a king of a police state. Tolerance was the exception, not the rule. But the state under the Moguls was different, a welfare state with a modern type of administration. Medieval government in India was a fusion of Perso-Arabic, Turko-Mongol and Indian elements. The fiscal system was Perso-Arabic, the army administration Turko-Mongol, the principles of government, church and departmental arrangements were borrowed from Arabia and Persia, the land revenue system was predominantly Indian, the judicial system had Indian elements and the conception of monarchy as it developed under the Moguls showed Indian influence.

Under the British, the Crown, at first through the East India Company, was the apex of the administrative system with the village panchayat at the bottom. The Crown meant the Secretary of State, constitutionally, and it meant the men on the spot, the Governor-General and the Governors, aided by the civil service. Side by side with reforms, departmentalization and centralization went on, in later stages accommodating

democracy along with autocracy. The major governmental activity concerned the collection of revenue, at first mainly land revenue, administration of justice and maintenance of law and order. The district was the administrative unit and each province was divided into districts, in charge of collectors and deputy commissioners. The system had to change into the present complex organization, first with Provincial Autonomy and later with Independence and the increasing role of the state. The main transformation has been the multifarious role of the district head, the development of the power of the bureaucracy, the impact of the increasing and interfering role of the minister and the legislator and the establishment of the many institutions of self-government. The result has been the diminished role of the bureaucrat at the level of the people and his increased importance in the secretariat.

Apart from the well-developed bureaucracy of the Roman Empire, which provided the pattern for most of Europe in the earlier centuries, Carlyle's "continental nuisance" developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and later in the nineteenth to the twentieth centuries With the transition from medieval to modern history, and from feudalism to capitalism, bureaucracy developed, particularly with industrialization. In several countries like Prussia, England and France, there was a professional civil service. In some countries, a group of office holders, working collectively and maintaining seniority, did the work of a hierarchy of officials and led to the establishment of the idea of a modern bureau. Hitler and the modern U.S. President inherited their personal officers from the practice of Frederick the Great of Prussia and Peter the Great of Russia. There was consistency as few states ceased to exist in spite of wars and changing boundaries. Bureaucracy became the expression of industrialization and urbanization and later of democracy with its welfarism. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries bureaucracy acquired a social and political role. Centralized rule came into vogue and France, as a unitary state, has had a continuous history of centralized rule. For organized development, the British bureaucracy is the best example. Soviet bureaucracy is a part of Soviet one-party rule and the importance of the proletariat has made no difference to it. The Yugoslav system of self-management has lessened the evils

of bureaucratism and for some time China waged an open war against these evils. In Japan the Meiji Restoration meant a western type of civil service. The bureaucracies of the private sector can be as hard as the bureaucracies of the public sector, and in any context bureaucracy is an expression of and bound by political, social, economic and technological considerations.

The bureaucracy which prevails now is not the bureaucracy which Curzon described, though the evils have persisted and multiplied. The involved, insidious manner of bureaucracy was well described by Themistocles. The Athenians, he said, governed the Greeks; he governed the Athenians; his wife governed him; their son governed her. In progression between the minister and the under secretary in the Indian secretariat, it is difficult to know who governs, the minister, the secretary, or the desk-clerk. Bureaucracy is a sleepily revolving wheel. When Napoleon asked his advisers to be speedy, to use despatch and not to forget that the world had been created in six days, he was protesting against the bureaucratic delays of his day. Bureaucracy also breeds verbosity and many verbal infelicities forbidden by the rules of rhetoric. Curzon, the most efficient practitioner of authoritarianism under constitutional government, wrote pompously to the Secretary of State:

> Thousands of pages, occupying hundreds of hours of valuable time, ar· written every year by score upon score of officers, to the obfuscation of their own intellects and the detriment of their official work, and are then sent up to the local government to be annotated, criticized and reported on by other officers who are similarly neglecting their duty in deference to this absurd tyranny; while finally this conglomeration of unassmilated matters comes up here to us again to be noted cn in the departments of the Government of India.

The system, developed through a century of absent-mindedness, reminded Curzon of a "gigantic quagmire or bog in which every question that comes up either sinks or is sucked down, and unless you stick a peg with a label over the part at which it disappeared, and from time to time go round and dig out the relics, you will never see anything of them again". There have

been notes by Churchill, Vansittant and others, and guidelines by experts like Gowers and others, on pruning officialese into plain, understandable English. But bureaucracy has its own jargon and cannot do without it.

In recent years, the Indianized Indian bureaucracy, even after discarding the Anglo-Indian literary manners of the Lyalls, Butlers and Haileys, has acquired obesity, while sticking to the elaborate ritual of red tape. The present-day bureaucrats are multi-purpose men: the secretariat is unwieldy and unworkable, too many stay too long, without contact with the people, and many of them are courtiers, some playing politics. The best products of the universities have stopped going to the services as they are no longer the best paid and they are not certain of being the rulers, though when ministers are incompetent, the best of the permanent officials can rock the cradles of government. It was said of a Duke of Newcastle of the last century, a sublime failure as a minister, that he was always doing business and never did it. In the progress towards social welfare, the principle of civil service neutrality may mean public accountability for ministers and limited liability for officials. The bureaucracy, like its political masters, must adapt itself to the pressures of social change without giving up its right to give independent advice, but it is only a strong efficient political master that can make use of a strong efficient bureaucrat. Adult suffrage, in conditions of underdevelopment, does not ensure it.

29

SCIENCE AND SOCIAL VALUES

India has come close to the scientific age, mainly due to Nehru's faith in science, his propagandist fervour and the national laboratories he established. There is still not a sufficiently strong social base for scientific activity and the scientific spirit or the scientific outlook will be an acquired appendage, till the bulk of the people are close to science or its applied aspect, technology. The government, the scientists, and the people are becoming aware of the relation between science and society, of the social purposes of science, and of the social responsibilities of scientists. Science has grown according to social needs and cannot escape the impact of the social environment. It cannot be merely theory; it has grown because of the need for action.

Mercantilism led to the development of mathematics. The work of Galileo, Descartes and Newton laid the foundations of mechanics; thermodynamics had similar origins in social development, and most inventions followed military or naval requirements. It is good for science to be freed from slavery to military needs. Atom scientists have, however, to face the dilemma which conscience sometimes presents. The processes of atomic energy, for peaceful or destructive purposes, are the same up to a point. Life and death are thus inextricably mixed in the scientific process, and individual scientists cannot be left to make awful choices. They must submit themselves to social control and follow the discipline of social values. Doctrinal dogma is an aspect of social compulsions, but ideology has made no difference to the operation of scientific laws. There has been nothing like bourgeois physics or communist physics. It is in the organization and application of science that ideol-

ogies matter and social control has shown better results than the profit motive or the mere law of demand and supply.

The Indus Valley civilization, with its achievements in standardization, with planned cities and bricks of controlled size, gives a clue to the methodical system of weights and measures which the early Indians developed, revealing a good standard of technology. The earliest of the Aryan or Hindu sciences were astronomy and its child, astrology, and later cosmology, based on the square and the cube. Kautilya's *Arthasastra* gives evidence of many devices of everyday life. Ancient Hindu mathematics depended on powers of ten and division of time into its smallest units. In Baudhayana and Apasthamba, mathematics were well developed. The zero was invented by the Hindus and Hindu medicine was an early development, incorporating surgery through Susruta. There was detailed analytical study of diseases. The first Hindu algebraist, Aryabhata-I, is remembered, and Bhaskara is another celebrated name. On this tradition, which was enriched by Arabic and other Muslim influences, Indian scientists like Bose, Ramanujan, Raman and Bhabha have carried India into the modern age of science. Bose invented delicate apparatus to measure the physiological response of plants. Ramanujan leapt instinctively to brilliant generalizations. Raman investigated experimentally and theoretically the molecular scattering of light. Bhabha took India into the world of nuclear physics. There was something like Islamic science, apart from Hindu science, but in modern India, Hindus and Muslims are collaborating in the great adventures of the scientific age, which is reducing the relevance of religion.

Why did India, after many scientific achievements in the early years of the Christian era, after Bhaskara and others following Kapila's materialist interpretations, make little progress thereafter? Some scientists attribute it largely to the importance given to the power of intuition and the authoritarian injunctions which made society rigid. The processes which were released by the Renaissance in Europe were not available for India; there was a paralysis of thought processes. But the reason why India lagged behind in scientific progress was, besides the superabundance of non-scientific processes, the

stratification of the economy and the lack of an urge for invention. With the importance given to liberal education by the British, there was little encouragement to science, and India became scientifically backward. Foreign observers who pronounced India's agricultural doom now admit that India's problem is largely one of making up for the uncreative economic processes of British rule. India missed a century of economic progress, whatever she may have gained.

Any state which neglects scientific research now would be an archaic state, but science cannot be left entirely to the universities and to private industry. Advances in atomic and cosmic research and the cost the effort involved make state action inevitable. The lead which the Soviet Union has achieved in scientific education, research and development has made even American leaders of science admit the superiority of socialist organization with its subordination of private interest to public interest or state preferences in scientific priorities. But for the bias given in favour of rocketry, the Soviet Union would not have gone ahead of other countries in launching space satellites. This might be somewhat lopsided. But the American Society for Advancement of Science has had to admit that scientific research in the United States, under the direction of drug industries and others, too, has been lopsided, that sciences like biology and biochemistry have been neglected, and that there should be some regulation of research. British Labour in power gave high priority to an organized scientific revolution. The correct course for India in laying the technological foundations of society is to give a high priority to scientific education. The government cannot be omniscient, even with a large array of scientific advisers, and would be capable of committing costly mistakes.

Three myths have been too long encouraged. The first is that the scientist cannot look after the work of a scientific institute; the second is that managers and administrators of science are more valuable than scientists; the third is that it is easy for Indian scientists working abroad to find work in India, for though they may have work and even the appropriate remuneration, they do not have the equipment. Science alone can point the way to the future but it has to be socially backed. Without a powerful state initiative, no country can attain an

advanced place in scientific progress, though it should not lead only to what is spectacular but to what is socially useful. Moon-landings have no value except that they may discourage people from crying for the moon and help them in probing outer space which is as challenging as Everest once was.

In Europe science has been an aid to production, particularly since 1850, and the organization of science has brought it nearer to society. From Aristotle to Newton and from Newton to Einstein, there have been several revolutions in science, each revolution an assault of reason on the Bastille of faith. The development of biochemistry and biophysics on the one side and the increasing exploration of outer space have made space-continuum real, though it has not made the world safe for democracy since the second Fall of Man at Hiroshima, when he tasted for a second time the forbidden fruit of knowledge. Whatever properties man may have endowed God with, it is clearer more than ever that God is infinite and endless. Science is making a difference to all activities of man, and if he saves himself from nuclear annihilation, he may acquire knowledge amounting to wisdom, though it would require wholesale social reconstruction. Against this background, India may like to learn how to depend on her old seers and new who have a vision of the future and do not seek to drug man's tormented soul with miracles which are not greater than landing on the moon.

There can be no doubt that Indian scientists are as good as any other. But the successes they have achieved, howsoever spectacular, should not be exaggerated and should not be allowed to obscure the deficiencies in the basic social structure. With the Pokhran test we entered the nuclear age. With Aryabhata and Apple, we entered the space age. These may be acclaimed as achievements of our scientists, who can equal anybody provided they have the equipment, but it should not be mistaken to be the acme of our scientific achievement. The scientific achievements are, besides, not supported by sufficient economic advance. The economic build-up necessary for the scientific build-up is not present, and the scientists must receive the necessary support in economic build-up, which means social build-up. We may be among the leading nations in terms

of scientific experiments, but it does not mean we are among the leading nations socially or industrially.

Satellite communication makes it possible to detect any intended move towards a major war by any nation and to plan retaliatory moves. India's first satellite launch vehicle carried Rohini-I into near earth orbit but due to malfunctioning it deviated from its preplanned course. Rohini-II was a succ ss and took India forward in space technology. It became the world's shortest-lived satellite. Through France's development of Ariane on behalf of a many-nation venture, Apple was successfully put by India in a pre-arranged space net. In India's space programme, Apple, built indigenously within three years at a cost of Rs.4 crore, is a spectacular space feat, the ninth country to claim this achievement and the fifth to prove its capacity to perform a series of manoeuvres in successful parking. Apple in due course will have its indigenous companions. India will take some time to aim at permanently manned satellites, and the space programme is promoting good-neighbourly cooperation more than anything else.

As a product of society and as an answer to society's needs, science and technology cannot be viewed in isolation from social and economic change. Man's view of science has differed at different periods in history. It is a question of what man needed and how science answered the needs. But some of the achievements of science were also accidental like Newton's or Faraday's discoveries, or even Galileo's and Copernicus's. Now society has ceased to depend on accidents. Man's landing on the moon may be an adventure to strip the moon of an old mystery, and most modern scientific probings are guided more by man's needs, like the improvements in biophysics or biochemistry, the exploration of the gene or the improvement of communication through space, making the world a closer one. The parallel adventure of probing man and probing other worlds in outer space may be endless. India's concern will be to give preference to scientific advances which will change society quietly and for the better.

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NUCLEAR AGE

India adapted herself to the nuclear age from the moment the United States detonated the atom bomb on Hiroshima and then on Nagasaki. The sense of horror Gandhi expressed was immediate. Nehru was aghast at the arrogance of the United States which not only made the bomb but used it first. It was the second Fall of Man. If man tasted the fruit of forbidden knowledge, the knowledge of nuclear power, it has been haunting him since then. The bomb has lodged itself in the human heart. But the usually prophetic forecast of Bertrand Russell that nuclear power would make national sovereignty out of date has not been, and is not near being, fulfilled. The world would have seen nuclear blackmail, if the Soviet Union had not achieved nuclear deterrence. While the balance of terror has only added to the nuclear nightmare, the world is as near nuclear destruction as ever.

For a country like India, which had just achieved national freedom and had yet to develop her scientific, technological and industrial power, there was little choice but to wait and press on with the task of enlarging the area of non-alignment and make proposals for disarmament, with priority for nuclear disarmament, in the United Nations and other international forums. But the new scientific advance was not to be repudiated without diminishing the dangers. In the race with the developed countries which had enjoyed the benefit of the traditional forms of energy, new nations saw an opportunity of skipping over some stages of development and using nuclear energy. India had to think of joining in welcoming the enormous possibilities of using the new energy for peaceful purposes.

It was known from the beginning that the processes were

the same up to a point for using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes or for making the bomb. In the race for nuclear status, Britain and France soon joined the United States and the Soviet Union for their capacity to make nuclear and thermonuclear explosions. China, after the clash with India, also exploded a nuclear device and achieved nuclear status causing anxiety among Indians concerned with their security. Even by 1960, India was among twelve countries, with operation reactors or with arrangements for operation reactors, which could embark on a nuclear weapon's programme in the near future. Eight other countries were economically and technically capable of producing the bomb, while six other countries had nuclear potentialities. China had to go ahead, if she wanted to impress anyone, and soon went ahead. Canada could have become a nuclear power long ago, but her defence was a part of the American defence system and she had no need to become one and showed great self-restraint. For India, Nehru had laid down the correct policy not only on behalf of his government but on behalf of successor governments that India would not make the bomb. This policy still stands, though with the Pokhran test India took a step in pursuit of using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

The case for India not making the bomb is still strong, though China has advanced as a nuclear power and there is the danger of Pakistan making the bomb. It would seem vain for anyone but the United States and the Soviet Union to seek to achieve deterrence. There is some appropriateness in the five permanent members of the Security Council becoming nuclear powers. For Pakistan or India to become a nuclear power in retaliation would seem ridiculous. To join in the nuclear race is to stay on in the race. To make one bomb is to go on making bombs. Apart from the forbidding cost estimates, it is obvious that it would require a massive scientific build-up, a massive technical build-up, and a massive industrial build-up to join in the nuclear race, though Dr. Bhabha thought it was possible. The option to make the bomb would, however, rest essentially on other grounds.

It was as early as 20 January 1957 that, inaugurating the swimming pool reactor in Trombay, Nehru declared:

> No man can prophesy the future. But I should like to say on behalf of my government and I think I can say, with some assurance, on behalf of any future government of India—that, whatever might happen, whatever the circumstances, we shall never use this atomic energy for evil purposes. There is no condition attached to this assurance because once conditions are attached, the value of such an assurance does not go very far.

Even earlier in October 1949, during his tour of the United States, he had said: "We have no atom bomb but we rejoice in not having an atom bomb." Chinese bombs did not make a difference to India's attitude and Pakistan's bomb or bombs cannot make any change. It is not merely a moral attitude. It is not idealism; it is also realism, because Nehru realized it would be difficult for India to build a nuclear stockpile and to achieve any worthwhile result by such a policy. As he said in another connection, idealism was the best part of realism. If it is a nuclear status that is wanted, it is there for anyone to see and it is not conferred by anybody, though countries with nuclear capability should be made parties to nuclear disarmament.

The case against India making the bomb can be understood only against the background of the wider world. The nuclear power pattern is complex now and this position has been arrived at like the Security Council pattern by force of logic. To be a nuclear power is to be a big power. It is not for India to declare herself a big power. China wanted to impress the United States and the Soviet Union by her nuclear explosions, not to impress India so much. Within the nuclear club, the United States and the Soviet Union are the foremost powers whose delivery system the other nuclear powers cannot match. The logic of the U.S.-Soviet nuclear deterrence is not conclusive, for it is not an ideal state and is ever a dangerous state. Then a nuclear war by accident is also possible, and if there are too many nuclear powers with their fingers on too many nuclear triggers, even the present uncertainties will be multiplied, and there is always the possibility of a surprise attack.

The case against a nuclear Armageddon need not be further argued, and it is not enough for India, with her position in the world and in the United Nations, not to make the bomb. Nehru

was indefatigable in pursuing the objective of nuclear disarmament, and while he did not believe in merely using harsh words and hurting the big powers, he never stopped from persevering with persuasive methods. Nuclear disarmament was not possible at one stroke, as even conventional disarmament was not. To the Soviet Union's proposals for general and comprehensive disarmament, India could not withhold support, but it was clear that in the matter of disarmament, it was not enough to be idealistic. As a practical first step he appealed to the big powers to stop any further nuclear tests and to end further damage to the health and safety of mankind. His effort, pursued at the United Nations by India's representatives, resulted at least in the Partial Test Ban Treaty, which reduced the hazards from tests. But the aim of disarmament, with priority for nuclear disarmament, had to be pursued and it was pursued with persistence and vigour, though with indifferent results. After infructuous appeals, Nehru suggested a standstill agreement on tests, particularly when the destructiveness of the hydrogen bomb was proved.

By 1957, India's efforts had some effect when a resolution spelt out the steps the General Assembly expected the nuclear powers to take to bring about effective nuclear disarmament. It was gradually that the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to discuss arms control. Soon the United States resumed testing in the atmosphere and neither India nor the non-aligned group could persuade a halt to a new series of tests. Asked to sign the Non-proliferation Treaty, India refused because she did not want a ban on testing for peaceful purposes when there was no prospect of an agreement on nuclear disarmament. Since then, the S.A.L.T. negotiations have been going at a slow-motion pace.

India has been impressing on all nations that a common search for new and renewable sources of energy is imperative, if there is to be no world crisis. There is solar energy at one end and nuclear energy at the other; in between there are many other sources. While all these sources should be developed, the world must collectively share the benefits of nuclear energy, instead of its being selfishly exploited by some powers or its being used in dangerous directions. The oil crisis would not seem so colossal or so disastrous, if other sources are used to

the maximum. It requires a unified effort on the basis that the world is one. For the first time there is such an effort under U.N. auspices. Nuclear energy is not to be shunned. After mastering so many discoveries in science, man has to make further advance, in spite of the risks, to understand it and to master it. In this effort, India cannot afford to lag behind. But there must be an end to bombs.

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FOREIGN POLICY

It can be said that there is a foreign policy tradition now in India. But the machinery and the men adequate for it are lacking, and nobody represents the temper and spirit and interests of the nation as Nehru did. He is a vital part of the tradition. When Gandhi said that he wanted India to keep her windows open to the winds of the world, he might not have thought of the winds which had been blowing in for centuries in the physical and the historical sense. In the old days, Indian rulers had to fight invaders from the northwest, whenever they were not busy fighting among themselves. The Moguls could not forget their Central Asian origins. British India had relations only with the Near East and the Middle East, though in the Boxer Rebellion, Indian troops were transported as far as China, and they fought on the Western front, in Mesopatamia, in East and North Africa, and in Burma in the two world wars. The Indian people throughout could be said to be peace-loving, like peoples everywhere else probably, but they were less troubled about what foreign policy was. Free India's foreign policy grew from subject India's foreign policy; it was an amplification of old Congress resolutions, which demanded freedom for subject peoples and peace among nations. There was vision, and, with clarity of vision, there might be aberrations, but there could be no longer adventurism.

India is big; her population is numerous; her economy is underdeveloped, following the middle path of mixed economy; even after Partition, she has one of the biggest Muslim populations in the world. She seemed to enjoy the protection of the Himalayas but only till 1957. There could be no doubt about her interests, but interests alone do not make policyThe.

meagre contribution which the several parties in Parliament make, in debate after debate on foreign policy, shows that there are no differences on interests and that, without a long tradition the tradition-makers, have an advantage, while the dissenters or the trouble-makers, as A.J.P. Taylor would call them, are found foundering. The dissenters of today become the traditionalists of tomorrow and responsibility in office overrides the opposition tendency to oppose. That was how Gladstone got entangled in Egypt, how latter-day Little-England Liberals could not avoid supporting the Boer War, and how peace-loving chancellors like Lloyd George became great war-time prime ministers, how Vajpayee adopted Nehru's foreign policy. There has been a consistency of outlook in Indian policy, and whatever its failures, no country's foreign policy can be said to be a success, and there is yet no alternative policy except the half-hearted alternative of alignment, which nobody wants. The present period may rank with that of Jefferson and Monroe in the United States and that of Chatham in Britain for its uncharted courses.

Non-alignment, of which India is the author and main exponent, does not mean what many want it to mean. It is only one aspect of the policy, not whole of the policy. It is a negative name for a negative aspect of that policy. It means that India does not want to be aligned to either of the two big military blocs, as long as they exist and deepen the divisions of the world. It does not mean that India is not committed to any cause or has no identity of outlook or purpose or interests with other countries. African freedom had no more committed champion than India and the 1956 attack on Egypt was nowhere else abhorred so much, even officially, as in India. When India ceased to be a colony, there had to be decolonization everywhere; half of the world became free.

A country like India cannot afford to be unsteady and can have no eternal friends or eternal enemies, but it need not act from fear or irresponsibility, like smaller countries; it has a heavy load of national tradition to carry. Now when non-alignment has preserved an era of peace and is respected, the aligned nations themselves are not as aligned as they were and the meaning of non-alignment is changing, for it essentially means independence, and confusion arises when the independence of

each nation behind non-alignment is forgotten. Geography affects policies powerfully, as it does in the case of the smaller communist countries of Europe. Thailand, for instance, has derived much from India and China, through centuries, and many things Thai are either Indian or Chinese, but the political-minded Thai for that very reason must dislike India and China as big neighbours, not merely because of their policies. There is little reason why Iran and Afghanistan should differ strongly except that Iran has a long coast and Afghanistan is land-locked and must look up to the tableland in the north and the historical connection with Samarkand and Bokhara. Any country, not threatened by aggression or subversion, can find it to be of advantage to be non-aligned, though only a big country like India could have given significance to non-alignment

The non-aligned world has expanded enormously and each country is independent. This fact should not be forgotten. India became free when true nationalism could mean true internationalism, and for years Indians had imbibed the international outlook at Jawaharlal Nehru's insistence. Even without direct relations with other countries, they admired the League of Nations and deplored its decay, watched with anxiety the Italian invasion of Abyssinia, the civil war in Spain, and the Japanese attack on Manchuria. There were few other more ardent anti-fascists. After the war, among their first preferences was the United Nations. There is more allegiance to the idea of international law and morality in India, where the ancients prayed for peace for the whole world, than in any other country. For a people who have no memories of hatred and have forgotten even the bitterness of British rule, it is not difficult to mix with all the odd assortment of people who come uninvited or invited. Only in one way are the people aligned, whatever governments and political parties may do; they are aligned to socialist reconstruction because that seems to be the only way for prosperity and peace.

Indian critics of their country's foreign policy have thought that there has been too great a meddlesome interest in international affairs. This was largely a realistic interest in freedom and peace, and now when almost the whole world is free, except Namibia, the interest in peace still remains. With the United

States and the Soviet Union closer to India than before, non-alignment has fewer critics now. The criticism now is that India has not cultivated Asian and African countries successfully; this is to forget that each country has its own interests to serve and it could afford to be neutral in the cause of other countries. With sovereign equality, Nepal is the equal of India and sovereign; so is Ceylon, or Dahomey, or the Upper Volta. They are not unfriendly, but if the critics want them to choose between India and Pakistan or between India and China, when the choice is not so awful and no such choice need be made, they are suggesting impossible tests. There are noisy differences within NATO and within the Soviet bloc, and no power can find allies who will always vote with it.

India has probably no diplomatic finesse or cunning, but every Indian diplomat cannot be expected to be a Talleyrand or a Metternich when diplomacy is decided far behind the conference table and has to be backed by economic or military strength. The Chinese attack of 1957 made India a power among powers, but she does not want to go through the costly and exhausting process of militarization. Some strength is necessary when a big country has to assume big responsibilities, or even defend itself. Most Indians are more international-minded than ever, for it seems that peace abroad and peace at home are necessary for progress and the impact of international developments on internal affairs is made clear impressively even to isolationists. Indian newspaper readers are insatiably interested in what happens all over the world, even in remote places in the Congo. Foreign policy is now everyone's concern and there is a general desire not to join the nuclear race and make a bomb or two. Peaceful coexistence is a necessity and competition unnecessarily exhausting. It is every Indian's policy, since Nehru made it clear that it had not risen from his head as Minerva had risen from the head of Zeus. India's foreign policy is a mixture of idealism and realism, and has grown from her history, geography, environment and interests. Nehru said once in the Lok Sabha:

> It is completely incorrect to call our policy 'Nehru' policy. It is incorrect because all that I have done is to give voice to that policy. I have not originated it. It is

> a policy inherent in the circumstances of India, inherent in the whole mental outlook of India, inherent in the conditioning of the Indian mind busy over the struggle for freedom, and inherent in the circumstances of the world today. I come in by the mere accidental fact that during these years, I have represented that policy as Foreign Minister. I am quite convinced that whoever might have been in power in India, they could not have deviated very much from this policy.

In an earlier spcech he had said; "In the ultimate analysis a government functions for the good of the country; it governs and no government dare to do anything which in the short or long run is manifestly to the disadvantage of that country."

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LIBERATION OF ASIA AND AFRICA

It has been said that it was India that made the British Empire imperial and has made the Commonwealth what it is. Similarly it can be said that it was India's freedom that led to the freedom of many other countries. A huge dependency like India, one of the largest countries of the world and the most populous next to China, had either to remain a colony and justify colonialism or become free and lead to the freedom of almost all other colonies, after the Atlantic Charter and other declarations of war aims and the emergence of the Soviet Union as a great world power. India also led in the way of a colony becoming an independent republic and being accommodated within the Commonwealth. This itself was an example for all other colonialisms to liquidate themselves with as much grace as possible.

One of the aims of India's freedom struggle was that not only India but all countries should be free. It is now only of academic interest whether Disraeli made imperialism a creed of the new world or whether Joseph Chamberlain gave meaning to modern colonialism. Imperialism, old or new, did not need emperors. When Lenin called imperialism the highest stage of capitalism, he made it a good target and anti-imperialism became the trigger. Colonialism, which has little to do with the New England colonies or Greek colonies in Sicily and southern Italy had become a synonym of imperialism. In India's case, there was both an emperor and a colonial economy which the East India Company had bequeathed to the Crown.

India could not be said to be a part of the Empire, which, according to Seeley, had been acquired by Britain in a fit of absent-mindedness. The empires of Europe imitated one another

not only in building grand palaces but in acquiring the loot of the world. If India was to be free, all other colonies had to be free, and from the beginning of her foreign policy, India pursued this aim. Even in the *Glimpses of World History*, the series of letters written by Nehru to his daughter from prison, the liquidation of imperialism was his grand passion. In *The Discovery of India*, Nehru describes how the Congress developed a foreign policy; as early as 1920, the Congress passed what could be called a resolution on foreign policy, the growth of fascism in Italy and the challenges to the Versailles system gave rise to apprehensions of another world war, and in 1927 several years before the Second World War broke out, the Congress declared its policy towards it. It was largely due to Nehru's experience of the atmosphere in Europe, and his awareness of the impact a world war might have had on the Indian nationalist struggle. While others saw in another war the break-up of the British Empire, he believed that the days of colonialism would be numbered not only by the momentum of nationalist movements but by the pressure of democratic forces within the imperialist strongholds. What was hope for others was a faith for him.

In its 1927 resolution on foreign policy, the Congress declared that India could be no party to an imperialist war and in no event should India be made to join any war without the consent of her people being obtained. This declaration was frequently repeated in the following years, annotated and amplified; it became one of the foundations of Congress policy, and it was generally accepted as Indian policy. No individual or organization in India opposed it. Nehru invested Indian policy with an international outlook at least from the moment he presided over a session of the Congress Against Imperialism in Brussels in February 1927. As Nehru repeatedly said later, it was not correct to say that India's foreign policy was Nehru's policy, though he gave voice to it. It was inherent in India's conditions and consistent with India's interests. The policy was correct but the Indian people were not free and could not affect the course of events. Only a free India could carry out the foreign policy of a subject India. The enunciation of non-alignment was the first big step in foreign policy. The Asian Relations Conference of March 1947 was another. It was the first big

step Nehru took towards the liberation of Asia. He was yet Vice-President of the Viceroy's Executive Council in the Interim Government, and while he did not want to be aggressive, he saw Asia was finding itself again and at the next stage Asia would assume its rightful place. The countries of Asia could no longer be used as pawns by others. Peace could come only when nations were free. They of Asia had a special responsibility to Africa. The freedom that they envisaged was not to be confined to this nation or that.

With his capacity to bind several issues into one and discover the underlying process, Nehru saw the freedom movement in all colonial possessions, British, French, Dutch, Portuguese or Japanese, as one, and even before Independence had taken a keen and continuous interest in Indonesia under Dr. Soekarno's leadership. When he was in power, he used India's freedom to secure Indonesia's freedom. In January 1949 he took the initiative to call an eighteen Asian nation ministerial conference when the issue of Indonesia's freedom was tied up in a diplomatic deadlock among the big powers, including the United States, which was uninterested in the liquidation of Dutch rule.

Indonesia had been reconquered from the Japanese by the Allies and then handed over to the Dutch. Therefore, a special responsibility remained with the Allied nations It was a story of broken pledges and continuous attempts to undermine and break the Republic of Indonesia. The leaders of the republic were imprisoned and separated from one another and treated with inhumanity. The Security Council had passed a series of resolutions asking for their release and a cessation of hostilities as a preliminary to a resumption of negotiations for a peaceful and honourable settlement. The Dutch authorities were trying to set up a so-called interim government. The conference had been called because the will of the Security Council was being flouted and they had to strengthen the United Nations. It was a regional conference to which Australia and New Zealand had also been invited and the U.N. Charter recognized such regional meetings. They had to make proposals to the Security Council for peace and be in touch with each other and their immediate objective was to restore the conditions in which the Republic of Indonesia had functioned and to enable it to negotiate as a free

government. Indonesia became free, with the United States helping a bit with her sympathy, and Dutch rule ended.

There was similar interest in freedom everywhere, in Palestine, in Egypt, in Sudan, in Malaya, in Cyprus, in the several countries of Africa, Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, Tanganyika (now Tanzania), Congo, Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia), Uganda, Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), in the French colonies like Tunisia and Algeria, in the dark corners of Angola and Mozambique. In spite of repeated disappointments in the Security Council over India's reference of the Kashmir question, Nehru followed a vigorous policy of support to the United Nations and the U.N. Charter. It included support to the ending of the cold war, support to disarmament, support to freedom against colonial rule, support to the ending of racial discriminatior, support to U.N. peace-keeping operations. In Korea, Indo-China and Congo, India intervened powerfully, and while it added prestige to India, it made non-alignment a factor for peace. India had friendly relations with the great powers which were parties to the war in Korea, and when responsibilities came to her, she could not evade them. "Why did we go to Korea? Was it to gain honour, glory and prestige?" asked Nehru in Parliament and answered: "We went to Korea because if we had not gone, there would have been no truce and no ceasefire, and the war would have gone on."

In March 1950, Nehru said that India's policy towards Indo-China was one of non-intervention because countries which had been unde domination would have resented intervention. By 1954, war was raging fiercely in Indo-China, while it had stopped in Korea. Nehru suggested to all the parties and the powers concerned that as this matter of Indo-China was to be discussed at Geneva, it might be desirable to have some kind of ceasefire without the parties giving up their positions. At Geneva India played a great role though the resulting Geneva Agreements were not observed in spite of India's useful role as Chairman of the Supervising Commission, for Dulles had decided on brinkmanship and the United States kept fighting disastrously in Vietnam till North Vietnam and South Vietnam became one. The Geneva agreements were essentially based on the fact that the great power groups should

not push aggressively into Indo-China states, which was demonstrated in Laos and recently in Kampuchea.

India, especially the Congress, was opposed to the policy behind the Balfour Declarat on and then to the policy of the British mandatory power in Palestine. Naturally it has meant consistent sympathy with the Arab cause over Palestine and opposition to the series of aggressive actions by which Israel was set up and has enlarged herself driving Arbas out of their homeland. If the Arabs are reconciled because of long-time occupation to the existence of Israel, India is also reconciled to it but insists on vacation of recent aggressions according to Security Council resolutions and restoration of a state of Palestine to the Palestinians. As there were Poles without a Poland for some centuries, there are now Palestinians without a Palestine.

India was in the centre of Southern Asia and had to look to the west, as far as West Asia, and to the east, as far as South-east Asia, but the liberation of Africa was the greatest chapter of decolonization after the liberation of Asia. The Europeans found it easy late in the last century to grab and divide Africa, for economic growth and technical innovation gave them strength and force and their culture and political organization gave them the carrying power. Twenty years were enough to see the continent carved into symmetries arbitrarily. Bismarck, Perry, Gladstone, Beaconsfield and Salisbury did not want an empire, unlike a poor king like Leopold of Belgium. But as soon as partition was almost complete, the search for markets began, and in the pulls between Islam in the north and the rise of South Africa in the south, Africa was divided. Similarly, the liberation of Africa did not take more than two decades, though tribalism had to struggle to nationalism.

The first African territory in which India was involved, apart from the fraternal interest in Egyptian freedom, Egypt's rights to the Suez Canal and the rise of Sudanese nationalism, was Congo. Ghana had been liberated, whether it was to be called transfer of power or demission of power, and Nkrumah soon joined the leaders of the non-aligned movement. As soon as Congo (now Kinhasa) became independent, India recognized it, looking upon it as a single entity not to be split up. But unity in Congo was a different thing, for a new nation-state was

not easy amidst rival tribalisms and the Belgians had left behind few educated Congolese. The United Nations responded with speed and efficiency, when the Congolese government appealed for help, and India sent a token force, as she sent to Cyprus and Palestine, to help U.N. effort. Lumumba was murdered and Hammarskjoeld lost his life in an air accident, but Congo was at last free, one of the largest states of Africa, and its liberation quickened the pace of liberation of other African countries.

By that time India had established a close identity of interest with other non-aligned nations and the movement strengthened the forces of liberation and encouraged liberal elements within the colonial countries. Within Britain, Conservatives and Labour were involved in a competition, and if one party could not accept liberation, the other party accomplished it. While James Griffith could not conclude the turbulent situation in Malaya in a settlement, the Conservatives could accomplish it. Between Macmillan and Mcleod, they recognized the wind of change in Africa and a number of countries had to be set free, Tanzania, Kenya, Zambia, Malawi and recently Zimbabwe, whose leaders like Nyerere, Kaunda and others had been inspired by Gandhi and Nehru. The emergence of Botswana became irresistible in spite of the earlier troubles over Seretse Khama. Within the Commonwealth the pressures proved strong if it was not to be split into black and white parts. What the British Empire converted into a Commonwealth could do, other colonialisms like the French, which proved more enlightened among others, had to do Algeria witnessed a fierce struggle but other old colonies fell like ripe fruit. Portugal held out, but Angola and Mozambique could not be denied independence. The whole of North, Central and West Africa had been liberated. South Africa, holding on to Namibia and making an apotheosis of apartheid, is holding out. But one Jericho cannot stand when all other Jerichos have fallen. The liberation of Guyana in South America and of islands of the Caribbean was of special interest to India. The liberation war of humanity has triumphed from Samoa to Sao Tone.

India took the lead and India was not alone. The U.N. Charter had recognized its responsibilities for the attainment of independence by non-self-governing territories. The establishment of the Trusteeship Council itself was a token of the

earnestness of the framers of the Charter. It was, however, probably the establishment of the Trusteeship Committee, or the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly, which helped India and other countries committed to anti-colonialism to wage a perpetual war for the liberation of large parts of the world, particularly in Asia and Africa, and from the Caribbean to the Pacific. Among India's forceful leaders in the Trusteeship Committee were Krishna Menon and others. Nehru never wavered in his vision but he needed instruments and he had them, and the lead he gave became one of the foundations of India's foreign policy. If Nehru's major contribution was secularism, democracy, planned development and foreign policy, decolonization, apart from non-alignment, was a major factor of that policy.

33

THE BRITISH CONNECTION

The transformation from conflict to cooperation which marked Indo-British relations was made possible by wise statesmanship in both countries. A mutual regard of the leaders of India and Britain helped to transcend the occasional controversies in Indo-British relations, which, at times, threatened to reach the breaking-point.

Goodwill apart, on the morrow of Indian Independence, there were many practical considerations which made India's links with Britain more a matter of convenience than of choice. Britain with her colonies was still the leading country in India's foreign trade. British commercial and industrial investment in India was substantial, somewhere between £300 and £500 million. Indian businessmen and manufacturers had predominantly British connections. India had a £1200 million credit in London earned during the Second World War which could be liquidated only through British exports. This credit represented a substantial reserve for India in the sterling bloc. In the days of economic stringency and dollar shortage following the end of the war, India's connections with the sterling group could not be lightly disturbed.

It was not only in economic terms that the link with Britain was necessary. The Indian army, navy and air force were originally products of British training and in the latter two services, British officers held key positions long after Independence. The Indian system of administration in law, education, medicine, police and other professional services was, and still is, very largely based on British practice. The only lingua franca of India was English and, to a large extent, is still so

and this acts as a close cultural bond between the two countries.

Though there were these practical considerations in favour of close links between India and Britain and Indo-British relations were built on the basis of mutual regard for each other's "bona fides", there were, almost from the very beginning, several irritants, some of which continue to affect the relations between the two countries. The most persistent of these irritants is Britain's feigned impartiality in India-Pakistan relations, which is seen in India as a continuation of the past "divide and rule" policy. On almost all vital issues between India and Pakistan, whether it is Kashmir, canal waters or the balance of power in the subcontinent, British attitude has been overtly or covertly in favour of Pakistan. Beginning with Prime Minister Attlee's blatant interference with the work of the U.N. Commission on Kashmir (UNCIP) in 1948, British leadership has invariably and persistently attempted to favour Pakistan, culminating in the unwarranted and ill-considered statement of Prime Minister Wilson condemning India at the height of India-Pakistan conflict in the autumn of 1957. Though Wilson's indiscretion was at that time glossed over and subsequently overlooked by India, it is to be remembered that Mr. Wilson subsequently retracted, and British policy on this subcontinent, for all it is worth, continues to remain tilted in favour of Pakistan. It was in the context of developments in the subcontinent in late 1957, that British policy regained a fresh balance in this respect.

Among other irritants in Indo-British relations may be counted, on the British side, the British condemnation of the liberation of Goa by India, British indifference to the fate of Indian immigrants in South Africa and other former British colonies in East Africa and, more recently, British policy towards Asian immigration into Britain. The passage of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act, 1957, by the British Parliament, placed the principles of free entry of Commonwealth citizens into Britain in jeopardy. India objected to the act on the ground that it was an instance of racial discrimination and was a unilateral act violating the important principle of prior consultations on matters of mutual concern. Though the first aspect, namely racial discrimination, was deeply resented by

the Government of India, the second aspect, namely the disregard of the principle of prior consultation, rankled more as India, more than any other member of the Commonwealth, had contributed to the fostering of Commonwealth ties, by influencing the decisions of the more recent members of the association from Africa and Asia.

The Commonwealth Immigration Bill, 1957, introduced with a view to restricting the immigration of Asians from Kenya to about 1,500 annually, was described by the Indian Minister of State for External Affairs as a "blatant" act of racial discrimination against British citizens of Asian origin. The agreement arrived at between the two governments on 27 July 1957 solved the problem by laying down that the Indian government will resume admission of British citizens of Indian origin from Kenya, with a view to permanent settlement, provided that their passports contained an endorsement confirming their ultimate right to enter Britain if and when they wish to do so. Britain thus acknowledged her responsibility towards them, and at the same time they were enabled to settle in the country of their choice. In spite of this limited agreement, British curbs on Indian immigration from Kenya remains a disturbing problem between the two countries. India feels that Britain should allow entry to a very large number of British passport holders of Indian origin from Kenya. The recent British Nationality Bill, followed by bloody riots, has also raised Indian apprehensions.

On the Indian side, India has on many occasions exasperated the British government. She not only refused to enter into the military alliances promoted by Britain jointly with the United States but condemned them severely and did everything to dissuade Asian and African countries from joining such alliances. India also proved to be a thorn in the flesh in colonial matters by her vocal and persistent advocacy of independence for British colonies. However, it should be noted on the credit side of Indo-British relations that India's role in the concerned U.N. Agencies frequently served to moderate and remove the sting of more violent criticism by Asian-African groups. The most flagrant sin of India, from the British point of view, was her condemnation of British action in Suez in 1956 and her

role in organizing international opinion against Britain and her allies, France and Israel, in that action.

If a balance-sheet is struck on Indo-British relations, on the credit side in Britain's favour may be set Britain's spontaneous and timely aid in the face of Chinese aggression and her continued commitment to India's economic development. In respect of the former, however, it should be noted that Britain not only refused to accede to India's request for submarines but was responsible for reducing the quantum of aid agreed upon between her and the United States at Nassau. Again, Britain's spontaneous offer of military assistance, limited as it was, to meet Chinese aggression was marred by the strong political pressure on India to reach a settlement with Pakistan over Kashmir. Nor did Britain hesitate to strike a commercial deal with China for the sale of British aircraft.

Britain's sustained interests in India's economic development remains the most solid base for future Indo-British relations. From the very beginning, Britain showed keen interest in India's efforts to modernize and develop her economy. Britain's contribution to India's economic development consists of both private investment and government aid. Britain is by far the largest investor in India. India has more collaboration agreements with British industry than with any other country. The British investment is spread over a wide range of industries—for example, petroleum, plantations, motor vehicles, aero-engines, agricultural machinery, radios, cables, chemicals and fertilizers, cement, sugar, textile machinery and electrical equipment.

India has also been the most substantial recipient of aid from Britain in the post-war period. Britain assisted India to the tune of Rs.50 lakh during the first Five Year Plan by supplying research and demonstration equipment for technical institutes. The British loans for India's Second and Third Five Year Plans (1956- 1957and - were of the amounts of £80.5 million and £185 million respectively. An additional £1.5 million was given in February 1957as part of emergency aid towards overcoming the Indian food crisis. The level of British aid to India was then over £40,000,000 annually. India's trade with Britain, however, has been declining in recent years.

In the early years of Independence, Indo-British relations were marked by a heavy reliance by India on Britain in matters of defence, administration, education, public and private investment and trade. With increasing diversification of sources of economic aid and channels of trade in the succeeding years, India is now far less dependent on Britain. From the beginning political relations between India and Britain were marred by several irritants, the most persistent and continuing of these being Britain's partisanship in India-Pakistan relations. A new British balance and moderation in her attitude towards the subcontinent and the continued commitment of Britain to India's economic development stand out as the most salient feature of Indo-British relations.

34

MULTI-RACIAL COMMONWEALTH

For some years, it is becoming evident, it is India that has made the Commonwealth what it is. The dominions had been constitutionally described as crowned republics; with India, a republic without royalty was added. The Commonwealth represents nearly a quarter of the population of the world and India contributes most of it. But the Commonwealth is no longer British or Indian or Asian in influence or authority; it is also African and Caribbean, and it has been found useful to look at world problems not only from London, New Delhi, or Kuala Lumpur, but from Mombasa or Kingston. In a multi-racial association, member-countries now discuss racial questions and assert racial equality. This was how two years ago the Commonwealth compelled Britain to make Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) free. This was possible because they were members of the United Nations, enjoyed sovereign equality, each one free to follow its interests and to differ from the rest on any problem. The British sovereign is the head but the link is symbolic. The common bond is that all the new members were till recent years British colonies, and when more colonies, including Pitcairn in the Pacific, with its ninety inhabitants, will be free, the Commonwealth will contain more members than Marlborough House can accommodate.

The search for commonness in the Commonwealth was becoming desperate. It could not for ever be a club without rules. Some things had been common: the English language, which is the first language in all countries and will hereafter at least be the second in some; Shakespeare, whose quatercentenary strengthened memories of his supreme genius; and

parliamentary institutions. The English language has not always been a uniting force, for it has not prevented the separation of the United States and Eire from Britain, and parliamentary democracy has been discarded in some countries, which prefer presidents in plebiscitary conditions. The British, forced to prefer the Commonwealth to the Common Market till they recognized they had to remain European, have devised new commonness, besides aid and trade and the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, new development projects, cooperation in education and satellite communication, and a Commonwealth foundation A Commonwealth secretariat, which looked remote, was wanted, and London is no longer considered a too dominating position for it. The Commonwealth is still an awkward camel, but it seems to work.

India's membership of the Commonwealth needs no longer to be defended; it is recognized as not inconsistent with India's freedom. The Commonwealth, which is becoming an association of peoples as much as of governments, has been a force for peace and will never be a military bloc. Queen Elizabeth's visit to India in 1961 recalled the long and chequered history of Indo-British relations, and what could sum up these relations better than that the Queen witnessed the Republic Day parade and pageant? The first and last time a reigning British sovereign had visited India was when George V was crowned in Delhi in 1912 amidst tumultuous splendour; after the First World War, the Duke of Connaught inaugurated the Montagu-Chelmsford Constitution; and the Duke of Windsor also made his troubled tour as the Prince of Wales. In 1959 Prince Philip moved about modestly in a short scouting expedition. There will be no more of the Delhi Durbars where magnificently bejewelled princes and native knights of chivalry walked with their backs to the audience in ridiculous obeisance. Queen Elizabeth's predecessors ruled and reigned over India; she was somewhat remote as the symbolic head of the Commonwealth.

As historians repeat themselves more than history repeats itself, George III was a madman, George IV a rake and William IV a fool. At any rate India had little to do with them, or even with the early Victoria. It was in her later years that she became the symbol of an imperial benevolence which was

brought out in its widowed dignity in marble and enthroned in parks and buildings. Victoria the Good took some interfering interest in India as in foreign affairs, but except for 1857-58, the days passed as peacefully in India as in Britain. Edward VII and George V had no sympathy for Indian nationalism and did not care to conceal their views; they were ignorant and courageous enough, but they could not but mumble agreement in the end to the stately progress of reforms. George VI's attitudes were not known at least to Indians, and as for the combined house of Windsor-Mountbatten, Indians have had no historical or personal grudges.

Queen Elizabeth was in India when royalty in Britain had been modernized. It had, of course, not been deglamourized as in Sweden, Norway or Greece, but the irreverence of men like Altrincham and Muggeridge had left royalty unscathed. Whatever the lingering ceremonial, royalty had lost a large part of its old Ruritanian flavour. George V was probably the first modern, more of a man and less of a king, who not only indulged in plebian gestures like his father, but moved among the people like a genial squire. Queen Elizabeth had been brought up under an exact routine and the privilege of being sovereign was subject to the performance of duties prescribed by the people. The task of receiving her was not exacting for a people capable of disorderly enthusiasm. There was constitutional significance about the visit of the head of the Commonwealth, but Queen Elizabeth was also the sovereign of the British people, representing their history, their culture, their strength, their orderliness and their sense of discipline. To the British people, it was a Commonwealth occasion, though interest in India is usually confined to Caxton Hall and to old civil servants ruminating over lost empires. The Indian people, too, woke up to the wholesomeness of the Commonwealth concept, and to the importance of India.

In the United Nations, each member of the Commonwealth follows its own policy, usually in association with other Asian and African members. Britain is alone among the five permanent members of the Security Council. But she also needs the Common Market and the Commonwealth. It is an anomalous position but not as out of date or dangerous as the cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union. No one

accuses India now of being in the British camp. The transition of subject India to free India was smooth and, though not consistent with earlier pretensions, Commonwealth membership has been Independence plus, as its advocates like Krishna Menon claimed.

The Commonwealth's biggest problem now is racialism and it is doubtful how long it will remain a multi-racial Commonwealth. Not all member-countries are reconciled to being multi-racial societies and Britain is in the grip of this crucial test. Powellism is frowned upon throughout most parts of Britain but the pace of integration has not been fast enough and growing unemployment has added to the competition for jobs. Race means colour and both are still divisive forces in society. The question frequently asked in Commonwealth circles is whether it follows the model of Moscow where racial divisions are not known to exist or the model of Alabama which Martin Luther King and others have proved to be the home of racism.

The broad facts about the pattern of the composition of the world's population is that every fifth man in the world is a Chinese and every fourth man in the world is a citizen of a Commonwealth country, while of every fifteen Commonwealth citizens nine are Indians. It is easy to denounce racialism passionately, but while it has to be denounced and repudiated, the practical difficulties that exist cannot be ignored. In a country like Nigeria where a tiny minority of white people live in a black country, it is not difficult to run a non-racial society. But when the minority is large, like the 200,000 Europeans in Zimbabwe, 200,000 Africans in Guyana, or 100,000 Turks in Cyprus, difficult problems arise. Yet Malaysia has shown that multi racialism or non-racialism can work, with Malays, Chinese and Indians in different but sufficiently strong proportions. Britain's problem is that with the second highest density of population in the world, she is finding it difficult to maintain a liberal record with the increasing pressures of immigration, with increasing unemployment and with the slow pace of integration. But it has to be accepted that there can be no first-class and second-class citizens in the same country. India's position in the Commonwealth is crucial and if Britain changes her immigration laws without consulting her, there is cause for

resentment. The racial riots which have erupted at several places in Britain are a warning to all countries. It is obvious that while race has to be isolated from economics, the Commonwealth cannot forget its obligations to social and economic change.

35

EMERSON AND BRAHMA

It is not difficult to disentangle the United States from India, the latest of cultures from one of the oldest. But the pioneering spirit of the founders of America gave birth to some seers who comprehended the universe as clearly as the seers of the Upanishads and breathed transcendentalism as if it was the air, without being directly influenced by India. and expressed it. Indian thought must have traversed boundaries or there was a parallel expression of the same elemental forces which had led the Pilgrim Fathers from England and the Aryans from the Arctic and Central Asia to the Indus and the Ganga. Emerson (1803-1882), one of the noblest spirits of American literature, wrote:

If the red slayer thinks he slays,
Or if the slain thinks he is slain,
They know not well the subtle ways
I keep, and pass and turn again.

They reckon ill who leave me out.
When me they fly I am the wings;
I am the doubter and the doubt,
And I the hymn the Brahman sings.

Emerson was a luminous writer. His younger friend, Thoreau (1817-1868), lived in a house built with his own hands by the Walden Pool, supported himself by working in the fields, anticipated Tolstoy and Gandhi and showed how the essence of civilization is simplicity. There was something even more Indian in the thinking and poetry of Walt Whitman (1819-1892).

When he published *Leaves of Grass* in 1855, he revolutionized not only American but all modern poetry. The opening poem of the book, and the longest, is packed with Upanishadic thought and expresses the philosophy of the Gita also, though there is no evidence that Whitman had read these Hindu classics or that they had been even known to him. But in what Emerson called "the most extraordinary piece of art and wisdom that America has yet contributed", the essence of Hindu thought is wrapped in American idiom, with Whitman saying "incomparable things extremely well" in his own wild, original way, making him an American rishi from the beginning of his renown.

The doctrine of the poem is more eastern than western, more Indian, and though the Gita was then available in translation, Whitman did not seem to have read it. When Thoreau went to see him in Brooklyn and said that *Leaves of Grass* was "wonderfully like the Orientals", Whitman said he had not read them, "No, tell me about them." There was evidence of such reading in his later poems; yet unlike most of the Indian sages, he was not a thorough-going idealist. He did not despise the body; for him it was as miraculous as the soul. Life was not all maya for him. He had also known something of Mahayana Buddhism and expressed thought similar to Ramakrishna's. The strain of Emerson, Thoreau and Walt Whitman has continued to this day, in spite of the material progress to which the American people have been devoted, and this commonness between these once widely separated countries but now brought physically close by air has continued, in spite of many differences.

By the turn of this century, these differences were increasing. The closing years of the nineteenth century saw America share the benefits of the Industrial Revolution which was transforming Europe, while America added to her natural resources the capital and varied talents of the immigrants and India was made to miss that revolution. Big business had developed in America, in spite of anti-monopoly measures like the Clayton Act and the Sherman Act. Into that booming capitalist world Vivekananda took the message of the Vedanta with his trumpet voice at the Parliament of Religions. India's past was remembered and the Ramakrishna Mission's work was appreciated.

Americans with their material prosperity listened to the spiritual message from the East and received with reverence some real and many bogus sadhus. Mark Twain relieved the metallic age with his humorous fantasies and had his glimpse of India. But the American emphasis on material achievements, accompanied by Teddy Roosevelt's little wars, did not vary till, after a long Republican rule, Woodrow Wilson introduced his note of idealism from his Platonic school of a new political philosophy from the portals of Princeton.

The First World War, into which Wilson swung a united America, opened the first massive contact of America with the world. The first Indian soldiers who fell on the fields of Flanders were a memory when Pershing arrived with his American divisions to fight for Wilson's dream of making the world safe for democracy. His other popular slogan, self-determination, aroused hopes in India and a patriotic Indian judge addressed a letter to Wilson. But Wilson's dreams and slogans were shattered and he fell ill and died a disappointed man, when his determined Republican opponents persuaded Congress to reject the Peace Treaty and kept America out of the League of Nations. America's abstention, like Russia's ostracism later, weakened and killed the League, and under Republican Presidents, who believed in doing nothing, America settled down again to the role of an El Dorado, the land of the Almighty Dollar and Al Capone. Indian visitors and students of journalism and others in peaceful pursuits brought back stories of American prosperity but the land of opportunities did not attract an India increasingly involved in her nationalist movement under the leadership of Gandhi, who found no reason for visiting America and was being caricatured into a Micky Mouse. Only the idealism underlying Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal following the Great Depression aroused interest in America's capacity for idealism, though America and India were on the opposite sides of the globe.

The Second World War ended America's isolationism for ever, and there was some faint hope that America might with declarations like the Atlantic Charter interest herself in persuading Britain to agree to liquidation of the British Empire as the last big bastion against the freedom of peoples. If most of the world had to be liberated India had to be liberated first.

But beyond Europe, America was content to play the second fiddle to Britain and even Roosevelt had to submit to Churchill's child-like but formidable charm. The interest which America took in the success of the Cripps Mission was feeble and it was with American acquiescence that Churchill could recall Cripps when he was on the point of succeeding and giving a chance for the preservation of Indian unity. In spite of the sympathies of G.I.s with Indian aspirations throughout South-east Asia, America under Roosevelt could do nothing for Indian freedom, in spite of the cavalier attempts of Col. Louis Johnson and American journalists who even then saw an easy way of saving India from communism.

There was some hope, in spite of the frustrations of war time, of America, intervening after the war on the side of liberal policies. But America decided to accept worldwide responsibilities, which she found she was in part heir to, and found herself an accomplice of the struggling European imperialisms, the British, the French, the Portuguese and the Dutch. It dealt firmly only with Japanese imperialism. She voted with Britain on all questions of British colonialism, including Kashmir, in the process of agreeing to parity between India and Pakistan. She stalled in Indonesia, bungled for many years in Indo-China, and stuck to the support of Portuguese colonialism to the last. She did not understand the course of the revolution in China. She was hostile to Nehru's policies, forgetting that if she did not understand even Nehru, there was nothing else she would be able to understand of what was happening in the East. She treated non-alignment as neutrality and immoral till the end. In the cold war with the Soviet Union, America was blinded by prejudice not only in Europe but in Asia and Africa, where instead of ranging herself on the side of liberation movements she ranged herself on the side of colonialism. At the United Nations, she led bloc votes against every motion for liquidation of colonialism or for sharing surpluses with the underdeveloped world. Besides, America was not deeply interested in the cause of disarmament, in reduction of conventional or nuclear arms and has pursued her policy of arms aid.

Against this background, Indo-U.S. bilateral relations, in spite of occasional declarations of goodwill, have not been

smooth or normal. India has been presented with policies of brinkmanship or tilt. Over Bangladesh, there was almost open conflict. There are many Kissingers in the State Department, following cynical attitudes and encircling India with armed client states. Indo-Soviet friendship is one reason for the American distaste for Indian policies. But if the Soviet Union helps India to become self-reliant, America has been helping India only to remain reliant. There have been contrasting American ambassadors to India, while Indian ambassadors have been indifferently selected. The best ambassadors between the two countries should be men from public life, but in India, there seems to be a shortage of them, while in America they are selected to suit contrasting regimes. It may be that India may require some realism but in Korea, Indo-China, and China India has been consistent and true to her profession while America has been violently inconsistent, as in her present axis with China. It is certain that America can improve her image by recovering a part of the idealism which led to her birth and remembering that she once fought a war of independence.

36

THE SOCIALIST WORLD

There is no need to trace Indo-Soviet relations romantically from the time of Afnasi Nikitin. The Russian Revolution, with its tremendous impact on the world, a turning point in history, is a good beginning. That revolution was unlike other revolutions which had preceded it. If among revolutions the American and the French Revolutions were considered the major ones because they impressed on the entire world major concepts, the Russian Revolution was different from them as it had a greater social and economic meaning, and tried to carry out Lenin's idea that while philosophers had tried to analyse the world, the problem was to change it. Marx and Engels had made more than passing references to India and British imperialism and predicted that the exploitation of the Indian people would end, and Gandhi established moral kinship with Kropotkin and Tolstoy. But India was an appendage of Britain and her foreign contacts had to conform to the requirements of British imperialism. That imperialism and Russian imperialism were rivals and friends in Europe and southeastern Europe and came into clash in Afghanistan.

There had been some cursory contacts between India and Russia. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, small colonies of Indian traders settled at the ports of the Volga. Indian merchants received protection from Peter the Great; Aurangzeb sent an elephant to St. Petersburg as a present to him. Some Indians did well in Russia, a Mohan Das becoming a Mogun Mugundasov settling in Astrakhan and acquiring a large villa on the Caspian Sea and a fleet of sailing boats. There is evidence of trade in the eighteenth century between India and territories on the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea and beyond.

But Russia was expanding and Britain was expanding and there was an iron curtain as far as a subject country like India with its reputed pagoda trees was concerned. But the Russian Revolution had no boundaries and detonated in the mind of man everywhere with its economic appeal to exploited peoples. Jawaharlal Nehru visited Moscow in 1927 and Tagore visited it in 1930 with far-reaching results, politically and culturally.

The events preceding the Second World War, particularly the policy of appeasement as it reached its climax in the Munich Pact, the Spanish Civil War, the rise of rival ideologies, with the gathering of the forces of fascism on the one side, expressing the economic and political frustrations of the Treaty of Versailles, and the forces of anti-fascism led by the Soviet Union, on the other, found India under the leadership of Nehru on the side of anti-fascist forces. British imperialism was identified with the rising tide of dictatorial tendencies under the prototype dictatorships of Hitler and Mussolini. When Hitler attacked the Soviet Union, it was the most foolhardy action he did, forgetting the tragedy of Napoleon. Britain ideologically and militarily aligned herself with the Soviet Union. Even then, the Indian authorities working as the agents of the India Office had no dealings with the Soviet Union. It was Nehru who advocated the opening of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and India, though she was still a subject nation. Nehru was thinking not only of the alignment of the Indian people with anti-fascist forces but with the forces as they would take shape after the war.

India's Independence was not enough to disarm Soviet suspicions about India's subordination to the British colonial power, and the Partition left the problem unsolved and the subcontinent in a precarious position with much shedding of blood. The continuing Commonwealth connection, in spite of the sincere explanation about it, did not entirely disarm suspicion. It was only when India acted independently both in the United Nations and outside and ranged herself against colonialism and neocolonialism and on the side of freedom struggles externally and for secularism, socialism, and planned development internally that she was accepted as outside the orbit of Anglo-U.S. policies and influence. Non-alignment took some time to be

spelt out as true independence with identity of outlook and interests with the Soviet Union, committed to anti-colonialism.

The community projects with U.S. help were not a demonstration of independent development. It was when Bhilai was established and Soviet collaboration seemed not only acceptable but a prelude to continuing collaboration that an identity of outlook between the Soviet Union and India was established. In Korea and Indo-China, India gave convincing proof of independence. The ground had been prepared, specially during Menshikov's ambassadorship, when Nehru made his historic trip to the Soviet Union in 1955 as Prime Minister, leading later to the return visit of Bulganin and Khrushchev. These were heart-warming and popular missions which revolutionized the relations between the two countries and led to further collaboration and an endless series of visits at the level of leaders, officials and representatives of culture.

Indo-Soviet friendship was based not only on many acts of useful collaboration to stop aggrandizement by neo-colonial powers but on understanding. In spite of Lenin and his insight, the Soviet people had been badly briefed on the role of Gandhi, which was assumed to be reactionary because of his loyalty to tradition and his use of misleading catch phrases. But there was a ready revision of the Soviet Encyclopaedia and other sources of information, based largely on sectarian Indian sources; there was a new understanding of the revolutionary and mass character of the Indian nationalist struggle and Gandhi's revolutionary role. Stalin, isolated from the world, showed a new awareness of the importance of India in his contacts with Radhakrishnan and K.P.S. Menon, the second and third Indian Ambassadors to the Soviet Union.

After de-Stalinization and Nehru's visit, it was easy to establish regular intercourse between the two countries. The Soviet Union accelerated the process with two significant acts of friendship, by exercising the veto in India's favour on Kashmir and by offering to help India's industrialization in setting up heavy industry. There was increasing hope that though India had escaped the direct impact of the war, while suffering from all its ill-effects, she had the same abiding faith in peace, security and disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament. No two

peoples were so devoted to peace as the Soviet Union and India were and prepared to work for it.

The Soviet Union has shown not only friendship but understanding in its relations with India in almost every crisis. India's attitude to China was friendly from the beginning. The Soviet Union was an ally of China, while India was a friend. But when India's relations with China entered an uncertain course and became bitter over the border, leading to the unnecessary conflict in 1957, the Soviet Union was seeking to persuade China to see reason. Almost everyone in India lost faith in non-alignment but not Nehru in the critical hours when the Chinese troops reached Bomdila. The Soviet Union not only maintained neutrality but was for discouraging China. The Soviet attitude was one of the reasons why the Chinese had to announce their withdrawal, though the compelling reason was that they realized that they had gone too far and that India was rallying to repel them. The growing understanding between India and the Soviet Union reached its climax in the Treaty of Friendship in 1957 leading to the dramatic developments in Bangladesh. The treaty will stay for a long time.

India's contact with the Soviet Union has meant close contact with the entire socialist world. China is a part of it, though she is trying to stand isolated and promoting her national interests in her own way. Yugoslavia is outside the Warsaw Pact with her place in the non-aligned world, with her earlier schism with the Soviet Union and her special problems of development and nationalities. The communist church has been long known to be not monolithic. There is a Polish road to socialism or a Rumanian road. But these are all socialist countries and go together, learning from each other and linked by the Warsaw Pact for security. India has had friendly relations with all the Soviet bloc countries with collaboration with each of them on a bilateral basis Peaceful coexistence has been long accepted as a cardinal principle of peace and international cooperation, but with planning in Indian conditions, India is in close contact with the socialist world especially because of her close interest in the course of socialism. The main attraction of the Russian Revolution to the Indian people was socialism and that pull is still powerful.

Proletarian internationalism is not now a compulsory doctrine as it was in Lenin's years of power, in Stalin's days or in post-Stalin days. Communism is not as international as it was; it is as nationalistic as any ideology except in the Soviet bloc. Moscow is not the central church, though it is central to communism. If the spirit of detente spreads and peace prevails, relaxation is possible and communist rigidities can slowly disappear. In Poland and other countries which are socialist or semi-socialist, the working class is feeling the need for economic and social democracy, and everywhere there is a revival of the human instinct for freedom. The communist world is holding together because of the common threat to its basic philosophy of social control and collectivization.

The Yugoslav variation on the centralized social control of the Moscow pattern has been of interest to Marxist and non-Marxist socialists. The Polish demand for self-management is a new assertion of working class consciousness seeking freedom for it from party control. It was thought that, as under Lenin, the party would remain the main instrument of social change. But party theory differs from party practice and it seems the party does not contain the core of the proletariat nor does it guide its destinies. There might be a dichotomy between the party bureaucracy and trade union bureaucracy. The worker as the primary producer seeks to be master of his fate, while the party as the ruling oligarchy may have other priorities. The gap between intellectual worker and the manual worker too has not been bridged and it remains to be seen whether it can ever be bridged. If within socialism itself there is class conflict, proletarian solidarity becomes difficult, and socialism is facing its basic problems. It does not mean that capitalism is the answer. Whatever the problems of socialism, there is a socialist world and its foundations are still strong.

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REVOLUTIONS IN CONFLICT

India and China may come together again into a working relationship, if not as close friends, if the exchange of leaders between the two countries leads to fruitful talks, especially on the border. The Chinese are accustomed to think in terms of centuries and the Indian people too can come to terms with time. But now a decade is equal to a century and the slow-moving East can move fast. It is natural for India and China to seek not only peace but friendship with each other which was disrupted so rudely in 1957. That conflict has not been sufficiently explained on the Chinese side. There were differences not merely on the border but ideologically and there were incidents. But the small library of books written on the subject by foreigners and Indians does not explain the Chinese side, and the suggestion that the conflict of 1957, which consisted mainly of a massive threat by the Chinese, was forced by India is one-sided. The size of the Chinese thrust has yet to be explained and what was happening inside the Chinese Communist Party is a closed book. Nor has the sudden withdrawal by the Chinese been explained, even if the sudden aggression could be, except that the Chinese realized that they had advanced too far and that they could not sustain it, in the face of Indian preparations for resistance, apart from hostile world opinion.

The somewhat sadistic pleasure taken by some commentators in the set-back that Nehru and his policies received is unfortunate and the description of the Chinese advance as India's defeat is not sustained by facts. All that has been written boils down to the fact that, whether India was sufficiently prepared or not, there was a failure of generalship on India's

part and that the Indian troops that were available in NEFA were not fully engaged, especially round the Sela Pass. There is a better historical perspective now, and when even the Chinese are prepared for it, Indians should not be reluctant to be as historical-minded about their own policies.

India and China are in contact with each other not only along the two-thousand-mile Himalayan border but throughout Southeast Asia. The invisible border is also important, for it has been the meeting place of two civilizations for centuries and now of two revolutions, representing two chosen ways of life. In Chinese conditions, communism was destined to succeed. The Soviet Union with its military might was in the background, the long-drawn-out civil war left the people without a strong national government, the Kuomintang regime was rotting with corruption, and the Japanese in their retreat left arms for the communists to gather. Mao Tse-tung, breaking the orthodox doctrines of Marxism-Leninism, organized the revolutionary possibilities of the peasants in degrading feudal conditions, and had been running a government for ten years in Yenan.

There was no strong defence against communism. Confucianism and Buddhism, with their emphasis on ethics, had impressed on the people a secular outlook which made them accept any political doctrine which promised a strong government. The human material was malleable and could be moulded by a political party with a ready-made and wholesale philosophy. When Emperor Shih Huang Ti, two centuries before Christ, unified the country and imposed one script and one language, whatever may be the dialects, he made it possible two thousand years later for communism to operate successfully in such a vast country. Nowhere is the temperature high any time in the year. India, with a stubborn social structure in which religion is interwoven, with a broad basis of unified and orderly government for about a hundred years only, and with a climate in which even Lenin would have wilted into a local revolutionary, is different. The Indian people are not clay for political potters; even if class ever re-emerges from caste, they may remain somewhat individualistic.

The Chinese civilization, like the Indian civilization, is ancient, massive, and continuous, and it is difficult to say which

is older. The Chinese have older records, while the proof of Indian antiquity lies in Mohenjodaro. Among Chinese philosophers, Confucius, with his emphasis on an ideal society, has had a permanent influence. Buddhism was taken to China through Sinkiang along the caravan routes probably in the early years of the Christian era and its influence lasted for nearly a thousand years. Buddhist scholars from China and India exchanged visits. Buddhist books in Pali were translated into Chinese. Buddhist temples and statues were built in several places and even rulers and noblemen became converts. Early in the twelfth century, Confucianism reasserted itself and Buddhism lost its influence. The commonsense of Confucius had a greater appeal than the metaphysics of Buddha to the materialistic, pragmatic Chinese mind. Without amounting to a religion, Confucianism prescribed a way of life in this world, discarding other-worldliness. After a challenge from western civilization in the nineteenth century, the Confucian way became an easy passport to the communist way of life. Like India, China seemed unchanging, with no change in the modes of production, but, without the measured liberalism of British rule, China was riper for violent revolution.

The first mood of China under communist rule was inevitably warlike, with the Kuomintang threatening invasion from Formosa and with constant danger of subversion. But soon the Chinese Revolution put on the smile of a Cheshire cat behind the benevolent looks of the fatherhood of Mao Tse-tung, not only China's leader but China's poet, philosopher and military genius. It seems the Chinese leaders had preserved the humanism and moralism of Confucian tradition. There was indoctrination everywhere but some doctrines were good, like loyalty to the country and care of public property. The people were to be persuaded, not coerced, and there were furious campaigns of conversion from corruption of every kind. The past was not to be repudiated wholly. Tang horses were repaired, Ming pottery was popularized, Peking Opera was used to present the revolutionary significance of old legends. The bells were ringing in temples. Behind the drab uniformity of grey, in which ministers and clerks were clothed to proclaim social equality, every gesture spoke of centuries-long civilization. Landlords were deprived of excess land but not liquidated

physically. Even by 1952, there were few cooperative farms. The Chinese Revolution, it seemed, had learnt from the mistakes of the Russian Revolution. A superior civilization was showing what it could make of Marxism-Leninism by adding the Thought of Mao.

The faith of the Chinese in the superiority of their race has been transmitted under Chinese communism, and it is seen in the attitude to other countries, including communist countries. After the first phase of recuperation, collectivization proceeded at a furious pace, and cooperative farms soon led not only to big leaps but to communes. There are various estimates of the triumphs and failures, but the tight regimentation of 800 million people, in which the women do a good share of the work, is a new type of totalitarianism. The schism in international communism is not a matter of doctrine but of clash of national interests, and what the rest of the world, including communist countries, is afraid of is the survival value of about 1000 million regimented people in a nuclear war.

The relations between India and China, which began with the introduction of Buddhism in China, about A.D. 67, were remote till the disappearance of Tibet as a buffer state brought China to the Indian border. Chinese aims are known to be ideological and not merely military. If the Chinese had not invaded India, coexistence would have seemed possible, and for several years Chinese leaders wanted India and other non-communist Asian countries to go their own way, if only they did not play the part of agents of the United States. In Southeast Asia, millions of Chinese live amidst the populations claiming to be citizens of China and are a prepetual source of subversion. India had colonies once in Southeast Asia and traces of Indian civilization are still strong in Thailand, Cambodia and Java. Thailand illustrates a dual cultural allegiance. Thai life has been deeply influenced by the Chinese as well as by Ramayana and Buddhism. Yet the Thais have reason to dislike the Chinese because they have gone communist and the Indians because they are not bound to the United States. India's sponsorship of China, for realistic and not ideological considerations, did much to confuse this part of the world more than others, and small countries, which do not trust big countries, are not prepared to choose between China and

India. Chinese strength and her assertion are feared, while the Indian way of life and Indian diplomacy appear soft and idealistic. Whether there is to be competition or coexistence between the influence that India and China can wield, it is not a rivalry merely between Indian and Chinese interests. India represents certain values and a democratic way of life, in spite of revolutionary urges, and China represents a communism which is at war even with the rest of international communism. It is a conflict between two revolutions. It is difficult to say how it will end, because nothing is certain about what happens inside the party, though Chinese leaders talk of reconciliation. India is not against reconciliation if it does not mean repudiation of her policies, including friendship with the Soviet Union.

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WEST ASIA AND PALESTINE

There had been contacts between India and the Arabs from ancient times, and even when the Arabs became Muslims, these contacts continued. The first big contact was when the Arabs came to India. The dismemberment of the Turkish Empire and of the Caliphate became an issue with Indian Muslims or with Muslims all over the world. When Gandhi took up the Khilafat issue, he identified the whole of India with Islam. Soon the Arabs became independent of Turkey, though their lands became mandates under the allied powers and the Caliphate was abolished. But India's identity with the Arabs became strong with the British mandate over Palestine and the Balfour Declaration promising a home for the Jews. The cause has been alive in a much more serious form and India is involved more than ever in West Asia. The oil wealth of West Asia in the present energy crisis has made this part of the world crucial for everyone.

Israel's 5 June 1967 aggression against the Arab states startled the world, but it did not wholly surprise it, following the aggression by which Israel had been created, the aggression of 1949, when after the armistice Israel had occupied Eilat, and the aggression of 1956. Israel's aggression this time was called a pre-emptive strike, but no such thing is recognized in international law. After the blockade of the Straits of Tiran, the U.A.R. was for peaceful means of action through the United Nations, and not for the abortive effort to get the maritime powers agree to a stand on the right of passage through the Straits of Tiran. Diplomacy could have settled everything, but Israel preferred aggression.

Israeli aggression, soon proved to have been pre-planned by

the admitted pre-emptive strike, had three basic purposes to serve, even if all of them may not have been intended by the Israeiis themselves. One purpose was to smash the progressive regimes in the U.A.R. and Syria; this was not served. The second purpose was to force the Arabs into accepting the existence of Israel, which had been created by imperialist machinations and could fill the role of an "imperialist bailiff"; this too was not served. The third purpose was to tighten imperialism's control over the Arab world, by extension of Israeli territory, guaranteeing to western monopolies unhindered exploitation of Arab oil for a long time to come, to put an end to Arab resistance to exploitation by international oil cartels on Arab soil, and to drive a wedge between the Arab countries and the socialist countries; this, again, was not served.

The Israeli ultras saw in Gen. Dayan's lightning military thrusts an opportunity of creating a Zionist empire extending from the Nile to the Euphrates, and urged the extension of Israeli rule to the territories on both sides of the Jordan river. Only half of the programme was realized in fact; but if this half was not undone, the other half might follow. Even oil-loving imperialists must see the danger to their interests if Israel kept Arab territories by force. There was often talk in Israel of making a choice between annexing the western part of Jordan along with the Sharm-al-Sheikh area, the Gaza strip, and the Galilee Hills or setting up a client state. Whatever the differences at the level of rulers or governments in the Arab countries the tendency towards unity at the grass-roots has grown. The Arab peoples have suffered from aggression by the Israelis in Arab lands several times in one generation, which they cannot forget. It was said that they had lost the battle of Palestine in 1947 despite the fact that there were seven states; they have now learnt that they lost because they were so many states.

The Security Council's unanimous call, following the June 1967 aggression, for an immediate ceasefire in West Asia as "a first step" served Israel's aggression and was not acceptable to the Arabs. As generally usual with it, the Security Council did not say who was the aggressor, though the Soviet Union and others noted that the ceasefire call was only a first step and said that Israel should be condemned for aggression and the

aggressor should be asked to pull back to the armistice demarcation lines. India sought to move for a ceasefire depending on withdrawal by both sides to the 4 June positions. But it was not acceptable. The unconditional ceasefire call could not have secured a unanimous vote but for some understanding that it was only the first step and the parties would have to pull back to the armistice demarcation lines or to the 4 June positions. The 22 November Security Council resolution called for withdrawal of aggression and has gathered wide support. The Arabs stand by it, but Israel does not.

India's position has been that Israel is the aggressor, and that, while the first step was a ceasefire, it had to be linked up with withdrawals so that the aggressor would be denied the fruits of aggression. By all accounts, it was Israel that had escalated the conflict and that was what Indira Gandhi said in both houses of Parliament. That was to put it mildly. India is not against the Jews. There is a pro-Jew sentiment amounting to a pro-Zionist sentiment in this country which has no relation to Indian tradition and to the long association of Indian nationalism with Arab nationalism. Even by the test of self-interest, during India's conflicts with other countries, the U.A.R. and other Arab states were helpful and friendly and not hostile. There is no gain in standing by an imperialist relic like Israel and alienating half a dozen Arab states, which are only fighting imperialism. The pro-Zionist sentiment is anti-Muslim sentiment in some cases and pro-American sentiment in others. There can be no sitting on the fence.

The war in West Asia affects India deeply, and she does not want war anywhere; but in working for peace, she cannot forget the rights and wrongs of a conflict. As a member of the Security Council, she had a responsibility then and she had to discharge it courageously. There was no sense in losing half a dozen friends for the sake of a doubtful friend who represented imperialism among the Arabs. Israel was born in conflict and it is for her to say if there is to be conflict around her always.

Indian nationalism always had close kinship with Arab nationalism and was never reconciled to the Balfour Declaration and its consequences. In 1928 at its Calcutta session, the Indian National Congress passed a resolution assuring "the Palestine Arabs of its full sympathy towards their struggle to

free themselves from the grip of western imperialism, which is a great menace to the Indian struggle". In 1937, the Congress strongly condemned "the imperialist machinations and the reign of terror unleashed with a view to forcing the Arabs into accepting the proposed partition of Palestine". Again in 1938, the Congress condemned British policy in Palestine and expressed its sympathy with the Arabs. At this time, Gandhi wrote that, while he had his sympathies, they did not blind him to the requirements of justice, and Palestine belonged to the Arabs and it was wrong to impose the Jews on them. Jawaharlal Nehru said that Palestine was an Arab country and Arab interests should prevail there. There is nothing new about India's present policy; it is a continuation of old policy.

The growth of the Jewish settlement in Palestine was due to the "practical" Zionists, who were opposed by the "political" Zionists, who insisted on the granting of a charter as an essential prerequisite for colonization. With the growing strength of the Young Turk nationalist movement in Turkey, especially after 1908, the prospects of obtaining a charter dimmed considerably. In 1914 there were about 90,000 Jews in Palestine, where the large majority of the population was Arab. There were 43 Jewish agricultural settlements with 13,000 settlers, many of them supported by Baron Rothschild. The situation changed with the outbreak of World War I. Zionist work in Palestine came to a standstill Turkey and Britain were at war and an opportunity offered itself to political Zionism to reassert itself and to combine the old British sympathies for Zionism with fresh political opportunities. As a result, the centre of the Zionist movement shifted from Germany, Turkey's ally, to London. The leadership passed to the Jews of Russian origin living in London; among them, Chaim Weizmann and Nahum Sokolow.

The Balfour Declaration is one of the Pandora's boxes of history. Weizmann and Sokolow were instrumental in causing a letter to be written by Arthur James Balfour, then British Foreign Secretary, to Lord Rothschild on 2 November 1917, declaring that "His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that

nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country." The British government hoped that a declaration in favour of Zionism would help to rally Jewish opinion, especially in the United States to the side of the Allies, and that the settlement in Palestine of a Jewish population attached to Britain would help to protect the approaches to the Suez Canal and the road to India. The Balfour Declaration fell short of the expectations of the Zionists, who had asked for the reconstitution of Palestine as "the" Jewish national home. Instead, the Balfour Declaration envisaged only the establishment "in" Palestine of "a" national home for the Jewish people. The Balfour Declaration was deceitful diplomacy, and the Zionists have enlarged its meaning.

When the Council of the League of Nations approved, on 24 July 1922, a British mandate over Palestine which included the Balfour Declaration in the preamble, and various provisions dealing with facilitating Jewish immigration, the mandate was officially interpreted in a statement of 3 June 1922, in which Winston Churchill, the British Colonial Secretary, announced that the declaration did not mean "the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole, but the further development of the existing Jewish community, with the assistance of Jews of other parts of the world in order that it may become a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride". His Majesty's Government, he announced, had not contemplated at any time, as appeared to be feared by the Arabs, "the disappearance or the subordination of the Arabic population, language, or culture in Palestine". This interpretation of the mandate was completely forgotten in subsequent years.

From the beginning the Arabs in Palestine bitterly resisted Zionism and the British policy supporting it. Several times they rose in revolt, especially in 1929 and in 1935-39, claiming the right of national self-determination, as they represented a large majority of the inhabitants, and demanding the preservation of Palestine as an Arab homeland. Therein they were supported by all the other Arabs. The British repressed the Arab rising

for independence, though indirectly recognizing the genuine character of Arab nationalism and Arab fears. They sent various commissions of inquiry and devised various schemes, culminating in the white paper of 17 May 1939, to reconcile the demands of the Arab population with the demands of Zionism for the control of Palestine.

In 1942 a Zionist conference in New York city demanded the establishment of a Jewish state in the whole of Palestine and unlimited Jewish immigration. This programme was endorsed by the Zionist organization. At the same time Arab nationalists throughout the Middle East intensified their demands for Arab rights. Britain submitted the case of Palestine first to Anglo-U.S. discussions for a solution and later to the United Nations, which proposed on 29 November 1947, partition of the country into an Arab state and a Jewish state and the internationalization of Jerusalem. But the state of Israel was proclaimed on14 May 1948, forcibly, and was immediately recognized by the United States. Armistice lines were negotiated under U.N. auspices giving Israel more territory than provided by the U.N. resolution. Thus half a century after the first Zionist Congress and thirty years after the Balfour Declaration, Zionism achieved its aim of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine. It has been enlarging itself by repeated aggressions, and the establishment of the state left several problems unsolved: its boundaries, its · onomic viability, its relationship to world Jewry, the settlement of the Arab refugees from its territory, its accommodation with the Arab world.

The November 1947 Security Council resolution is still there to be carried out, but Israel has remained intransigent. The big-four powers, especially the United States and the Soviet Union, are trying to work out peace, which will be as much in their interest as of the Arabs or of Israel, but Israel continues to be intransigent. King Hussein of Jordan offered some time ago a peace plan, on the lines of the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1947, but designed to dispel Israel's fears for its security as far as they are genuine. Israel is at war not with any Arab state but with the Arab world as a whole, and its claim to deal with each individual Arab state is meant to undermine Arab unity. If it is to be peace, it has to be peace for everyone concerned in the area.

The Arabs are prepared for peace on honourable terms, but if Israel is to be recognized as a fact, what kind of fact is it? Not even those who support the Arab case say it should be undone. It is not official Arab policy to undo it. What then is the essence of the West Asian problem? Some history will help. Britain, in control of Palestine for thirty years, committed herself under the Balfour declaration to encourage the establishment of a Jewish national home but subject to the rights of the existing population. Jewish and Arab opposition to it increased. There was a complete society in Palestine; but the aim of the immigrants was not to be absorbed into it but to create their own society with their farms and cities, institutions, and culture. A wholly Jewish economy was to be created, land bought with the aid of the Jewish National Fund became the inalienable property of the Jewish people and no non-Jew was to be ever employed on it. Political power and land power went together in West Asia, and the Arabs thought that if the Jews had power, they would occupy the greater part of the land, and that, therefore, they would take over power.

Zionism, whatever the background of Jewish suffering, was an expansionist idea, and as immigration went on, the threat became a certainty. In 1922 Jews formed 13 per cent of the population of Palestine, in 1947, 33 per cent. The idea of a Jewish national home turned into the idea of a Jewish state, in which Arabs would be reduced to a minority or refugee status. The Arabs wanted to preserve the Arab character of Palestine and wanted little or no Jewish immigration and the Jews wanted more and more of it. Britain, without a stable policy, abdicated, the United States backed the Jews, and the immigrants seized power in the greater part of Palestine. There were more and more immigrants and two-thirds of the Palestine Arabs lost their lands and homes. Israel was thus the child of violence. It is a fact but a forced fact.

The Israeli attitude was to refuse to consider the refugee problem unless the Arab states agreed to a peace settlement. There has been a vicious contradiction in this attitude. If Israel wanted more land for more immigrants it had to stop the return of the refugees; if it wanted peace with the Arabs, it had to take back the refugees. The refugee problem, apart

from repeated aggression, has been the essence of the Arab-Israeli conflict. If the Arab states have to end their state of belligerence, they have to see that the refugees are rehabilitated. As long as they are not, it is idle for Israel to call for direct talks for peace with the Arabs.

The United Nations passed a resolution every year calling for the return of or compensation for the refugees but no one has tried to carry it out. It was not a mass of individuals that fled in 1948; it was the greater part of society. Israel and the western powers have nursed the illusion that the refugees would melt away and there would be no Palestine problem but there has been a Palestine Arab nation or sub-nation, though scattered, with memories of a common land and language and common memories of suffering. The suffering of the refugees had its impact on the surrounding Arab states, where many families had connections with Palestine. The Arabs had cause to resent the western attitude and western double talk, sympathy for the rights of the Jews, who had suffered from western persecution and not Arab persecution, and apathy towards the rights of the Palestine Arabs. Israel was there to stay, but where were the Palestine Arabs to stay? There was talk of Israel's right to free navigation but no talk of the Arab refugees' right to return. Arab spokesmen have been accused of talking of throwing Israel into the sea; the Arab retort is that Israel has thrown a large number of Arabs into the desert.

The Arab states have naturally been united in their attitude towards Israel and received the support of Afro-Asian and Communist states. Israel was in a position to absorb the rest of Palestine and probably southern Syria and Lebanon. By her latest aggression, she has proved that there could be no end to her expansionism. No mediators are wanted by Israel and Arab states also can get on without mediators. It has, however, not been possible to argue for Israel's independence. The official policy of the Arab states has been not to destroy Israel but to return to the settlement of 1947 and get all the U.N. resolutions fulfilled; the state of active belligerence was to continue.

Israel, on the other hand, has followed a double policy, a policy of peace with the Arabs, if possible on its own terms,

a policy of war with the Arabs which might give larger territory and better frontiers. But better frontiers may mean fresh aggression. While many things have changed, the problem of the Palestine Arabs has not changed. If Israel is a fact, it will have to be a bi-national fact.

This has not been recognized in the Camp David agreement; though they eased Egypt's difficulties, loss of face and loss of territory. The other Arab states have not appreciated the humiliation inflicted on Egypt for its bravely bearing the brunt of fighting against Israel. An American initiative is necessary for a settlement in West Asia but the United States has not been able to get rid of the incubus of the Jewish vote. Israel continues to be intransigent.

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SOUTHEAST ASIA

Southeast Asia is a convenient name but it is not a homogeneous region like West Asia. The countries comprising the area may or may not include Australia and New Zealand, which are the outer bastions of the Commonwealth, and may touch the sprawling islands of the usually but not always peaceful Pacific Ocean. There are polyglot peoples and cultures in almost all the countries, India and China meeting throughout on invisible borders. Indians overseas do not claim dual citizenship, Nehru asking them soon after independence to choose between the country of their origin and the countries where they wanted to work and live. Communist China, like its predecessors, did not give up claims to the allegiance of overseas Chinese, most of them enjoying dual loyalties. This often led to conflicts especially in Indonesia between the Indonesians and the Chinese or in Burma between the Chinese and the Burmese. In Vietnam in recent years there has been a conflict between the Vietnamese claiming sovereign rights and the Chinese claiming occupancy rights without giving up their allegiance to China. If China became assertive because of the communist revolution and the independence and self-respect it gave to the Chinese, the Vietnamese, the Indonesians and others also gained their independence and asserted themselves against big-power hegemony. Vietnam's friendship with the Soviet Union is another provocation to China. The Vietnamese have always disliked China's big brotherly attitude.

India was involved in Southeast Asia from the moment she breathed the air of freedom. It was largely because of the foresight of Nehru. The Second World War had freed Southeast Asia from the older imperialism and threw it into the

grip of the conquering Japanese imperialism. This meant change of subjection and puppet regimes in some countries, but when Japanese colonialism was humbled, it meant the hastening of their freedom and, though temporarily, the return of the old imperialism. The Philippines, Indo-China, Malaya and Singapore, Indonesia, and Burma were submerged by the surging tide of Japanese imperialism, and it was slowly by a combination of sea and jungle warfare that country after country was liberated, though ultimately by the detonation of the atom bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It was not a transition from Japanese rule to freedom but from Japanese rule to rule by the old colonialisms which returned with American and British troops. But the whole of Southeast Asia was exalted by the exhilaration of the first taste of freedom though each country had to fight its own battles for freedom. Nehru's idealism and the emergence of free India were the stimulating factors. They provided inspiration and an example. But with frequent threats of big-power interventionism, he declared a kind of Monroe Doctrine for Southeast Asia.

Burma was liberated with the racing of Slim's armies to Mandalay and Rangoon. Aung San, who had been encouraged by the Japanese, was mowed down with his colleagues and U Thant and others guided the new Burma. Between India and Burma there was only the question of citizenship, no territorial or other claims. Malaya, liberated under the combined operations of Mountbatten's forces, had tremendous troubles from terrorism largely directed by the communists. She finally got rid of British tutelage by accepting a constitutional scheme suitable to a multi-racial society, consisting of the three great communities of Malays, Chinese and Indians, and reconciling the conflicting claims of monarchical states. India's relations with Malaysia have been happy and India has taken a special interest in the local Indian population. Singapore, under the long rule of Lee, has been an intrepid but happy partner in the Commonwealth. In Indonesia's freedom, India took deep interest from the beginning when the Indonesian leaders were fighting Dutch overlordship and the indifference of the United States. Apart from his personal interest and his sustained championship of Indonesia in international forums, Nehru,

after rousing the whole of Asia at the Asian Relations Conference even in the days of the Interim Government, called for a conference on Indonesia in Delhi, in which the collective effort was to facilitate Indonesian freedom and remove the last obstacles to it. The Bandung Conference was a boost to the new Indonesia, and in the first years of non-alignment, Indonesia and India worked closely.

Vietnam was a chapter in itself and her epic resistance to sustained U.S. onslaughts, in which more than one U.S. President was mauled, and in re-uniting the two Vietnams, compelled world recognition. Indian recognition was delayed by considerations of protocol, not by events, but there was never-failing Indian sympathy for Vietnamese resistance. Vietnam proved to be a nation of heroes, a David who felled Goliath, the Athens of Asia. The developments in Laos and Cambodia followed the developments in Vietnam and Vietnam could not have allowed a hostile Cambodian regime to work against the freedom of Indo-Chinese states or be the Trojan horse of Communist China or of any other country. This is what India has recognized in recognizing the Heng Samrin regime. The Philippines has been somewhat remote to India and the old contacts with the Philippines have intensified with the establishment of several pan-Asian institutions in the main island. Korea was an Indian absorption for many years, a hangover from British days. But why India took so much interest in Korea was explained fully by Nehru. India was a member of U.N. bodies dealing with divided Korea and was a good medium with China having established close ties with that country which was rapidly being conquered by communism. India took interest in Korea in the interest of peace and could help it. India did not intervene in Vietnam in the early days of the U.S.-Vietnam war or earlier because the Vietnamese people were sensitive and would not like the least suspicion of interference.

India has had bilateral relations with all the countries of Southeast Asia, and these have had to be bilateral relations because there has been no common organization among them. To set up a Southeast Asia bloc without China could be misunderstood by China and would be unrealistic and ineffective against her. Asia has made itself useful by discarding the ideology and armed

embellishments of SEATO, which India did not like as it was a part of the U.S.-sponsored military blocs and of the cold war. India has not hesitated to take a firm stand against regional arrangements which would be exclusive, would foster distrust and would not promote peace, but India has not hesitated to influence regional tendencies by discouraging cold war alignments and encouraging collective arrangements in conformity with U.N. policies. Even the Brezhnev doctrine, which sought to promote a Southeast Asian regional arrangement of collective security, was not encouraged by India because it might only exacerbate differences with China. Sino-U.S. arrangements are new in their rudimentary form but with the U.S. fleets navigating in the Indian Ocean and Pacific regions there is a threat to peace in Southeast Asia. India would not like to invite the cold war to this area.

Japan is a considerable power which may be dealt with as a part of Southeast Asia. The Japanese as a whole do not like militarism now and dread a nuclear nightmare, but there are militarist circles and pro-nuclear advocates who are watching the situation, resenting the humiliation suffered from the United States in the war and sultrily reacting to restrictions on armaments. With her high growth rate, Japan may turn from the attractions of an industrial power to those of a military power. Indo-Japanese relations are at a standstill, though Japan would like to capture Indian markets. Thailand in the west is a different type of country whose generals are ministers and ministers do business. Under U.S. influence and enjoying good foreign exchange position, with an easy flow of U.S. goods and exports of surplus rice, Thailand is not close either to China or to India.

The region remains as heterogeneous as ever, with India of 683 millions bound to spread her influence but not seeking to organize or lead the disparate group of nations, though, except politically, they are seeking ways of cooperation.

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AFRICAN FRIENDS

India's relations with Africa, the Dark Continent according to western mythology, were confined to what Stanley and Livingstone discovered there, how Indian settlers had settled down in the various countries, as tribes were called, cutting across natural divisions which the colonial powers of Europe had carved in a fit of frenzy. Imperial-minded colonizers and statesmen like Cambon, Chamberlain and Salisbury competed in this *safari*. If it had taken two decades for the imperialization of Africa, it hardly took more time for its liberation, while retaining its old unnatural and arbitrary boundaries.

Egypt, with memories of her ancient independence and civilization, was the first country to struggle against foreign rule--first Turkish and then British rule, the latter being called the Condominium. Egyptian nationalist and Indian nationalist leaders were fraternal leaders and Egyptian leaders appeared at Congress sessions. It was natural that, after the liberation of both India and Egypt and after the overthrow of Farouk's effete monarchy, Nehru and Nasser should become two important leaders of the non-aligned movement Ghana, the former Gold Coast, was freed soon after and found a forceful leader in Dr. Nkrumah. In other parts of Africa, like Kenya, Tanzania and North Rhodesia, Kenyatta, Nyerere and Kaunda, who had grown under the influence of Gandhi and the Indian nationalist movement, became the natural leaders of their countries and led them into the non-aligned movement, taking their place by the side of Nehru and learning, from India's example, ideas about planning and national development. Soon other African countries were liberated till Zimbabwe

could get rid of Ian Smith's white man's rule under the pressures of the Commonwealth, and Portugal had to let Angola and Mozambique assert their independence by revolutionary struggle. In the tortuous struggle of the Congo's achievement of freedom from Belgian rule and in Zimbabwe's constitutional settlement India played a mediatory and peace-keeping role, apart from places of localized unrest like Cyprus.

In West Africa, France had to abide by the spirit of the times and under De Gaulle's enlightened rule allowed Algeria to be free. Libya and Tunisia were liberated by the liquidation of the Italian Empire and Central Africa did not lag behind. The contrast between Arab Africa and African or tropical Africa continues and in countries like Sudan and Somalia it creates problems. But, whether there are Arabs or Africans, the problems are common and the urges desperate and, with varying emphasis, those countries are with the Afro-Asian solidarity group and in the non-aligned movement, and are now vociferous in the North-South dialogue. The tribal affiliation and growth of nationalism in these tribal societies are more a part of African history and affairs and not of Indian interest, except academically. South Africa, the area of Gandhi's earliest satyagraha campaigns, is the crux of Africa, politically and strategically. It has become the bastion of racism, the upholder of the out-of-date doctrine of apartheid, and the foothold of western powers with their lingering colonial instincts. The nearby pockets of imperialism have become independent states such as Lesotho, Botswana, Zimbabwe, apart from Angola and Mozambique, but South Africa is able to prevent the old German colonies under South Africa's mandate, now known as Namibia, from becoming independent. Namibia is subjected to South Africa's police and military surveillance. The several Indians in South Africa, allied to the African people fighting for racial equality, keep India's interests in South Africa alive, but India has been helpless, while South Africa flourishes as a military power with nuclear interests, remaining one of the bastions of the old colonialism.

India's strongest links, apart from Egypt and Sudan, are with Kenya, Tanzania, of which Zanzibar, with the Indian interest in the clove trade, is a part, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

There are other countries of only a little less importance such as Ghana, Algeria, Nigeria, Kinshasa. There is commonness of interests—political, economic and commercial, and even in the sphere of mass communication, and this means there is a wide diversification of diplomatic relations and exchange of visits. India is interested in maintaining links with a continent which has a large future and is now a live part of the international community. The interests are common and varied. Asia and Africa go together; so do India and the nearby free countries of Africa, and they all have the common object of fighting South Africa's stubborn racism. The liberation of the world cannot be complete unless all the people of South Africa are liberated.

India's interest is in bilateral relations and not in passing judgement on societies which are different from her and have had a different history. The main interest of the African countries, with their different colonial heritage and stages of economic development, is in more development. The agrarian and urban problems are difficult with the clinging colonial hangover and, in spite of the mass movements of the African peoples which have had some resemblance to the mass movement which Gandhi had initiated in South Africa, the problems of government have been daunting for lack of trained personnel in all spheres of life an of resources, for which they have to depend on the international monetary system. Education has a high priority and in most of the countries it naturally receives emphasis. The first results can be seen in the strident voices which are raised in international conferences by African representatives broadly falling into the French-speaking and English-speaking groups. Indian representatives have found Africans to be warm-hearted friends who can make hard-hitting speeches for common causes. If African and Asian representatives march together, the world may settle down to a new and more representative order than is possible at present. It is not surprising that several of the African countries are groping for equality without waiting for further development, as by the Arusha declaration of Tanzania, for equality is not only justice, economic and political, but an agent of de-tribalization, though in the process one-party regimes have become natural and effective instruments in the conditions of Africa.

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THE OTHER INDIA

India was extended beyond her territories for centuries, and it could be called some kind of conquest, political and cultural, particularly in South and Southeast Asia. But British India had no such conquests to defend except for some parts in Tibet. The problems of Indians, either in British or pre-Independence India, are looked upon as the problems of what has been called the other India or what can be called the concern of multi-racial societies. It is not a single problem. Indians in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania live in conditions different from those of Sri Lanka, Burma and Mauritius, and the conditions of Indians in South Africa are special. Similarly, Indians in Britain have their own problems. But there are common aspects and it is against this background that special problems can be understood.

In the pre-Independence period, Britain had the responsibility of protecting the Indian communities abroad, and it often took the form of feeble protests or formal protests as over the clove trade in Zanzibar. After Independence, the responsibility has been that of the Government of India. The protests are now more vigorous and retaliation is easy. Following the nationality rules under the Indian Constitution, Nehru laid down from the beginning the broad policy that Indian settlers abroad must opt for Indian citizenship or for the citizenship of the countries in which they lived and which were becoming rapidly free. To be an Indian citizen, a person must have his domicile in the territory of India, or he must have been born in India, or he must have been resident in the territory of India for not less than five years before 26 January 1950. While most Indians abroad thus could not get Indian citizenship,

many of them had not acquired the nationality of the countries of their domicile. The hangover of this essential problem is to be found in many countries.

It is difficult to keep pace with statistics in this world in which emigration and immigration are in a flux. According to recent estimates, there are about ten million Indians living abroad, of them more than six million and a half are nationals of the countries in which they reside. The next largest group are Indian nationals, British nationals outside Britain, numbering about forty thousand, and over a million stateless. Of the ten million Indians overseas, over six million are in South and Southeast Asia; and a million and a half are in Africa, including Mauritius, and over a million in the Caribbean. In West Asia there are three million, in Britain, Australia and New Zealand over 600,000, in North America about 45,000. Thus Indian communities live in all continents of the world.

The old nostalgia remains. The Ramayana lives all over the Indonesian Islands. In Thailand, the Ramayana is the old testament and Buddhism the new testament. The overseas Indian problem arose in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries when large numbers of Indians migrated to several British colonies to work on plantations in near conditions of slavery. The abolition of slavery in the British Empire, the refusal of the freed slaves to work on plantations in the West Indies, a similar refusal of t' local population to work on railway construction projects in East Africa and mining projects in South Africa, and the demand for cheap labour elsewhere and almost everywhere provided employment opportunities to the poor Indian peasants who were ready to emigrate to any place in the world. The indenture system, under which they worked, was almost a form of slavery, but they worked hard and made the plantation economy a success. The Indian traders who followed the colonial flag were enterprising and became competitors with British business first and with African business later. This invited restrictions and in certain countries Indians could not buy land; with the rise of racialism, Indians were segregated and driven into the arms of the Africans and the hospitality of ghettoes. The abolition of the indenture system in 1920 remained a major irritant, and racial discrimination was the dominant policy in South Africa, which was the

theatre of Gandhi's earliest satyagraha campaigns. But the discrimination has remained.

The Indians have, however, been looked upon as camp-followers of the colonial powers, as far as the African population was concerned. It was only the liberation of almost all colonies that established an idea of the kinship of Indian and other newly free citizens, backed by India's own liberation and identity of outlook and interests, fostered by the non-aligned movement, the conversion of the British Empire into a Commonwealth, and the common demand of the developing countries for a share in development In the post-Independence situation, India was liberated and was independent, free and equal, and other African and other countries also became free. Whatever the earlier faults of the Indians, there is now a new concept of equality, though economic exploitation has not been erased. The integration or acceptance of multi-racial societies in independent states, however, raises problems like political and economic domination, following division into majorities and minorities.

In Guyana and Trinidad, Indians are in a majority, slightly more than fifty per cent of the population, but economically and politically they are handicapped. In Guyana, the African minority has an edge over the Indians because it is urban and almost hundred per cent literate. They constitute only thirty per cent of the population but they occupy 73 per cent of the positions in the security forces and 53 per cent in the civil services; only 55 per cent of the Indians are literate and have on the whole remained rural. There is discrimination against the small traders among them. Under Cheddi Jagan's Progressive People's Party their condition improved, but after a brief spell in office they had to give way to rule by African and other races with Burnham's People's National Congress. In similar conditions in Trinidad, the Indians rally round the Democratic Labour Party and the Africans support the People's National Movement. In these two countries, the Indians, in their life of isolation, have lost much of their Indianness. In the conflict of races, they are turning inwards and rejecting modernization.

In Fiji, at the other end, Indians constitute 51 per cent of the population and play a dynamic part in the country's

economy. The only industry and export commodity in the country is the sugar industry and Indians grow almost the whole sugar-cane. They have taken to education, though they came as illiterate, indentured labourers, and often have occupied good positions as ministers and officials. But the Fijians receive preferential treatment, 98 per cent of the land is owned by them and is rendered inalienable, while the Indians have only leases of thirty years. Even in education, Fijians receive preferential treatment. Strikes are illegal. The conflict of races is sometimes so bitter that the Fijian National Party once asked for repatriation of all Indians. Indian interests are represented by the National Federation Party. The other races and rich Indian sugar-cane growers are in the Alliance Party. Indians feel their future is bleak and some of them seek to migrate to the United States and Canada.

Indians form the majority in Mauritius but lack economic power. The country's commercial and industrial establishments are mostly owned and managed by the tiny minority of French Mauritians. The class conflict is turned into a racial one by the Creoles joining the French Mauritians to contain the Indian majority. The non-Indians were opposed to grant of independence to Mauritius, fearing the emergence of Indians as the dominant group, as it has happened under Ramgoolam and his Labour Party, while the rest have rallied round the Mauritian Social Democratic P. .y under the Creole, Duval. The radical youthful Movement Militant Mauriciess stands for an experiment in multi-racialism. The Partition of India divided the Indians in Mauritius, as in Fiji

British East and Central Africa attracted Indians mainly as traders, big and small, soldiers, policemen, skilled workers and clerks. Unlike indentured labourers, they were free men receiving salaries. Indians were encouraged to stay and enjoy the monopoly of internal trade. Africans were forbidden to trade or to cultivate commercial crops, which became a European preserve. Indians had an advantage over Africans in all walks of life subject to the dominance of the European community. The Asians, however, did not mix with the Africans and did not promote African interests; they were reluctant to take local citizenship and repatriated money to safer countries in Africa, if not to home countries. The Africans retaliated.

In Tanzania all businesses were nationalized. In all the countries, Africans were recruited to the public services on a preferential basis. Africanization was an anti-Indian move and the British were left untouched. Even Indians who identified themselves with African interests were not spared. For certain skills and capital, Asians were spared.

The Indian minority in South Africa is small but substantial. Several of the Indian indentured labourers have become independent traders and professionals. The majority of them are, however, discriminated against, some belonging to the middle classes and some to the upper classes. Their identification with the Africans in the political struggle is recent and it has to be intensified.

In Sri Lanka, Burma and Malaysia, there are substantial Indian populations but politically and economically weaker than the majority communities. They mostly went to these countries as plantation labourers and have been subjected to discrimination. The non-Indian majorities are substantial and whatever they do looks legitimate and carries legal authority. In Sri Lanka, Ceylonization has affected Indians, and where Indians predominated that section of the economy was Ceylonized. But in one part of the island, they are concentrated, and are able to make their presence felt. In Burma, most Indians were urban labourers, apart from a large community of big traders, moneylenders and officials. Burma was once a part of India but is now independent and nationalization was inevitable but it led sometimes to expulsion. Though Malaysia is supposed to be multi-racial, the Malays have a pre-eminent place in the country and get preference even in education. The Chinese dominate the economy as traders, industrialists and professionals, and Indians who originally went as indentured labourers and are non-citizens suffer most, and, in spite of the Malaysian Indian Congress, they have not been able to keep for themselves enough importance, as they should if they are to remain even as the third community.

In Britain, the post-war labour shortages led to Indian immigration, and while it is not popular, the British feel that there has to be control of immigration, unless integration of the existing Indians is complete. A large number of Indians are in the National Health Service and a considerable number are

manual labourers. Several of them own houses. The Race Relations Board looks after complaints of discrimination The immigration which increased in the fifties has to be controlled or may go on and create complications. The controversial new Nationality Bill is a consequence and race riots have become common. In the United States, Canada and Australasia, only skills and expertise are needed and Indians are no threat to their culture, politics or economy. In the Gulf countries, they are not yet much of a problem.

There is need for expansion of the activities of the Indian missions abroad for the purpose of looking after Indians there, apart from other purposes. There is need for a deeper analysis too of the problem of Indians overseas The main interest of Indians should be in the countries where they live; they should be a part of the environment. They have to choose. Culturally, they have to imbibe whatever comes from the rest of the world. Politically, they cannot have it both ways. Indians are but a part of humanity and they must take their part in the war for its liberation. They must be different from Chinese overseas, who are encouraged to look to the motherland and consider themselves Chinese citizens.

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INDIA AND THE WORLD

India's relations with the rest of the world can be summarized as India's relations with the United Nations. The United Nations, though still not as united as it should be, is a step in aid of world federation, which is as distant as ever because nuclear power has not outdated national sovereignty but made it stronger. The League of Nations, conceived in idealism and nearer to the earlier dreams of United Nations, lived only for about twenty years, weakened by the boycott of the United States and the ostracism of the Soviet Union. The United Nations, conceived in realistic terms and based on the post-Second World War realities, has lasted longer and is a going concern in spite of the disappointments it has caused. It is difficult to change its structure to reflect the new realities; but for some reform of the Security Council, it stands for the status quo and revision of the U.N. Charter is slow. The League of Nations went down under the strain of unrealized dreams and an unjust post-Versailles structure. The United Nations is slow in responding to the needs of the member-nations but it has preserved the world from the danger of a major war either because it has known that such a war would be disastrous for everyone or because the principle of five-power unanimity, though based on segregation of the big powers from the small, has prevented any of the powers from allowing a war against itself or against others.

India put great faith in the U.N. Charter from the beginning, filling it with her own idealism. The big powers, apart from the Soviet Union, may have been interested mainly in defence of the status quo but India's aims were to strengthen peace

and security, to promote disarmament and work for the liquidation of the remaining pockets of colonialism. Peace and security have been achieved on the whole, though disarmament has made no progress, while nuclear and other arms are being piled up, colonialism has on the whole been liquidated, though it returned in the form of neo-colonialism. It has not been a peaceful or even record. Whatever have been the objectives of other small or middle powers, with the big powers clinging to their colonialisms as far as they could, India took a lead in fighting for liquidation of colonialism, wherever it existed. In this effort, she could work with like-minded powers, particularly the newly free nations, for the freedom of the biggest colony like India and other countries could not but lead to the freedom of other countries. India found herself naturally a leader among the members of the Afro-Asian group, which became a force after Bandung, and among the members of the non-aligned bloc, especially after the first non-aligned summit in Belgrade. India did not succeed equally well in all her three objectives, but the records of U.N. debates, both in the Assembly and its various committees and of the Security Council, apart from the commissions and Specialized Agencies, show that she was indefatigable in her effort and that her interest was unflagging.

There could be no prevention of small wars following local conflicts, with the big powers only showing a spirit of self-abnegation to avoid a major war which could be calamitous. The Security Council and the General Assembly could not prevent repeated Israeli aggression against the Arabs and could not punish her or make her vacate her aggression. There had to be a near major war over Korea, and there was a prolonged war in Vietnam. Even the liberation of colonies like the Congo, Zimbabwe or Mozambique and Angola required wars. Cyprus and West Asia were other threatres of war. In all these conflicts, India not only took interest in the framing or passing of appropriate resolutions but took the risk of participating in peace-keeping operations, for which she was preferred as much as Scandinavian countries for her probity and impartiality. Thimayya and Gyani in Cyprus and Gaza, Rajeshwar Dayal in the Congo and Zimbabwe did notable work, in spite of the heartaches and disappointments. The United Nations can

be said to have acted in aid of the time-spirit in the liberation of the world. Blood has been shed because of the reluctance of the colonial powers but this stands to the credit of the United Nations. Only, South Africa still stands as the stronghold of racial inequality and apartheid. From its dungeons can still be heard the sharpest cries of humanity, of Nelson Mandela and others.

The United Nations has been able to do little for disarmament and peace is precarious, though deterrence is the effective part of it, and whatever it has done for development and the distribution of surpluses among the nations of the world equitably has been a prolonged and painful affair. The Group of 77 has been battering at the doors of the developed nations for justice and equality, the developed and developing nations are ranged into North and South carrying on a dialogue perpetually, and Brandt and others have blown their bugles, but there is little progress. An international economic order is as distant as an international political order, making nonsense of the new talk of an international information order. Against the arrayed vested interests of the developed world, the Soviet Union offers tempting means by which developing nations can become independent and self-reliant. But the developed world does not want to encourage socialist measures. India finds an escape from U.N. agencies, economic and financial, in seeking self-reliance in bilateral relations.

The United Nations can do something and has done something but it has not made national effort unnecessary, for it can do only what so many member-nations can enable it to do. It is largely a forum, where secret diplomacy has been largely displaced by diplomacy by conference and debate, and an agency of action only to a small extent. It is not a sovereign agency, not a state. It is not an effective inter-governmental agency. As an inter-governmental agency it has limitations in even following up its own resolutions. Every member-nation, howsoever big or small, enjoys sovereign equality and the smallest country has one vote as India has in the General Assembly, though the Security Council is based on the power pattern. The increasing assertiveness of the General Assembly with growing membership from the Afro-Asian group has been annoying to the United States and other big powers. But even the democratic

base of the General Assembly with its noisiness is not able to project the still vague aspirations for the representation of peoples instead of nations transcending the tensions of national sovereignty. Still, the United Nations is worth the real and artificial importance it is enjoying. It is worth keeping it going as a show and it is worth watching its fitful exertions. Like the League of Nations, it may have made peace fashionable, though the challenges to peace are now far more dangerous because of the nuclear possibilities, though outer space exploration has added new dimensions to everything.

There is no prospect of a world government yet. At least if there is realization of one world and what it can achieve for peace and development, India's dreams will not look like being unrealizable dreams. India has faith in one world, and, for lack of any other enduring faith, she has to work for one world which she can do only through the United Nations. The human race is one for this country and India is not only living up to the dream of her oldest philosophies and philosophers but is a proof that she is above all a country of humanists. This ideal should sustain her in this tormented world with the closing of one country and the opening of another.

The two worlds, of which Mathew Arnold spoke, may be many more worlds now, some dead and dying and some struggling to be born. To the terrors of space and time must be added the terrors of technology which India with the rest of the world must face. The meaning of the centuries that man has passed and will pass through is not clear except in terms of the great philosophers of the universe. The values of the market-place have invaded the precincts of government and the temples of learning. Will the world ever become one before it meets other worlds? Will India contribute to it? Between micro-history and macro-history India must think in terms of the thousands of years ahead and do her bit for the future of man amidst the lingering hope of her dreamers and the prayers of her silent seers.

EPILOGUE

The attempt in this book has been to trace the evolution of India and its broad features. It has not been possible to do it in detail. It is also as difficult to sum up the contents of the book as it is to sum up India. It is no longer possible to identify the Hindu view of life with the Indian view of life, as many leading philosophers and poets like Rabindranath Tagore have done. Even Dr. Suniti Kumar Chatterjee, a leading Indian scholar of this century, says:

> We should look upon the Pilgrim's Progress of Humanity as being essentially one. In this Great Quest which mankind has undertaken, ever since Man became conscious of his intellectual heritage, India, in her own way, has made a great contribution. In formulating this contribution of hers, from the very fact of genesis as a people, she has had to take note of the thoughts and ideas and actions and behaviours of so many different peoples, and take note of them in a sympathetic and an all-embracing spirit, and that is what has given the basic tone or colour to the culture of India, as representing a Great Synthesis, the philosophical as well as spiritual and the mystical as well as practical expression of which is the sum-total of all the philosophies which developed in India, with the great ideals of the Vedanta looming in the background and even forming the basis.

Then Dr. Chatterjee gives quotations from early Indian literature as terse, aphoristic expressions of the way of life he describes.

This way of life is essentially the Hindu way of life, which absorbed many races and religions which came to India. But it was a way of life applicable to India before the coming of the Muslims. The impact of Islam was powerful and has invest-

ed India with a duality, which along with western and other influences, has added to the compositeness of the culture of India. In dealing with India's evolution, this compositeness and the inevitable secularism have been dealt with to fix for India her place in the modern world. The nuclear age is different from the Vedantic age, in the perils that the countries of the world have to face.

The unity of India amidst her diversities has been emphasized, probably over-emphasized, from time to time. At every stage, it is the diversities that are coming to the fore. Is it because they have been understressed and even ignored so far, or, with the achievement of national freedom, are the diversified forces seeking expression? The north-east cannot be dismissed, as it was once, as a tract of tribes; these are now demanding self-expression. Why is Sikhism taking extreme forms for self-expression? Why are the Dalits becoming more and more demanding? It has been free India's misfortune that she took over wholesale some of the nomenclature of the British. The Scheduled Castes have been lumped and damned together because the British put them in some schedule. The Scheduled Tribes are not treated as national minorities as they are in some countries, but, because the British put them in some schedule, they are being treated as tribes professing a sub-human culture to be left to anthropologists.

Even now, there is no attempt at understanding some missing factors of Indian history. Jainism is a living faith professed by many persons and Buddhism is also at least partly a living faith. But why and how was Buddhism practically driven out of the land of its birth, and why should people call themselves neo-Buddhist? Buddhism as a powerful protestant movement is being ignored in a land which requires Buddhism, if it requires anything. Gandhi absorbed some of the living principles of Jainism, Buddhism and Christianity, and while even Gandhi is not considerd relevant now, non-Hindu faiths are becoming relevant, particularly since Hinduism was Brahminized and has come to mean Brahminism.

The effort to establish India as a secular state with a modern outlook has degenerated into a caricature. of secularism, socialism, planning and an independent foreign policy. For this one need not go back to religion or philosophy; one has

only to ask what have been the consequences of Gandhi, Nehru or Indira Gandhi, the three protagonists of three recent identifiable epochs. It should be the work of historians as relentless as history to ask and answer, for corruption has become the law of life and it is no use talking of the one God or the Hindu or Islamic way of life. Corruption has become almost a way of life, in pursuit of money and power. The distortions of Indian democracy have been recorded in this book, but that is not enough. There should be more of identification and more of idol-breaking.

Why has money become so powerful an agent of every human activity? Even god-men, apart from the politicians who patronize them, are ruled by money. The ideals of youth are money and power, and if this is the stage at which India has arrived after some centuries of wisdom and some epochs of high endeavour, is there hope ahead? Where did Gandhi fail? Where did Nehru fail? Where is Indira Gandhi failing? The moral fibre is shattered and we are a nation without character.

It is for our historians, sociologists, economists and political scientists to tell us. The far-seeing, fearless men who can see with insight can be only men of integrity, and though they may be few, they have a duty to analyse inexorably, pronounce judgements, and warn before it is too late. Conformity and submissiveness have become too common. Dissent is a paramount need, and this book will have served its purpose if it provokes awareness and the need for non-conformity.

[illegible] a future of fairly stable prosperity for [illegible] And, yet, a paralysis holds the system and [illegible] the fragile framework of democratic functioning built up over [illegible] years of freedom. Romesh Thapar, who has spent some forty [illegible] commenting on and analysing the triumphs and failures of [illegible] the problem of his country's future and shows how it can be [illegible] by more coherent thinking and more determined management at [illegible]. The ideas contained in this book—from the call for smaller States [illegible] for a system of hire and fire to re-establish responsibilities; [illegible] on civil liberties and human rights to the emphasis on [illegible] the poverty of so many millions of our people; from the [illegible] vision of what is needed to the calculations of classes, castes and communities; and from the political/economic compartments of today to the [illegible] which must take place tomorrow—are not new or original. They draw on the experience of other systems and other peoples, relating this experience to the continental dimensions of India.

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